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Abstract 
Over the past 50 years, strong social norms have developed in Western societies that 
encourage people to curb the overt expression of prejudice and stereotypes based on 
social categories such as gender and race. Yet, approaches applying new measurement 
of stereotypes, focusing on implicit evaluations and beliefs that are not under conscious 
control, suggest that such suppressed thoughts are not simply eliminated but may leak 
out in more subtle ways. Recent work has demonstrated that one of the subtle ways is 
through feature-based stereotyping. Regarding the issue of women’s 
underrepresentation in STEM fields, we argue that instead of referring to gender-based 
stereotypes, students may look to other characteristics (e.g., empathy) as a feature-based 
cue to determine whether they fit the image of particular careers. 
The main purpose of the PhD project was to develop a new Implicit Association Test 
(IAT) to explore people’s unconscious feature-based stereotyping of empathy in 
scientists. It was comprised of three stages. In the first stage, the procedure of how to 
systematically design and computerize the online Science-Empathy IAT (SE-IAT) was 
presented. In the second stage, psychometric properties of the newly developed SE-IAT 
were examined and issues with the original SE-IAT were addressed by modifying the 
test to the Single-Category SE-IAT (SSE-IAT). In the third stage, comparisons between 
implicit and explicit attitudes were made using the modified SSE-IAT and self-report 
questionnaires.  
Results showed that implicit and explicit stereotypes were distinct constructs. Despite 
the self-report positive attitudes, participants demonstrated implicit bias against 
empathy in scientists. Moreover, different gendered patterns, as well as variations by 
major subject, were also observed for implicit and explicit stereotypes. Finally, explicit 
stereotype, but not implicit stereotype, was found to relate to scientific career 
aspirations. These findings indicate that the ‘socially clumsy’ image of scientists may 
still be a deeply embedded stereotype amongst University students in England. 
Interventions such as counter-stereotyping role models are in demand to attract more 
people to pursue science.   
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
With the rapid development of science and technology, every country in the world 
needs more skilled scientists and engineers to keep pace with the times. This demand 
will not be met unless great efforts are made to recruit and retain women in science, 
technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) careers. Although the number of 
women obtaining undergraduate degrees have increased drastically in “soft” scientific 
fields such as in Life Science and Medicine, the gender gap remains wide in Physical 
Science, Mathematics, Computer Science as well as Engineering which have the 
reputation of requiring a high level of mathematical skill and of being “hard” sciences 
(UCAS, 2017).  
 
Apparently, there is no single explanation for the lack of gender diversity in math-
intensive STEM fields. Early studies often placed emphasis on gender difference in 
mathematical ability and academic achievement in STEM subjects. However, evidence 
has shown that men and women have equal intrinsic aptitude for mathematics and 
sciences (Spelke, 2005) and girls even outperform boys at GCSE, A-level and degree 
standards in most STEM subjects (UCAS, 2017). Gender differences in subject 
interests have been shown to be socially constructed, not biologically based (Archer et 
al., 2012; Leaper, Anderson, & Sanders, 1998; Rudman & Phelan, 2010). Under such 
circumstances, recent work has switched its attention to social and psychological 
factors that may constrain women's preference and choices rather than biological sex 
differences in scientific competence.  
 
Existing evidence has shown that there is a mismatch between women's gender role and 
the image of scientists (Cheryan, Siy, Vichayapai, Drury, & Kim, 2011). A robust 
finding is that people tend to depict scientists as “a middle-aged man wearing a white 
coat and glasses who conducted dangerous experiments alone in a laboratory” (Finson, 
2002; Steinke et al., 2007). In contrast, a feminine gender role usually includes traits of 
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being warm, gentle, empathetic, sensitive, soft-spoken, as well as concerned about hair 
and makeup (Williams & Best, 1990; Worell, 2001). Though we can clearly see a gap 
between female gender role and the image of a scientist, it remains unknown which 
specific characteristic of the stereotypical image of scientist steers women away from 
STEM fields.  
 
One phenomenon that has attracted my attention is that women tend to rate themselves 
higher in self-report empathy than men (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983), whereas physical 
science, computer science as well as maths majors usually rate themselves lower in 
self-report empathy than those majoring in other subjects (Baron-Cohen, 2002; Manson 
& Winterbottom, 2012). Empathy, as a key social skill, is regarded associated with arts 
and humanities careers. It is possible that women do not prefer certain science careers 
not because they are incapable of the careers, but because they have better perceived 
empathy than men thus are more reluctant to be seen as “solitary geniuses” who are 
lacking in empathetic skills.  
 
In this case, it is considered intriguing to investigate how people view empathy in 
scientists as well as whether stereotypes about empathy in scientists are related to 
science career aspirations. Though existing research has documented a pervasive 
stereotypical quirky image of scientists, very few empirical studies have been 
conducted to investigate contemporary stereotypes about empathy in scientists in 
particular. There is furthermore a shortage of reliable instruments to capture stereotypes 
of empathy in scientists.  
 
In order to bridge this research gap, the present PhD project aims to develop a new 
measurement to assess stereotypes of empathy in scientists. It is important to 
differentiate between implicit and explicit stereotypes: explicit stereotypes are beliefs 
and attitudes people know they hold, subject to deliberate (often strategic) control in 
their expression (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995). In contrast, implicit 
stereotypes are unconscious beliefs and attitudes that are inaccessible to introspection 
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(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Explicit stereotypes are often measured by self-report 
questionnaires and participants can alter their answers. Implicit stereotypes are assessed 
via different reaction time to stimuli that are either paired in a stereotypical way (e,g., 
empathy and humanities) or not (e.g., empathy and science) and participants have 
difficulty altering their immediate spontaneous reactions. The present study examines 
both implicit and explicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists. 
 
Before providing an overview of the thesis structure, it is important to explain why I 
was interested in conducting such research. Being born in mainland China in 1991, I 
am the so-called one-child generation when China had a compulsory birth control 
policy according to which married couples were allowed to have only one child. Despite 
the proclamation made by Mao Zedong, the founding father of the People’s Republic 
of China, that “women hold up half the sky”, Chinese families preferred having sons 
instead of daughters (Gu & Li, 1995). The belief that girls are inadequate and of lesser 
value than boys is deeply rooted in our culture and influences people’s attitudes and 
behaviours in various ways. Taking myself as an example, my grandfather was 
disappointed on the mere fact that I was a girl when I was born. During my middle 
school years, it was almost a consensus by most teachers that though boys obtained 
lower grades than girls, they were actually smarter and would surpass girls, especially 
at STEM subjects, as long as they started to devote more time on study when they 
entered high school. As a top student and a girl at the same time, I felt threatened by 
such stereotypes and struggled with the concern that I could have fallen behind boys at 
later stages. As a result, I gave up Maths and Physics soon after I entered high school.  
 
As China became more and more open to the world, I dreamt to study in the UK which 
I supposed to be a place where gender equity had been achieved. With such belief in 
my heart, I started my postgraduate study in Cambridge and became aware that, in spite 
of the drastic decrease of overt expressions of stereotyping and discrimination, gender 
equity is still an issue in Western societies and unconscious biases about women as well 
as many other social groups are still widespread. It seems imperative to me that more 
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empirical research should be conducted to uncover people’s underlying biases toward 
different social groups in order to create awareness for persistent implicit stereotypes. 
While there are a variety of topics involved in unconscious stereotyping, my personal 
experience led me to focus on gender stereotypes and stereotypes of scientists. As few 
measures were developed to capture implicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists to date, 
I felt it would be meaningful to develop a new implicit instrument to capture 
unconscious biases about empathy in scientists to lay a solid foundation for further 
research looking at the potential influence of such stereotypes on career choices. The 
following paragraph outlines the structure of this thesis as well as the three stages of 
the present study. 
 
The following Chapter 2 demonstrates the context of the present study and Chapter 3 
contains critical reviews of relevant literature. This main research consists of three 
stages. In Stage one (Chapter 4), a new instrument applying the Implicit Association 
Test (IAT) paradigm to assess stereotypes of empathy in scientists is designed and 
developed. In Stage 2 (Chapter 5), the newly-developed IAT is examined and modified 
to address the discovered psychometric issues. In Stage 3 (Chapter 6), the modified IAT 
and self-report questionnaires are applied to investigate individual differences in the 
implicit and explicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists as well as the interplay of these 
stereotypes in science career aspirations. Results of Stage 2 study are discussed against 
psychometric criteria for implicit measures and results of Stage 3 study are discussed 
with reference to existing findings and theories about implicit and explicit stereotyping. 
Finally, a general discussion of the summary of findings, the contributions and 
limitations of the present PhD project are presented in Chapter 7.  
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Chapter 2  Context of the study  
The main purpose of this chapter is to delineate the context of the present study and 
justify why it is important to study stereotypes of scientists. This chapter starts with a 
brief overview about the remaining gender gap in “hard” science fields (e.g., physics 
and computer science) in the UK, followed by a review of the potential explanations 
for women's underrepresentation in these fields. Based on the existing empirical 
evidence, some of the explanations are considered no longer valid and the potential 
influence of stereotypes on women's interests in science has received much recent 
attention. On that basis, justifications for the topic of the present study are demonstrated 
to provide the foundation for further literature review on related studies. 
2.1. The current gender gap in certain STEM fields in the UK 
Over the past 50 years, the number of women obtaining undergraduate degrees has 
significantly increased across a wide range of scientific disciplines in the UK. In the 
1960s, all scientific disciplines were male dominated (Ceci & Williams, 2010). Today, 
more than half of all undergraduate degrees in life science and medicine are awarded 
to women. As shown in Figure 2.1 below, according to the report from the Higher 
Education Statistics Agency (HESA, 2018), women occupied 58% in Medicine & 
Dentistry, 77% in Veterinary Science, 63% in Agriculture, and 63% in Biological 
sciences among UK undergraduate degree holders in 2016/17. However, despite an 
upward trend in growth of female undergraduates in the STEM fields, women still 
remain the minority in other math-intensive subjects, including Physical Science (41%), 
Mathematical Science (37%), Computer Science (17%), and Engineering & 
Technology (18%). The recently released UCAS acceptance data also showed that 
women represent only 25% of the acceptances in Physics, Computer Science and 
Engineering in 2016 – a figure that has remained unchanged since 2007 (UCAS, 2017). 
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Figure 2.1 Undergraduate science qualifications obtained by students in the UK 
by gender, 2016/17. Data retrieved from HESA, 2018. 
 
Statistics published by Eurostat in June 2017 show similar trends in subjects studied by 
women and men in higher education across the European Union countries. In 2015, 
women occupied only 26% of students studying engineering, manufacturing and 
construction related subjects and 38% in physical sciences, mathematics and computer 
science. In the same year, 78% of students studying education and 72% of students 
studying health related subjects were women.  
In addition, there is another issue that has been referred to as the “leaky pipeline” 
whereby the number of women continues decreasing at the later stage of the pathway 
in STEM academia and also across STEM industry (Alper, 1993). The wider trend is 
that some female STEM participation decreases as the seniority of positions increases 
(Resmini, 2016). For example, according to the annual report provided by the Women 
in Science and Engineering (WISE) campaign, in 2014, 71% of male engineering 
graduates who were in employment went into engineering occupation, compared with 
58.7% of female graduates in the UK (WISE, 2015). More recent data in 2016 also 
showed that only 8% of the UK's engineering workforce are women – the lowest 
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number across all the EU countries (Morgan, Kirby, & Stamenkovic, 2016). Women 
also represent only 17% in IT professionals and 19% in IT Technicians (WISE, 2017). 
It is therefore clear that women are still underrepresented in the most mathematically 
intensive fields – engineering, physics, mathematics, and computer science in higher 
education and workforce, despite the fact that women have actually outnumbered men 
in university with 57% of university students being women in the UK nowadays (HESA, 
2018). The robust gender difference in some math-intensive STEM fields raises the 
important question of what its cause is. 
 
2.2. Potential explanations for the gender gap in science 
2.2.1. Are women "not cut out for science"? 
Why women are underrepresented in certain STEM fields has been under debate for 
some time. Are there social and psychological factors, or do evolutionary and biological 
reasons lie behind this underrepresentation? Numerous researchers have proposed 
various factors to explain this gender gap, such as sex-linked hormones (e.g., Valla & 
Ceci, 2011), cognitive ability (e.g., Kaiser et al., 2008), stereotype threat (e.g., Good, 
Woodzicka, & Wingfield, 2010) and social forces (such as the effect of child rearing 
on careers, Ceci & Williams, 2011), over the past five decades.  
Early studies focused mainly on the role of mathematical ability and achievement in 
STEM fields (e.g., Astin, 1975; Baenninger & Newcombe, 1995; Benbow, Lubinski, 
Shea, & Eftekhari-Sanjani, 2000; Fischbein, 1990; Lubinski & Benbow, 2006; 
Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974). This line of studies attempts to examine a particularly 
contentious hypothesis that gender differences in mathematical ability and achievement 
account for the lack of women in some STEM fields. However, regarding the intrinsic 
aptitude for mathematics, Spelke's (2005) meta-analysis of studies on cognitive sex 
differences revealed no consistent evidence for a male advantage, from birth to maturity, 
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in the cognitive ability for mathematical and scientific thinking. Moreover, currently in 
the UK, 42% of undergraduate mathematics majors are women, as are 38% of 
postgraduate mathematics majors, suggesting that whatever these women's 
mathematical or spatial aptitude, they are compatible with high levels of achievement 
(WISE, 2015). As such, the claim that women are “not cut out for science” is not valid 
and should be discarded.  
 
More recent studies suggest that women's underrepresentation in STEM fields has little 
to do with ability or achievement, but is instead more likely a result from their 
preferences and choices. It has been reported that women choose at a young age not to 
pursue careers in certain STEM fields, with few adolescent girls expressing desires to 
be engineers or physicists, preferring instead to be medical doctors, lawyers, 
psychologists and artists, which are concerned with "helping people" and "more girly" 
(Archer & McDonald, 1991; Archer, Osborne, DeWitt, Wong, & Willis, 2013; 
Rommes, Overbeek, Scholte, Engels, & Kemp, 2007). A survey among 9000 Year 8 
(age 13 – 14) students in the UK uncovered that though a higher percentage of girls 
rated science as their favourite subject, yet girls were still less likely than boys to aspire 
to science careers (Archer, Osborne, et al., 2013). Similarly, The UCAS data also 
showed that, though girls outperform boys at GCSE, A-level and degree standards in 
scientific subjects, they are disproportionately less likely than males to choose certain 
STEM majors in higher education (UCAS, 2015). Based on these findings, women's 
underrepresentation in STEM should be attributed more to social and psychological 
factors that may constrain women's preference and choices rather than biological sex 
differences in scientific competence.  
2.2.2.  Potential factors constraining women's aspirations in science 
Though women prefer not to enter certain scientific fields, presumably because they 
don't want to or they don't like these fields, their choices are not actually "free" or not 
constrained (Cheryan, Master, & Meltzoff, 2015). If women are freely choosing not to 
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pursue sciences, perhaps nothing can or should be done about it – after all, it is their 
free will. However, a large body of research has demonstrated a variety of social and 
psychological barriers to women's entry into science and engineering that preclude 
women from being able to make a truly "free" choice.  
 
Based on the existing literature and empirical evidence, we can distinguish three main 
factors that may limit women's science subject choices and career aspirations: 1) work-
life balance issues; 2) gender roles and values; and 3) stereotypes of scientists.  
2.2.2.1. Work-life balance issues 
The work-life balance issues are due primarily to factors surrounding family formation 
and childrearing and have been identified as a critical contributor that leads to the 
retention difficulty with women working in STEM fields (Glass, Sassler, Levitte, & 
Michelmore, 2013; Hunt, 2010; Williams & Ceci, 2012). As pointed out by Williams 
and Ceci (2012), having children in one's career exerts more downward pressure on 
women than men in all fields, but this challenge is exacerbated in STEM fields due to 
the fact that the number of women is smaller to begin with. For example, the British 
case study of female employees in the Cambridge high-tech sector finds that women 
with children are effectively excluded from informal social networks after hours, 
limiting their job promotion opportunities (Gray & James, 2007). 
  
In addition, the work-life balance issues not only contribute to attrition from STEM for 
those who have already become mothers but also to a lack of attraction to STEM for 
younger women who want to become mothers. A longitudinal study following 12th-
grade girls who have an interest in male-dominant STEM careers revealed that most of 
them did not actually pursue it by the time they were 25 years old because they believed 
that children and STEM work are incompatible (Frome, Alfeld, Eccles, & Barber, 2006). 
Female graduate students and postdocs were also found to have lowered their ambitions 
in STEM academia due to their desire for children (Mason & Goulden, 2004). 
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2.2.2.2. Gender roles and values 
Although many high-qualified women leave the STEM industry and academia, a much 
larger contributor to the gender gap is that girls are much less likely than boys to choose 
them in the first place. Existing evidence shows that gender roles and values may 
greatly affect course-taking patterns and selection of a major or occupation (e.g., Archer, 
DeWitt, et al., 2013; Su, Rounds, & Armstrong, 2009; Weisgram, Dinella, & Fulcher, 
2011).  
 
From a social psychological perspective, gender roles are defined as society's shared 
beliefs and expectations about a range of behaviours and attitudes that are considered 
acceptable, appropriate, or desirable for people based on their socially identified sex 
(Eagly, 2013). Gender roles are usually centred on the conceptualisations of femininity 
and masculinity. Although historical trends have seen changes in the feminine gender 
roles in the past few decades as women begin to take on multiple roles to a greater 
extent (e.g., female scientists, female CEOs), the essence of femininity remains 
unchanged (Weisgram et al., 2011). Communal traits are usually cited to describe 
femininity including being warm, gentle, empathetic, sensitive, soft-spoken as well as 
concerned about physical appearance. In contrast, men are expected to display more 
agentic traits – assertive, competitive, dominant and deference to facts over feelings 
(Diekman, Brown, Johnston, & Clark, 2010; Rudman & Glick, 2001; Witt & Wood, 
2010).  
 
Several researchers argue that women are reluctant to enter STEM fields because they 
believe that STEM careers are in conflict with their gender roles and values (e.g., 
Diekman et al., 2010; Su et al., 2009; Weisgram et al., 2011). Based on the vocational 
interest literature, STEM professions are often described as “thing-oriented” that 
involve manipulating things, machines, objects, tools and animals, whereas non-STEM 
professions are described as “people-oriented” that involve informing, training, or 
helping other people (Feist, 2008; Lippa, 2005). People-and-thing oriented individuals 
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can also be termed “empathisers” and “systemisers”, respectively (Baron-Cohen, 2002; 
Manson & Winterbottom, 2012). Several researchers argue that women are more likely 
to be empathisers whereas men are more likely to be systemisers. Thus women are more 
interested in “people-oriented” fields of art and nursing, but men are more interested in 
“thing-oriented” fields of science and engineering (e.g., Auyeung, Allison, 
Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2012; Billington, Baron-Cohen, & Wheelwright, 2007; 
Manson & Winterbottom, 2012; Su et al., 2009). Studies with university students in 
America also revealed that female college students and those high in femininity showed 
stronger altruistic values, whereas men and those high in masculinity were more 
focused on monetary rewards in future careers (Diekman et al., 2010). The more 
feminine and less masculine a woman, the more likely she is to avoid male-dominated 
STEM careers (Weisgram et al., 2011). 
 
Women need to overcome more difficulties, such as the somewhat contradictory values 
of being feminine and being science professionals, than men when pursuing a STEM 
career. During adolescence, high-performing girls report believing that boys find them 
unattractive because they defy the traditional female gender roles (Archer, DeWitt, et 
al., 2013; Kessels, 2005). A longitudinal study with 128 American female science 
undergraduates uncovered a phenomenon that female science majors who reported to 
feel less feminine showed lower self-esteem, greater depression, and lower grades than 
their counterparts who successfully reconciled their gender role and science identity 
(Settles, Jellison, & Pratt-Hyatt, 2009). 
2.2.2.3. Stereotypes of scientists 
Another cluster of studies focuses on stereotypes about science majors, occupations and 
individuals in these fields that can serve as deterrents to entry into STEM fields, 
especially for women. The psychological literature differentiates between implicit and 
explicit stereotypes. Implicit stereotypes are assessed via different reaction time to 
stimuli that are either paired in a stereotypical way (e.g., men and science) or not (e.g., 
 12 
women and science). Implicit measures of stereotypes such as the Implicit Association 
Test (IAT) have the advantage of being resistant - or at least less susceptible – to social 
desirability bias (i.e., the tendency of respondents to report an answer in a way they 
deem to be more socially acceptable than would be their personal answer to project a 
favourable image of themselves and to avoid negative evaluations; Callegaro, 2008) as 
participants are either unaware that their stereotypes are being assessed or do not have 
enough cognitive capacity to alter they immediate spontaneous responses. Explicit 
stereotypes are assessed via self-report questionnaires and participants can usually 
discern what is being measured and possibly give politically correct answers 
(Asendorpf, Base, & Mücke, 2002; Brunel, Tietje, & Greenwald, 2004). 
 
The most robust stereotype about scientists is that they are often perceived as one 
gender - men. On both implicit and explicit measures of math and science stereotypes, 
women are less likely than men to associate math and science with themselves in 
childhood (Cvencek, Greenwald, & Meltzoff, 2016; Cvencek, Meltzoff, & Greenwald, 
2011), in adolescence (Kurtz-Costes, Rowley, Harris-Britt, & Woods, 2008; Winter, 
2008) as well as in young adulthood (Lane, Goh, & Driver-Linn, 2012). The gender-
science measures also reveal that men are more likely to be associated with science 
whereas women are more likely to be associated with humanities by both women and 
men implicitly and explicitly (Cai, Luo, Shi, Liu, & Yang, 2016; Carli, Alawa, Lee, 
Zhao, & Kim, 2016).  
 
Beyond the gender stereotype, other stereotypical traits related to scientists are more 
documented qualitatively by studies using the "Draw-A-Scientist" method (Chambers, 
1983). When asked to draw a picture of a scientist, people most often depict a middle-
aged white man, dressing in a lab coat and wearing glasses, doing dangerous 
experiments alone (Barman, 1997; Finson, 2002; Steinke et al., 2007). Such 
stereotypical pictures of scientists can emerge as early as Year 2 (Losh, 2010) in 
elementary school and have been found to last untill adulthood (Finson, 2002). Cross-
cultural studies found that images of scientists drawn by students from China matched 
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those from Western culture (Chambers, 1983) and that both Black and Caucasian 
children in Australia had similar stereotypical images of scientists (Finson, 2002). 
 
These stereotypes of scientists have been found related to academic performance and 
major choices. Women who implicitly associate math with men were found less likely 
to engage in math study and have more math anxiety (Nosek & Smyth, 2011). Murphy, 
Steele and Gross (2007) demonstrated that stereotypes not only affect academic 
performance, but also the sense of belonging or identification with STEM fields. In 
order to consider a major or occupation, one must have a sense that one belongs or at 
least could belong. For example, a series of work by Cheryan and colleagues suggests 
that the stereotypes of scientists could make women feel they do not belong and 
dissuade them, but not men, from considering majoring in computer science (Cheryan, 
2012; Cheryan et al., 2015; Cheryan, Plaut, Davies, & Steele, 2009). 
 
2.3. Justification of the present study 
As noted before, recent work investigating the gender gap in STEM fields has switched 
its attention from the disparity in competence to other social and psychological factors. 
Given that the work-life balance consideration is a general issue for women across all 
fields and no existing data support that STEM fields are more gruelling than other fields 
(Lubinski & Benbow, 2006), this factor is not included in the present study.  
 
The present study attempted to investigate a relatively novel factor that may perpetuate 
the underrepresentation of women in science: stereotypes of empathy in scientists. As 
presented above, it is clear that there is a mismatch between female gender roles and 
values and the stereotypes of scientists. The unmatched stereotypes can make it difficult 
for women to imagine themselves as a scientist, as such reduce their interest in science.  
Reasons to focus on the stereotypes of one particular trait – empathy, are provided as 
follows. 
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Over the past 50 years, strong social norms have developed in Western societies that 
encourage people to curb the overt expression of prejudice and stereotypes based on 
social categories such as gender and race (Klonis, Plant, & Devine, 2005). Yet, 
approaches applying new measurement of stereotypes, focusing on implicit evaluations 
and beliefs that are not under conscious control, suggest that such suppressed thoughts 
are not simply eliminated but may leak out in more subtle ways. Recent work has 
demonstrated that one of the subtle ways is through feature-based stereotyping, wherein 
stereotypic inferences are made on the basis of such features both within social 
categories and between them (Ko, Muller, Judd, & Stapel, 2008). For example, both 
Whites and African Americans with more Afrocentric facial features (e.g., full lips and 
wide noses) are seen as more athletic and aggressive (Blair, Judd, Sadler, & Jenkins, 
2002) and both women and men with more feminine voices are judged as more warm, 
but less competitive (Ko, Judd, & Blair, 2006).  
 
Such findings suggest that the recent active attempts to suppress category-based 
stereotyping may lead to rebound in another form, with greater feature-based 
stereotyping following (or even during) the process of avoiding using one’s social 
categories as the basis for judgment. This has been the main assertion that motivated 
the present research. Regarding the issue of women’s underrepresentation in STEM 
fields, we argue that instead of referring to gender-based stereotypes, students may look 
to other characteristics as a feature-based cue to determine whether they fit the image 
of particular careers (Meltzoff, 2013).  
 
An interesting experiment conducted by Cheryan and colleagues (2011) revealed that, 
regardless of the gender of the scientist representative, female undergraduates who 
interacted with a stereotypical representative who embodied "geeky" characteristics 
(i.e., wearing glasses, T-shirt saying "I code therefore I am", and playing video games) 
for only 2 minutes reported significantly less interest in majoring in science than the 
control group who interacted with a "normal" scientist representative wearing a solid 
coloured T-shirt and enjoying hanging out with friends. In this experiment, the traits 
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that individual representative displayed (i.e., person schemas, meaning judgments 
about the traits that a specific individual possess) seemed to influence the judgment that 
participants had based on the subject that the representative majored in (i.e., role 
schemas, meaning norms and expected behaviours of people in particular roles and 
social types). A schema is defined as a mental structure we use to organise and simplify 
our knowledge of the world around us. Different schemas act like filters, accentuating 
and downplaying various elements that we notice. Schemas therefore affect how we 
interpret things and how we make decisions. Results of Cheryan’s experiment showed 
that, it might not be the gender itself, but certain other features (e.g., appearance or 
personality traits) of the exemplars that participants noticed in the face-to-face 
interaction that were coded into the role schemas of scientists. These role schemas were 
later deemed in contrast to female gender roles and values, which steered female 
participants away from science. In other words, such evidence indicates that it may be 
feature-based stereotyping, rather than category-based stereotyping, that functions as 
the deterrent for women’s participation in STEM fields.  
 
According to the Implicit Personality Theory (IPT), we like to see people in as 
consistent a way as possible and we all have ‘implicit’ theories about which personality 
characteristics tend to go together or cluster (Zwbrowitz, 1990). The IPT enables us to 
infer what people are like when we have very limited information about them. As 
proposed by Asch (1946), certain central perceived traits that we believe one possesses 
may determine our overall impression of that person. For example, if we evaluate 
someone as ‘warm’, it may produce an overall positive impression, while ‘cold’ 
produces an overall negative impression. Stereotype can be thought of as a special kind 
of IPT that relate to an entire social group.  
 
In contrast to the commonly recognised view of stereotypes as coherently positive or 
negative, Operario and Fiske (2004) claim that stereotypes can be ambivalent: they 
comprise both positive and negative attributes about social groups. According to their 
Stereotype Content Model (SCM), group stereotypes and interpersonal impressions 
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form along two basic dimensions: warmth and competence. Based on such distinction, 
they argue that, though the two dimensions are conceptually independent, subjectively 
positive stereotypes on one dimension often are functionally consistent with 
unflattering stereotypes on the other dimension (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). 
Perceived ‘competent’ groups (e.g., business women, Jews, rich people) can be viewed 
as ‘not nice’, while the perceived ‘incompetent’ groups (e.g., housewives, the mentally 
retarded, the elderly) can be viewed as ‘nice’ people. Based on the SCM model, 
scientists are perceived as ‘competent but cold’. While people respect the 
accomplishments of scientists, they don’t like them. Nevertheless, people rate writers 
and doctors as competent and warm at the same time (Fiske & Dupree, 2014)..  
 
As only a fundamental dimension of social perceptions, we still don’t know what makes 
people think scientists are not warm (yet doctors and writers are warm). Can we break 
down warmth scientifically? Is there a specific perceived trait of scientists that makes 
people not like them? In the present study, we propose that empathy, as one key element 
in interpersonal relationships, may very likely work as the feature-based cue for people 
to determine their assessment of a certain profession’s warmth. As Fiske and Dupree 
(2014) pointed out, competent professionals whose job involves communicating and 
caring seem warmer and more trustworthy. Empathy is often considered more related 
to humanities, but not sciences (Carroll & Chiew, 2006; Manson & Winterbottom, 
2012). Furthermore, given that women often have higher perceived empathy than men 
(Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Rueckert, 2011), it is reasonable to hypothesize 
that the stereotypes of empathy in scientists may serve as gatekeepers, driving women, 
who believe that scientists are socially isolated, away from certain male-dominant 
STEM fields.  
 
To date, very few studies have been conducted to examine how people perceive 
empathy in scientists, partly because of the lack of measurement. As mentioned earlier, 
stereotypes can be seen as a special kind of implicit personality theories and such 
cognitive processes often happen unconsciously. In this case, it is of great importance 
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to develop a new measurement to assess people’s unconscious biases, which are 
difficult to gauge using self-report questionnaires. In the present study, I systematically 
developed a new implicit association test attempting to investigate stereotypes of 
empathy in scientists by gender and major subject as well as the interplay of the implicit 
and explicit stereotypes in science career aspirations among UK university students.  
 
Moreover, it is worth noting that although I treat stereotyping of scientists as a potential 
negative factor that can steer women away from STEM fields in the present study, 
categorisation of people is normal and expected from a cognitive point of view. 
Traditionally, American psychologists studied stereotypes in relation to prejudice and 
regarded them as false, illogical over-generalizations based on group membership (e.g., 
Allport, 1954; Lippmann, 1922). Nevertheless, many European psychologists saw 
stereotyping as a normal mental shortcut (e.g., Operario & Fiske, 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 
2001). In addition, given that perceptions about individuals may translate into 
stereotypes about the social roles that the person engages in, many researchers propose 
that counter-stereotypical role models can be used as interventions to change traditional 
stereotypes about certain professions. A counter-stereotypical role model is an 
individual who engages in a role that is antithetical to traditional stereotypes (e.g., a 
female scientist, a well-dressed scientist, or a scientist surrounded by people in a party).  
If the knowledge about an exemplar of a social group forms cognitive schemas, which 
give rise to stereotypical beliefs and influence behaviour, interventions involving 
exposure to counter-stereotypical role models should reduce stereotypes and enhance 
counter-stereotypical aspirations (Wood & Eagly, 2012). For example, Dasgupta and 
Asgari (2004) presented female students with photos and descriptions of famous 
women in leadership positions in counter-stereotypical fields such as science, business, 
law, and politics. Following such exposure to counter-stereotypical women, female 
participants were quicker to associate women with leadership in an IAT test. The results 
suggest that exposure to counter-stereotypical role models can act as intervention to 
reduce stereotypical cognition. Furthermore, the majority of research efforts seeking 
explanations for women's underrepresentation in STEM fields have been conducted in 
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the United States (Beyer, 2015). However, as presented before, shortages of women in 
physical science and engineering in higher education as well as in workforce also exist 
in the United Kingdom. Studies looking at the images of scientists are limited in the 
UK and mostly conducted with children and adolescents using general questionnaire 
survey and interview data, such as the ASPIRES project (Archer, DeWitt, et al., 2013). 
The present study is, to my knowledge, the first attempt to investigate both the implicit 
and explicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists in higher education in the United 
Kingdom.  
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Chapter 3  Literature Review 
Given that the present study attempts to develop a new Implicit Association Test to 
investigate stereotypes of empathy in scientists by gender and major subject, this 
chapter is to critically review three groups of relevant literature, including 1) studies 
about empathy, gender and science; 2) studies about stereotyping and images of 
scientists and 3) studies about Implicit Association Test. The pitfalls and research gaps 
of the existing studies are pondered upon. Based on the literature review, the chapter 
ends with introducing the current study, including its research questions, hypotheses 
and research design. 
3.1. Gender, empathy and science  
Comparatively little academic work has addressed specifically people's perceptions of 
empathy in scientists, yet existing studies indicate that scientists could possess a 
cognitive style that is less empathetic but more systematic than those in non-science 
fields. The cognitive style could be an important factor to explain the gender difference 
in certain science fields. In the following sections, theories and empirical evidence 
about the relations between gender, empathy and science will be reviewed. Issues with 
existing studies about the relationships between empathy and science are discussed with 
the purpose to demonstrate why it is important to study stereotypes of empathy in 
scientists in the present study.  
3.1.1. Defining empathy 
As mentioned earlier, the present study has placed its focus on the construct of empathy 
because of its potential effects on individuals' major selection and career aspirations. 
Before we review the literature about relations between gender, empathy and science, 
it is important to clarify the definition of empathy.  
 
Ever since the term ‘empathy’ was coined by Titchener (1909) as a translation of the 
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German word Einfühlung (i.e., an aesthetic term meaning “to project yourself into what 
you observe”), it has been an important concept in contemporary developmental, social, 
personality, and clinical psychology. Perhaps because of its wide-ranging application, 
the notion of empathy has been a broad and somewhat slippery concept (Eisenberg, 
2002). Some researchers use the term empathy to refer to the cognitive process of 
perspective taking (e.g., Einolf, 2012); others take it to mean an affective process 
(though having some cognitive elements) such as the ability to experience the same 
feelings of another person (e.g., Moore, 2004); still from the clinicians' perspective, 
empathy is viewed as a process that serves a communication function in therapy (Hojat, 
DeSantis, & Gonnella, 2017).  
 
With the recognition of its multidimentional nature, we define empathy as the ability to 
take another person's perspective, understand the feelings of another and interact within 
different social situations (Thomson, Wurtzburg, & Centifanti, 2015). This working 
definition aims to include cognitive, affective and behavioural components 
encompassed by empathy. Under this view, empathy consists of 1) cognitive empathy, 
which means the ability to identify and understand another person's point of view; 2) 
emotional empathy, which means the ability to be sensitive to and vicariously 
experience the feelings of others; and 3) social skills, which means the ability to give 
emotionally appropriate reactions in different social situations.  
 
Empathy is without question an important social ability that allows us to interact 
effectively with each other in the social world. It has been taken as a desirable 
characteristic that positively correlates with interpersonal relationships and mental 
health. For example, participants who reported higher empathy also reported more 
prosocial behaviours (Davis et al., 2001), were less aggressive (Capage & Watson, 
2001), and had more supportive peer relationships in both adolescence and adulthood 
(Davis et al., 2001; Eisenberg, Morris, McDaniel, & Spinrad, 2009). Empathy deficits 
are related to social distress and anxiety and may even lead to offensive behaviours 
(Geer, Estupinan, & Manguno-Mire, 2000).  
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3.1.2. Empathy and the gender gap in science 
From the bio-cognitive view, some researchers argue that men and women have 
different cognitive styles that lead them to varied academic majors and professions (e.g., 
Baron-Cohen, Knickmeyer, & Belmonte, 2005; Billington et al., 2007; Manson & 
Winterbottom, 2012). The attempt to categorise individuals by different cognitive styles 
is in the shape of empathising - systemising theory (Baron-Cohen, 2002). According to 
Baron-Cohen and his colleagues, empathising is defined as the ability to read emotions 
and thoughts in others and to give appropriate responses (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 
2004). Systemising is defined as the ability to analyse and construct systems (Baron-
Cohen, Richler, Bisarya, Gurunathan, & Wheelwright, 2003). Individuals can possess 
different cognitive styles due to their levels of empathising and systemising skills.  
 
Two important hypotheses have emerged from the cognitive style theory to explain the 
underrepresentation of women in STEM fields. First is that women tend to be 
empathisers while men tend to be systemisers (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Knickmeyer, & 
Belmonte, 2005). Second is that systemisers tend to enter the STEM fields while 
empathisers are more likely to choose humanities and social sciences (e.g., Billington 
et al., 2007; Manson & Winterbottom, 2012; Wheelwright et al., 2006). Nevertheless, 
existing research has provided controversial evidence for both hypotheses.  
 
In the following sections, empirical studies examining gender differences in empathy 
from the biological and developmental perspective using different kinds of 
measurements are critically reviewed. Existing research on the relationship between 
empathy and academic major selection is also carefully pondered upon. 
3.1.2.1. Do women have better empathy than men?  
Studies using Empathising Quotient (EQ) questionnaire and Systemising Quotient (SQ) 
questionnaire measuring empathising and systemising skills consistently report a 
female advantage in empathy and a male advantage in systemising (Baron-Cohen et al., 
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2003; Focquaert, Steven, Wolford, Colden, & Gazzaniga, 2007; Lawson, Baron-Cohen, 
& Wheelwright, 2004; Manson & Winterbottom, 2012; Wheelwright et al., 2006). 
These findings have been cited as evidence for the claims proposed by Baron-Cohen 
(2002) that men are predisposed to learn about objects and their mechanical relations, 
whereas women are predisposed to learn about people and their emotional interactions. 
However, close inspections of studies on sex-linked hormones, cognitive development 
in human infants, children and adults, studies using different kinds of measurements 
have suggested a rather nuanced picture about gender differences in empathy. 
  
3.1.2.1.1. Biological sex difference in empathy 
Firstly, research on the biological basis of the E-S cognitive style suggests that gender 
differences in empathy may be related to sex-linked genes (Chakrabarti et al., 2009) 
and hormones (Baron-Cohen et al., 2005). It is argued that the more prenatal 
testosterone (i.e., a sex steroid hormone that men produce twice as much as women in 
the womb) one has been exposed to, the more likely one may have a low empathising 
but high systemising cognitive profile (Chapman et al., 2006). Prenatal testosterone 
exposure is usually assessed by measuring the ratio of the length of the second (ring) 
finger and fourth (ring) finger (i.e., 2D:4D digit ratio). Individuals with a low 
empathizing, but high systemizing, cognitive profile have been found more likely to 
have a lower 2D:4D (more masculine) finger ratio than people with the opposite 
cognitive profile (Manning et al., 2010; Von Horn et al., 2010; Wakabayashi & 
Nakazawa, 2010). 
 
However, Hönekopp's (2012) meta-analysis of the correlations between 2D:4D finger 
ratio and E-S cognitive style suggests that the influence of prenatal testosterone on 
cognitive style is usually significant among individuals with autistic spectrum 
conditions, but not with typically developing individuals. Moreover, when looking at 
the typically developing population in particular, a significant correlation of 2D:4D 
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finger ratio was usually found with systemising ability (Manning et al., 2010) but not 
with empathy or emotion recognition performance (Teatero & Netley, 2013; Voracek 
& Dressler, 2006). All these findings suggest that prenatal testosterone may promote 
an extreme low empathy but high systemising cognitive style only in people with a 
specific cognitive profile (e.g., autistic spectrum conditions), but may not substantially 
contribute to the gender difference in empathy among typically developing individuals.  
 
3.1.2.1.2. Developmental gender differences in empathy  
Although sex hormones may not directly relate to empathy, research on the 
development of social cognition indeed reveals a female advantage on empathy to some 
extent. A great number of studies focusing on the development of theory of mind (ToM), 
the ability to reason about others' mental states (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985), 
suggest that gender differences in social cognition appear early in life. A study of one-
day born infants revealed that female infants preferred to look longer at the active 
person, whereas male infants looked longer at a similar sized inanimate object 
(Connellan, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Batki, & Ahluwalia, 2000). However, it is 
worth mentioning that though more girls showed preference for human faces over 
objects than boys (36% versus 17% of the sample) in their study, the largest group of 
newborn girls tested in this study actually showed no preference (47%). Therefore, it is 
possible that the claimed gender difference might not be that evident and this 
experiment needs to be independently replicated. Furthermore, Fine (2010) points out 
that parents may not have been totally blind to the baby’s sex before it is born and there 
might have already been gendered ‘congratulations’ cards and gifts (e.g., pink for girls 
and blue for boys) around the bed. As such, there could be social influence on newborn 
babies and we should not simply attribute the gender differences shown in them to 
biology. 
 
For preschoolers, evidence indicated that girls had better knowledge of the distinction 
 24 
between real and apparent emotion than their male counterparts (Banerjee, 1997) and 
grasped the concept of false belief (i.e., the understanding that others can have beliefs 
that are in contrast to the reality) earlier than boys (Charman, Ruffman, & Clements, 
2002). Though all typically developing children would pass the false-belief task sooner 
or later around age 4 (Bloom & German, 2000), girls still outperformed boys in judging 
the intentions and emotions of characters in stories and movies during middle childhood 
(Calero, Salles, Semelman, & Sigman, 2013; Devine & Hughes, 2013).  
 
During adolescence, girls usually score higher than boys in self-report empathy 
(Allemand, Steiger, & Fend, 2015; Van der Graaff et al., 2014) but this female 
advantage does not exist in studies using neurophysiological measures of empathic 
arousal (Michalska, Kinzler, & Decety, 2013). Longitudinal studies of adolescent 
empathy found that girls’ empathic concern remained stable and higher than boys 
during adolescence, whereas boys showed a decrease in empathic concern from early 
to middle adolescence with a rebound to the initial level thereafter (Mestre, Samper, 
Frias, & Tur, 2009). A potential explanation for the gender gap in social cognition 
development could be that girls enjoy a more emotion-oriented growing environment 
than boys. A meta-analysis of studies examining gender effects on parental language 
indicated that mothers tend to talk more and to use more supportive speech with 
daughters than with sons during toddlerhood (Leaper et al., 1998) Moreover, older 
siblings are also found to mention feeling states more frequently to girls than boys 
(Brown, Donelan-McCall, & Dunn, 1996). 
 
3.1.2.1.3. Gender differences by different measures of empathy 
Instead of a rather consistent female advantage found in childhood, research of adults 
has produced mixed findings about gender contrasts in empathy assessed by various 
measurements. The most robust evidence of a female advantage in empathy is observed 
in studies that employ self-report measures (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983; Michalska et 
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al., 2013). For instance, women were found scoring significantly higher than men on 
the Empathy Quotient (EQ) questionnaire, in which participants were required to rate 
themselves on statements such as: “I tend to get emotionally involved with a friend's 
problems” (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Nettle, 2007; Wakabayashi et al., 2007; 
Wakabayashi, Sasaki, & Ogawa, 2012). Studies relying on other self-report 
questionnaires such as the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983) also revealed a 
female advantage in empathy (Berg et al., 2015; Harton & Lyons, 2003; Rueckert, 
2011).   
 
Beyond self-reported empathy, behavioural tasks provide mixed evidence for gender 
differences in empathy. Researchers utilising emotion reading tests found that women 
outperformed men in telling different emotions from static pictures of eyes (Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001; Chapman et al., 2006; Voracek & 
Dressler, 2006). Nonetheless, no such female advantage was observed in tasks requiring 
participants to infer the specific content of protagonists' thoughts and feelings in stories 
and movies (Hall, 1978; Ickes, Gesn, & Graham, 2000; Russell, Tchanturia, Rahman, 
& Schmidt, 2007). Moreover, when measures that rely on physiological and 
neuroimaging data are considered, reports of gender contrasts on empathy become even 
less clear (Michalska et al., 2013). For instance, Eisenberg and Lennon's (1983) meta-
analysis of studies of empathy demonstrated that changes in autonomic nervous system 
activity such as electrodermal activity, heart rate, blood pressure, as well as gestural 
measures, showed no clear evidence for gender differences in either children or adults, 
while self-report questionnaires and (to a lesser extent) emotion identification tasks did 
reveal a female advantage. In addition, a meta-analysis of 65 neuroimaging studies of 
responses to emotional stimuli found no greater activation to viewing emotional 
materials for women than men (Wager, Phan, Liberzon, & Taylor, 2003). 
 
To sum up, existing studies suggest a ubiquitous female advantage in self-report 
empathy but not in the actual empathetic ability, meaning that women are more likely 
than men to perceive themselves as empathetic, yet they may not actually have better 
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empathetic abilities than men. From the biological perspective, gender-linked 
hormones have been found only contributing significantly to people with special 
cognitive profiles but not in a typically developing population. Moreover, from the 
developmental perspective, girls have displayed a consistent advantage in empathy 
during childhood and adolescence as compared to boys, but such developmental 
advantage does not lead to a prominent advantage in adulthood. Though boys have 
some fluctuations in empathy development during adolescence, men have shown 
comparative emotional arousal and empathetic skills with women during adulthood. 
Despite the controversial evidence for the female advantage in empathetic ability, 
women indeed showed more empathetic concerns and consistently reported higher 
perceived empathy about themselves than men.  
3.1.2.2. Are empathy and science incompatible? 
According to the second hypothesis of the empathising-systemising theory, people who 
study sciences have been described as lacking in empathy but outperformed in 
systemising when compared to people who study humanities (Billington et al., 2007; 
Focquaert et al., 2007; Manson & Winterbottom, 2012). This hypothesis is firstly 
examined by a large-scale study among 1761 students from Cambridge, revealing that 
physical science majors scored significantly lower than those from biological science, 
social science and humanities fields in the EQ questionnaire but higher in the 
Systemising Quotient (SQ) questionnaire (Wheelwright et al., 2006). Systemising is 
defined as the drive to analyse and construct systems by understanding the rules that 
govern the system (Baron-Cohen, 2002). Participants are asked to rate themselves on 
statements such as “when I learn a language, I become intrigued by its grammatical 
rules” (Wheelwright et al., 2006). The differences in empathising-systemising cognitive 
styles by major subject were later replicated by Manson and Winterbottom (2012) with 
another 321 Cambridge students. In this study, they also claimed that cognitive style is 
a better predictor than gender for major selection using logistic regression to compare 
the predictive power between gender and cognitive style to major choices (Manson & 
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Winterbottom, 2012). Similar consequences were also found in cross-cultural studies 
among students from Belgium (Focquaert et al., 2007) and Malaysia (Zeyer et al., 2013). 
 
These studies have made crucial headway in exploring the link between empathy and 
major selection, but they are still prone to pitfalls and several research gaps exist. First 
of all, most existing studies are conducted under the framework of the empathising-
systemising cognitive style, but it is important to note that empathising has been found 
largely independent from systemising, therefore there is not necessarily a trade-off 
between empathising and systemising (Carroll & Chiew, 2006; Lawson et al., 2004). 
That is to say, even though scientists may be categorised under the label “systemiser” 
with a relatively higher systemising skill than empathising skill, it does not 
automatically mean that his or her empathy is absolutely low. Researchers must be 
aware that it is not the discrepancy between empathising and systemising that 
determines whether one chooses science majors or not. Given that women and men are 
compatible with high levels of mathematical ability and achievement, it would be 
intriguing to focus on the unique role of empathy in major selection. 
 
Secondly, female and male scientists may show different levels of empathy. It has been 
proposed that women and man may employ different strategies when making major 
subject decisions (Ceci, Ginther, Kahn, & Williams, 2014). An interesting study 
conducted by Valla et al. (2010) among 144 undergraduate students revealed that being 
in a scientific field of study was associated with poor empathising skills in men, but not 
in women. Moreover, they also found that systemising ability was coupled with 
sacrifices in empathising abilities in men but not in women and high systemising is 
associated with science major selection for women but not for men. Based on these 
findings, Valla et al. (2010) then argue that men's choice of science field of study could 
more be associated with weakness in empathy regardless of their systemising ability, 
but women's choice of science could more be associated with their strength in 
systemising. Among women and men with comparably outstanding mathematical 
aptitude and achievement, women are more likely to have outstanding empathetic skills 
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(at least perceived empathy) at the same time (Thomson et al., 2015; Valla et al., 2010).  
Therefore, empathy and science should definitely not simply be seen as incompatible 
constructs. Scientists do not necessarily have a higher-systemising-lower-empathising 
cognitive style, yet they can have both good mathematical ability and interpersonal 
skills at the same time.  
 
Moreover, variations within the science field should also not be ignored. Though all 
STEM majors require students to systematically study the natural world through 
observation and experiment, life science, which requires students to take ethics into 
consideration, can be more 'people-oriented' than physical science. Performance in 
subjects like medicine requires high levels of empathy in order to be successful (Hirsch, 
2007; Wright, McKendree, Morgan, Allgar, & Brown, 2014). Biology students may 
have plenty of opportunities to cooperate with their colleagues in labs whereas students 
majoring in computer science often instead focus on highly independent coding jobs on 
their own (Diekman, Clark, Johnston, Brown, & Steinberg, 2011). Supporting this 
claim, Thomson et al.'s (2015) survey of empathy among 404 undergraduates showed 
equivalent self-report empathy among students in life science and social science. 
Khorashad et al. (2015) even reported an advantage of medical students over students 
from all other majors in emotion recognition in Persia. 
 
The final caveat springs from the applied measurements for empathy and calls for extra 
attention to the interpretations of results. As we saw earlier, the distinct female 
advantage in empathy captured by self-reports was not that evident in ability tasks and 
people can over-report or under-report certain behaviours due to their personal bias or 
social pressure (Zerbe & Paulhus, 1987). Despite a wealth of self-report data supporting 
the claim that scientists have lower empathy than people from other fields, studies 
utilising ability tasks revealed mixed findings. For instance, Billington et al. (2007)  
found a significant advantage in emotion identification task for students studying 
humanities, but the effect is only marginal in the study carried out by Carroll and Chiew 
(2006) and did not even exist in a more recent study carried out by Khorashad et al. 
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(2015). It is possible that science majors underestimate their empathetic ability due to 
the impact of certain stereotypes about scientists. Related research about stereotyping 
and image of scientists will be discussed later.  
 
To sum up, existing studies revealed mixed evidence for the claim that scientists are 
lacking in empathy. Although some studies found that scientists scored lower than other 
majors in self-report empathy, there is no evidence for a trade-off between scientific 
ability and empathetic ability in general. Students majoring in life science and medicine 
even showed some advantage in empathy over other humanities majors. The relations 
between empathy and science major selection were gender-dependent, for which only 
certain men may choose to study science due to poor empathetic skills but women in 
science could have both good interpersonal skills and scientific competence. After all, 
scientists have shown comparable empathetic ability with people from other fields, but 
they underestimate their empathy in self-reports. I suspect that scientists' inaccurate 
perception of their empathy may stem from the stereotypical image of scientists being 
socially awkward. Therefore, the present study proposed to look at people's stereotypes 
about empathy in scientists and the potential variations in such stereotypes by gender 
and major subject.  
 
3.2. Implicit and explicit stereotypes of scientists  
As discussed above, existing evidence of a consistent disadvantage in self-report 
empathy, but not their empathetic abilities, among science majors indicates that 
stereotypes about scientists may be the reason why scientists underestimate their own 
empathy. Moreover, many researchers have argued that the existence of stereotypes 
about scientists may also influence the appeal of STEM majors and careers to certain 
individuals (e.g., Cheryan et al., 2015; Schmader, Johns, & Forbes, 2008).  
 
In the following sections, related theories and empirical studies about implicit and 
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explicit stereotypes as well as images of scientists will be critically reviewed. Readers 
will be equipped with all the necessary information about how implicit and explicit 
stereotypes differ and are related, the existing empirical evidence of the content of 
implicit and explicit stereotypes of scientists, as well as factors related to individual 
differences in stereotypes of scientists, setting up a stage to further discuss the 
limitations of existing studies and demonstrate the research gap that the present study 
aimed to address.  
 
 
 
3.2.1. Conceptualising implicit and explicit stereotypes 
3.2.1.1. Defining stereotypes and related constructs 
Before we approach the definitions of implicit and explicit stereotypes, it is important 
to first and foremost define stereotype and its related constructs prejudice and 
discrimination. Though laypeople may use these terms synonymously, psychologists 
draw distinctions between each concept. Stereotypes are usually defined as associations 
and attributions of specific characteristics to groups; prejudice as attitudes and feelings 
reflecting an overall evaluation of a group, and discrimination as biased behaviours 
toward, and treatment of, individuals due to group membership (Dovidio, Hewstone, 
Glick, & Esses, 2010).  
 
Stereotypes are cognitive schemas used by social perceivers to process information 
about others, and it has the function of simplifying a complex environment (Hilton & 
von Hippel, 1996). Prejudice is conceptualized as an attitude that has both a cognitive 
component (e.g., beliefs about a target group) and an affective component (e.g., like or 
dislike; positive or negative) that creates or maintains unequal status and role 
differences between groups (Eagly & Diekman, 2005). When it comes to discrimination, 
it implies more than simply distinguishing among social objects, but refers also to 
actively negative behaviour or, more subtly less positive responses, that create, 
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maintain, or reinforce advantages for certain groups and their members over other 
groups and their members (Mummendey, Otten, Berger, & Kessler, 2000). 
 
While discriminations can occur toward a group or its members, stereotypes and 
prejudices are intrapsychical phenomena that occur within an individual. That is, 
stereotypes and prejudices may vary not only in their transparency to others but also in 
the level of awareness to the person who possesses them (Dovidio et al., 2010). 
Specifically, people can implicitly hold cognitive representations of certain beliefs 
without explicitly endorsing such stereotypes, without feelings of prejudice, and 
without awareness that such stereotypes could affect one's judgment and behaviour.  
3.2.1.2. Defining implicit and explicit stereotypes 
The idea of implicit/explicit stereotypes is based on the dual-process model of social 
cognition which claims there are two modes of thought: one is the controlled processing 
denotes mental functioning that is conscious, deliberative, effortful, and/or voluntary in 
nature, whereas the automatic processing is unconscious, unintentional, effortless, 
and/or involuntary (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Chaiken & Trope, 1999; E. R. 
Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Explicit stereotypes are beliefs and attitudes people know 
they hold, subject to deliberate (often strategic) control in their expression (Fazio et al., 
1995). In contrast, implicit stereotypes involve a lack of awareness and unintentional 
activation (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).   
 
Ever since Greenwald and Banaji (1995) coined the term implicit social cognition , 
researchers have been using it in different ways. Some researchers use the term implicit 
merely to refer to measurement procedures that gather data without asking for verbal 
responses (e.g., Fazio & Olson, 2003). Other researchers use the term to describe 
assessed constructs that do not require conscious introspection (e.g., Banaji, 2001). To 
overcome the confusion arising from differences in linguistic conventions and 
semantics that can disrupt research progress, De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, 
and Moors (2009) have suggested a taxonomy to outline the differences between the 
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terms direct/indirect and explicit/implicit. They suggest using the terms direct and 
indirect to describe features of measurement procedures whereas the terms implicit and 
explicit for features of the psychological attributes captured by different measurement 
procedures. In the context of the present study, we use the term implicit as the synonym 
of unconscious to refer to the automatic and uncontrolled mental processes and explicit 
as the synonym of conscious to refer to the deliberate and controlled mental processes.  
 
Accordingly, explicit stereotypes are usually assessed directly by self-report measures 
whereas implicit stereotypes are "inaccessible to introspection" therefore must be 
measured indirectly (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). A widely used direct measurement 
of explicit attitudes is the Semantic-Differential Method. The Semantic-Differential 
procedure involves presenting individuals with opposing adjective pairs and asking 
them to locate the object on a rating scale anchored by the opposing adjectives (Osgood, 
1952). For example, the object may be dog, and adjectives might include smart-foolish, 
pleasant-unpleasant. When applying the Semantic-Differential scales, participants are 
directly asked to report their attitudes toward certain objects, thus are able to 
consciously reflect on their responses, therefore such method is widely considered a 
direct way of capturing explicit attitudes. However, this type of instrument cannot 
capture implicit attitudes. 
 
In order for a measure to be called implicit, it needs to evoke the to-be-measured 
attribute to automatically cause the measurement outcome in the absence of substantial 
cognitive resources, substantial time, and awareness of certain goals (Moors & De 
Houwer, 2006). As such, implicit measurement procedures often rely on computerized 
stimuli and recording of reaction time latency. The most widely used implicit 
measurement is the Implicit Association Test, which assesses participants' reaction time 
to compatible or incompatible pairs of concepts (see later Section 3.3 for a full review).  
 
A number of cognitive models help us to understand the distinction and relationship 
between the implicit and explicit cognition. The following sections will cover the most 
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dominant models and theories for the implicit and explicit stereotypes, as they are 
crucial for understanding and interpreting the measured outcomes in the present study.  
 
3.2.1.3. Theoretical models for the implicit and explicit stereotypes 
There are many different cognitive theories drawing distinctions between aspects of 
cognitive processes. These postulate alternative explanations through which implicit 
and explicit stereotypes may have an impact on behaviours. These theories can be 
summarized into three theoretical models: 1) double dissociation, that implicit and 
explicit attitudes are completely independent of each other, thus implicit attitudes 
predict spontaneous behavior whereas explicit attitudes predict deliberative behaviour  
(Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002) 2) additive, that the implicit and explicit 
measures reflect a single construct with different procedures, therefore attitudes 
inferred by the two types of measures explain different portion of variance in the 
behaviour (Fazio & Olson, 2003); and 3) interactive, that the implicit and explicit 
attitudes are distinct but related, as such they interact in influencing behaviour (Strack 
& Deutsch, 2004).  
 
3.2.1.3.1. Double dissociation model 
At one extreme, some researchers argue that the implicit and explicit stereotypes are 
completely independent of each other and may give rise to different kinds of behaviours. 
Based on this dual-processing model, implicit and explicit attitudes are viewed as two 
separate constructs that coexist in memory (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). 
Implicit stereotypes are automatic and unconscious biases, whereas explicit stereotypes 
are deliberative and conscious evaluations. From this perspective, the low correlations 
(average implicit-explicit measurement correlation of 0.19) between implicit and 
explicit measurements of stereotypes are taken as evidence for the existence of two 
independent cognitive constructs, but not the discriminant validity between two 
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different measurements of the same cognitive system (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Wilson 
et al., 2000).  
 
Given that implicit and explicit attitudes are regarded as independent constructs, they 
are assumed to direct different behaviours and demonstrate a double-dissociation 
pattern. Implicit attitudes are assumed to influence spontaneous actions and nonverbal 
behaviours that are uncontrollable or with no attempts to control them. In contrast, 
explicit attitudes are assumed to influence more deliberative behaviours and expressive 
responses that are under conscious control (Dovidio et al., 2002). This double-
dissociation pattern has been confirmed in a few studies examining racial attitudes (e.g., 
Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Monteith, 2001; Green et al., 2007; McConnell & Leibold, 
2001). For example, implicit negative attitudes toward Blacks were found to 
successfully predicted subtle less positive nonverbal behaviours (e.g., less speaking 
time, less smiling, less eye contact) during an interaction with a Black experimenter as 
compared to an interaction with a White experimenter. However, it was the explicit 
self-report racial attitudes, but not the implicit attitudes, that related to ratings about 
legitimacy of anti-Black community laws (McConnell & Leibold, 2001).  
3.2.1.3.2. Additive model 
At the opposite extreme, implicit and explicit attitudes are viewed as expressions of a 
single construct, only under different conditions. From this perspective, mental 
representations are similar to icebergs, with explicit stereotypes residing above the 
surface of conscious control and the implicit stereotypes residing below it (Fazio et al., 
1995). According to the Motivation and Opportunity as Determinants model (MODE 
Model; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999), the expression of an implicit attitude or an 
explicit one depends on two moderating factors: 1) whether individuals are motivated 
enough to consciously reflect on their beliefs and attitudes and 2) whether they are able 
to engage in such reflection.  
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The MODE model suggests that when people have the opportunity (e.g., sufficient time 
and cognitive ability) and motivation (e.g. concerns with social desirability) to evaluate 
the consequences of various actions, explicit attitudes primarily influence behaviours 
as people reflect on their relevant attitudes. Nevertheless, implicit attitudes take control 
in situations when opportunity is not permitted (e.g., because of time pressure) or the 
motivation is absent (e.g., because the task is not important). According to this model, 
implicit and explicit attitudes can be best understood as implicit and explicit measures 
of the same attitude: one relying on self-reports, which are assumed to allow 
participants to evaluate and manipulate their responses; and the other relying on 
reaction time tasks, which are assumed to limit the opportunity for participants to 
introspect their responses.  
 
In this case, Fazio et al. (1995) also claims that the implicit attitudes that are 
automatically activated early in the judgment process (upstream) can manipulate 
selective attention and information search, and as such influence explicit judgment and 
behaviour (downstream). Consequently, automatically activated stereotypes can have 
an impact on both subtle (e.g., nonverbal reactions) as well as controlled behaviours 
(e.g., self-reported preferences). That is to say, if we follow the assumption of a single 
system with a single representation and two different measurements, the general 
predictive model should be an additive pattern, where both implicit and explicit 
measures of the same attitudes can cast a distinctive influence on behaviour.  
 
3.2.1.3.3. Interactive model 
According to the more recent models such as the Associative Propositional Evaluation 
Model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006) and the Reflective Impulsive Model (Strack 
& Deutsch, 2004) as well as the work of Smith and DeCoster (2000), implicit and 
explicit cognition are best comprehended in terms of associative and propositional 
mental processes that interact with each other. Associative processes are defined as the 
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activation of mental associations between concepts in memory, which is assumed to be 
affective in nature and often has spontaneous effects on behaviour. Propositional 
processes are defined as the validation of information implied by the activated 
association, which is considered to affect controlled behaviours when one desires to 
evaluate the truth or falsity of certain beliefs (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). 
Implicit stereotypes reflect the automatic (or impulsive) associative activation 
processes in memory that are fast to form, whereas explicit stereotypes reflect 
propositional validation processes that require reasoning and logical thought 
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014). 
 
From this perspective, the associative and propositional processes are viewed 
functionally distinct, but also assumed to mutually interact, such that the associative 
processes may influence the propositional processes, and vice versa. The "bottom-up" 
effects of associative on propositional processes work by mentally activating associated 
concepts that provide basic information for propositional evaluations. The "top-down" 
effects of propositional on associative processes work because the propositional 
reasoning can activate new information in the course of validating activated information. 
Specifically, if people are motivated to believe a particular propositional judgment, they 
may selectively search for related information confirming the validity of such 
proposition. Therefore, biased retrieval as well as activation of confirmatory 
information can produce mutual interactions between implicit and explicit mental 
processes (Galdi, Arcuri, & Gawronski, 2008; Peters & Gawronski, 2011). 
 
Based on the interactive theoretical model, implicit and explicit cognitions should work 
together in predicting behaviours. Evidence collected to support this model is focused 
on cases where a negative implicit attitude conflicts with a positive attitude. For 
instance, research about people's defensive and secure self-esteem found that people 
with secure self-esteem (i.e., the congruence between high implicit self-esteem and high 
explicit self-esteem) were less narcissistic, showed less in-group bias, and engaged less 
in dissonance reduction compared to participants with defensive self-esteem (e.g., low 
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implicit self-esteem but high explicit self-esteem; Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-
Browne, & Correll, 2003).  
 
To sum up, researchers have articulated three different theoretical models about implicit 
and explicit stereotypes and their relations with behaviours. The three models 
correspond to the situation when a) implicit stereotypes predict spontaneous behaviour 
and explicit stereotypes predict deliberative behaviour and not vice versa (double 
dissociation pattern), b) implicit and explicit measures of stereotypes contribute distinct 
impact on behaviours (additive pattern), and c) implicit and explicit attitudes interact 
synergistically to predict behaviour (interactive pattern). Empirical evidence from the 
present study examining the relationship between implicit and explicit stereotypes of 
empathy in scientists and science career aspirations will be interpreted and discussed 
with reference to these models.  
 
3.2.1.4. Variations in implicit and explicit stereotypes 
Given that the present study proposed to examine individual differences in implicit and 
explicit stereotypes of empathy by gender and major subject, it is also of great 
importance to review related theories and findings of factors that may affect variations 
in stereotypes.  
 
3.2.1.4.1. Are women less stereotypical than men? 
Gender differences are ubiquitous in the social psychology literature and there is a 
wide-held belief that women and men differ in prejudice and stereotyping. For example, 
it is almost cliché in Western cultures to state that women are more emotionally 
sensitive than men. Some research has found support for this stereotype, such that 
women actually do smile more than men (LaFrance, Hecht, & Paluck, 2003) and show 
more empathetic concerns than men (Koenig & Eagly, 2005; Rueckert, 2011). Given 
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that empathy can encourage people to adopt perspectives of others and lead to prejudice 
reduction (Todd, Bodenhausen, Richeson, & Galinsky, 2011; Vescio, Sechrist, & 
Paolucci, 2003), an argument could be made that women are nicer and more supportive 
than men, thus are less prone to stereotypes and prejudices than men.  
 
At first glance, there appears to be consistent evidence of the female advantage in 
producing less stereotypical beliefs. For example, women have reported more 
favourable attitudes than men on social issues such as against desegregated 
neighbourhood (Hughes & Tuch, 2003) and acceptance of homosexuals (Ratcliff, 
Lassiter, Markman, & Snyder, 2006). In comparisons, surveys have found that men 
reported higher levels of xenophobia, endorsement of White superiority, and racism 
compared to women (Ekehammar, Akrami, & Araya, 2003; Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar, 
& Levin, 1999). 
 
However, inconsistent findings were revealed when researchers used implicit measures 
of stereotypes. Ekehammar et al. (2003) found that although women expressed lower 
explicit racial prejudice than men, they actually held higher implicit racial prejudice. 
Similarly, women showed less explicit prejudice than did men about female authority, 
but their implicit attitudes were similarly negative (Rudman & Kilianski, 2000). In 
contrast, women demonstrated significantly lower implicit prejudice than men about 
homosexuals and people with disabilities (Dozo, 2015).  
 
These findings suggest that gender differences in stereotypes vary according to whether 
it is implicitly or explicitly measured, and according to the substantive topic in question. 
In the present study, we will compare both the implicit and explicit stereotypes of 
empathy in scientists between women and men.  
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3.2.1.4.2. Do people show more positive views about ingroup members explicitly but 
not implicitly? 
Moreover, a closer examination of existing literature reveals that people's intergroup 
attitudes can also vary based on whether it is their self-report explicit attitudes or 
implicitly measured unconscious bias. Commonsense and many psychological theories 
(e.g., Social Identity Theory; Tajfel & Turner, 2001; Self-Categorisation Theory; 
Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) suggest that positive affiliation with 
one's own social group is a basic and fundamental fact of human existence. Cognitively, 
people have been found to remember more detailed as well as more positive information 
for ingroup than for outgroup members (Hogg & Hains, 1996; Howard & Rothbart, 
1980). As a result, people help ingroup members more than outgroup members 
(Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997) and report relatively more 
positive beliefs about ingroups (Howard & Rothbart, 1980). The strong tendency to 
respond more positively to people from our ingroups than we do to people from 
outgroups is known as ingroup favouritism. 
However, with the development of new instruments that allow researchers to measure 
implicit attitudes and beliefs, we found many conditions under which the ingroup 
favouritism principle does not operate as expected and an opposite outgroup 
favouritism emerges. Nosek, Banaji, and Greenwald's (2002) study of a large sample 
of White and Black participants' implicit and explicit racial attitudes via the Internet 
(Ns > 17,000) revealed that though African Americans explicitly expressed much 
stronger ingroup favouritism in self-reports, they exhibited no implicit ingroup 
favouritism. Furthermore, when playing a video game stimulating police chase, African 
American and White American participants were found equally likely to harbour 
implicit stereotypes associating Black with criminality and responded faster to shoot at 
the Black armed fictitious characters compared to the White (Correll, Park, Judd, & 
Wittenbrink, 2007). In some other studies, African Americans were even found to 
favour White Americans over their ingroup implicitly (but not explicitly; Ashburn-
Nardo, Knowles, & Monteith, 2003; Dasgupta, 2004). 
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To explain why people show implicit outgroup favouritism, Jost and Banaji (1994) 
proposed the system justification theory, which maintains that all people, including 
those in the inferior or stigmatized groups, have a tendency to legitimize existing social 
norms and hierarchies even at the expense of personal and group interest. Stereotypes 
and prejudices about their own group are a way to satisfy that tendency to rationalize 
the group's social position (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). Under such circumstances, 
the present study will examine "whether science majors have less stereotypical views 
about empathy in scientists than humanities majors?" using both implicit and explicit 
measures.  
 
3.2.1.4.3. Will cognitive dissonance influence implicit and explicit stereotypes of 
identified groups differently? 
The desire to maintain consistency between social cognitions including attitudes, 
stereotypes, self-evaluation, and self-identity has been recognized by many 
psychologists as an important human motive (Festinger, 1962; Greenwald et al., 2002; 
Heider, 1958). That is to say, cognitive dissonance involving conflicting self-evaluation, 
self-identity, stereotypes and attitudes can produce a feeling of discomfort leading to 
an alteration in one of the attitudes or beliefs. Based on the cognitive consistency 
principle, change in any one of the three sets of associations – group identity (e.g., self 
= science), self-evaluation (e.g., self = empathy) or stereotype (e.g., science ≠ empathy) 
would induce balancing change in at least one of the others.  
 
Cvencek, Greenwald and Meltzoff (2012) proposed the Balanced Identity Theory (BIT) 
for consistency in implicit social cognition. In line with the aforementioned Social 
Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 2001) for explicit social cognition, BIT also 
assumes a close relationship between group membership and self-concept. BIT predicts 
that people who identify strongly with a group should display more positive attitudes 
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toward ingroups (Cvencek et al., 2012). However, the most substantial difference 
between SIT and BIT relies on how the SIT and BIT treat the role of self-evaluation in 
the tendency to favour one’s own group relative to other groups.  
 
SIT treats self-evaluation as a motivational force that leads people to use group 
identities to generate positive self-regard either by viewing their ingroups more 
positively or viewing outgroups more negatively (Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). 
According to SIT, people with low self-esteem in a specific trait or social state should 
be more motivated to distinguish between ingroups and outgroups and relate relatively 
stronger positive attributes to their ingroups in order to establish a positive social 
identity for themselves and hence promote their personal self-esteem (Rubin & 
Hewstone, 1998). Nevertheless, BIT takes associations as its conceptual building 
blocks and treats self-evaluations as an associative connection of self to positive 
attribute, and the balance-congruity principle calls for the link between the self-
associated group and positive attribute to be strengthened by the link of self to positive 
attribute (Cvencek et al., 2012; Greenwald et al., 2002). In other words, the BIT 
emphasizes the transmit of the positive attribution of self-evaluation to self-identified 
groups. In contrast with SIT’s expectation that group members with low self-esteem 
should display stronger positive views about ingroups, BIT predicts the reverse – that 
those who have high self-esteem in a specific trait should develop stronger positive 
views about that trait for their ingroups. 
 
SIT was developed before the field widely recognised the distinction between implicit 
and explicit measures and has been tested mostly with self-report explicit measures 
(Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). Mixed evidence has been found for the SIT predictions. 
For instance, using the minimal group experiments (i.e., a method to investigate the 
minimal conditions required for favouring one’s own group relative to other groups 
based on arbitrary and virtually meaningless distinctions between groups; Tajfel, Billig, 
Bundy, & Flament, 1971), Wagner, Lampen and Syllwasschy (1986) found that 
individuals with lower self-esteem showed relatively stronger intergroup discrimination, 
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but some other researchers found the opposite pattern that individuals with higher self-
esteem exhibited higher prejudice than did lower self-esteem groups (Crocker, 
Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987). Nevertheless, tests of BIT have been carried 
out with both implicit and explicit measures and results of a meta-analysis of 18 studies 
of gender and racial stereotypes revealed that the relationships predicted by BIT are 
evident more strongly and consistently when assessed with implicit measures than 
when assessed with parallel explicit self-report measures (Cvencek et al., 2012).  
 
In the present study, following the SIT account for explicit stereotypes, men majoring 
in science who have relatively lower self-evaluated empathy than their female 
counterparts are hypothesised to be more motivated to show weaker explicit stereotypes 
about empathy in scientists in order to promote their personal self-esteem in empathy 
from their social identity. In contrast, according to the BIT account for implicit 
stereotypes, women majoring in science (self = science) who have relatively higher 
self-evaluated empathy (self [women] = empathy) than their male counterparts are 
hypothesised to transmit this positive self-evaluation of empathy to their identified 
science academic group (science = empathy), leading to a comparatively weaker 
implicit bias about empathy in scientists than men majoring in science. The two 
hypotheses will be examined using both implicit and explicit measures of stereotypes 
of empathy in scientists in the present study.  
 
To sum up, taken these findings and theories together, variations in stereotypes vary 
according to whether they are measured implicitly or explicitly. Therefore, it is essential 
to use both implicit and explicit measures to gain a fuller picture about stereotypes of 
empathy in scientists in the present study. Existing research on implicit and explicit 
stereotypes of scientists is scrutinized in the following section, setting up a stage to 
further discuss the limitations of existing studies and demonstrate the research gaps that 
the present study aimed to address. 
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3.2.2. Existing research on stereotypes of scientists 
In this section, empirical studies utilising different kinds of measures to assess people’s 
perceptions about scientists are critically reviewed. As mentioned earlier, it is of great 
importance to distinguish between implicitly-measured and explicitly-measured 
stereotypes, therefore concentrations are placed on examining the existing 
measurements used to assess stereotypes of scientists. Related findings about variations 
in stereotypes of scientists are also scrutinised.  
3.2.2.1. Early research  
Empirical studies about stereotypes of scientists can be traced back to the study 
conducted by Mead and Métraux (1957) asking 35,000 high school students to write an 
essay describing their image of a scientist. Analysis of these essays revealed that the 
typical high school student in this study perceived scientists as being an elder or middle-
aged man wearing a white coat and glasses who conducted dangerous experiments 
alone in a laboratory. Later in the 1960s, Beardslee & O’Dowd (1961) generated long 
lists of observed stereotypes and categorised these stereotypes as either "positive" (e.g., 
intelligent, highly trained, devoted) or "negative" (e.g., brainy, dull, work alone) after 
conducting unstructured interviews with 1,200 college students. In the 1970s, the 
stereotypical image reported by Mead & Métraux (1957) persisted and this persistence 
was confirmed by several other empirical studies using questionnaires to survey public 
attitudes to science in America (Etzioni & Nunn, 1974; Ward, 1977).  
 
In the 1980s, researchers started to develop questionnaires for stereotypes of scientists 
in particular. Krajkovich and Smith (1982) developed the Image of Science and 
Scientists Scale to measure students’ perceptions of science and scientists. This scale 
includes both items about perceptions of scientists’ personality traits (e.g., “when I 
think about a scientist, I think of a person who is intelligent”) as well as items about 
attitudes toward science as a job (e.g., “a scientist’s work is dangerous”). Participants 
are asked to rate these items from a 6-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly agree” 
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to “strongly disagree”. Though it was proven to have strong reliability with a coefficient 
alpha of .86 (Krajkovich & Smith, 1982), researchers criticized that the scale has 
considerable semantic confusion among the terms “scientific attitude” “attitude toward 
science” and “image of science and scientists” (Koballa, Krajkovich, & Smith, 1983; 
Wyer, 2003).  
 
3.2.2.2. Recent research on stereotypes of scientists using explicit measures 
3.2.2.2.1. UK government’s public attitudes to science survey 
To understand the UK public’s attitudes toward science, scientists and science policy, 
the UK government has funded a series of questionnaire surveys – known as the Public 
Attitudes to Science (PAS) series since 2000. The PAS surveys address a broad range 
of topics including public attitudes toward the current state of scientific literacy, current 
scientific issues and scientific engagement. According to the PAS 2014 report, the UK 
public’s overall perceptions of scientists and engineering were “overwhelmingly 
positive” with 90% of participants indicating that scientists “make valuable 
contribution to society” and 83% of participants agreeing that scientists “make life 
better for average person” (Ipsos MORI, 2014, p. 44). However, when asked to rate 
scientists and engineers on their personal traits, 44% said they are poor at 
communication and 50% considered them to be secretive (Ipsos MORI, 2014, p. 47). 
These findings suggest that the perception of scientists as less-social people may still 
be a deeply embedded stereotype in the UK society.  
 
Although the PAS surveys have long been used in the UK as a source of authoritative 
knowledge about science-related attitudes, there are doubts about the robustness of its 
methods and claims. First of all, the sampling of the PAS 2014 study is problematic. 
This study consisted of a main survey of 1749 UK adults aged 16+ and a booster survey 
of 315 young people aging from 16 to 24 years. Clearly, the sample sizes for both 
surveys are limited and the young participants recruited for the booster survey are not 
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representative of the general UK population. Secondly, there is a lack of procedural 
transparency about data processing in the report. The underreporting of test statistics 
such as the p-values makes the claims made in the PAS report less credible (Smith & 
Jensen, 2016). Higher quality research with rigorous methodology is still needed to 
investigate the objectives of the PAS survey including how people perceive scientists.  
 
3.2.2.2.2. ASPIRES project 
To understand how young people’s aspirations in science develop in the UK, a five-
year study called ASPIRES combining quantitative online surveys of over 19,000 
students aging 10 to 14 years and longitudinal interviews with a selective subsample of 
83 students and 65 of their parents were conducted from 2009 to 2013 (Archer, Osborne, 
et al., 2013). The ASPIRES project covers many topics including aspirations in science; 
attitudes towards school science; self-concept in science; images of scientists; 
participation in science-related activities outside of school; parental expectations; 
parental school involvement; parental attitudes towards science; and peer attitudes 
towards school and towards school science (Archer, Osborne, et al., 2013). 
 
Regarding students’ perceptions about scientists, the ASPIRES survey data showed that 
only 21% of Year 9 students agreed that scientists are “geeks” and even fewer (14%) 
believed that scientists are ‘odd’. Only 25% agreed that scientists spend most of their 
time working by themselves. Such findings suggest that young people’s explicit views 
of scientists have become less stereotypical in recent years. However, the interview data 
showed that science aspirations and attitudes are patterned by gender. Girls were found 
to describe careers in science as ‘not girly’ and those who define themselves as highly 
feminine were particularly unlikely to aspire to a scientific career (Archer, DeWitt, et 
al., 2013). Medicine was a particularly popular scientific aspiration among girls as it 
was concerned with ‘helping people’ (Archer, Osborne, et al., 2013). Girls who aspire 
to science by Year 9 were a minority among their peers and described themselves as 
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being odd for studying science, while at the same time being ‘girly’ and enjoying 
socialising with others (Archer, Osborne, et al., 2013). Nevertheless, boys who aspire 
to science were more evenly divided between those who described themselves as 
‘cool/sporty’ and those who did not. These findings suggest that girls who aspire to 
science careers may require considerable resilience to maintain their aspirations in 
science.  
 
All in all, in contrast to the above-mentioned PAS survey results, young adolescents 
from the ASPIRES project reported less stereotypical views about the isolated and 
geeky image of scientists. It is possible that with the increasing awareness of the harms 
of stereotyping, adolescents may be reluctant to report their bias due to social 
desirability concerns. However, ASPIRES found a widespread explicit stereotypical 
view among young people in the UK that science careers are ‘not girly’. It remains 
unknown which specific feminine trait is considered unrelated to science careers.  
 
3.2.2.2.3. ROSE project 
The Relevance of Science Education (ROSE) project is a cross-cultural research project 
investigating young people’s attitudes toward science and technology. It comprised 
surveys among 15-year-old students from 40 countries from all continents (Sjøberg & 
Schreiner, 2012). The ROSE project used a long questionnaire containing 108 items 
addressing students’ science-related out-of-school experiences, interests in learning 
science, views and attitudes toward school science, views of scientists and career 
aspirations. 
 
According to the ROSE report, young people from all the countries agreed that science 
is beneficial to society. However, students from more developed countries (e.g., UK, 
USA, Japan) showed weaker interest in learning science than those from developing 
country (e.g., Nigeria, India, Ghana). In developed countries, young people showed 
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very low interest in “becoming a scientist”, in particular very few girls would like to 
get a job in STEM fields. Nevertheless, young people from developing countries 
believed that science can “make their lives healthier, easier and more comfortable" and 
rated scientists very high on an empathetic notion “helping the poor”. However, 
children from developed countries, especially girls, were very unlikely to associate 
science and scientists with such positive notions. In most developed countries, girls 
reported more interest in getting a job that can help other people than boys, and less 
than 20% of girls think of scientists as "helping the poor" (Sjøberg & Schreiner, 2012).   
 
3.2.2.2.4. Stereotypes of Scientists survey 
Instead of surveying a wide range of topics relating attitudes toward science, scientists 
and scientific experiences as the above-mentioned project, Wyer, Schneider, Nassar-
McMillan and Oliver-Hoyo (2010) developed the Stereotypes of Scientists scale 
concentrating on assessing people’s perceptions about scientists’ professional 
competence as well as their interpersonal skills. In this scale, participants are required 
to rate items such as “scientists are intelligent” or “scientists make friends with people 
from other departments”.  
 
This scale has so far been used only in their own study with 1106 college students in 
the US (Wyer et al., 2010). They found that American college students nowadays 
explicitly reported positive attitudes toward both scientists’ academic competence and 
interpersonal relations. However, given that self-report questionnaires are prone to the 
disadvantage of allowing participants to censor and control answers, this scale may not 
be able to capture participants’ unconscious attitudes toward scientists.  
 
To sum up, recent research on attitudes toward scientists using explicit self-report 
questionnaires found mixed results about stereotypes of empathy in scientists. The PAS 
2014 survey suggested that around half of the adults in the UK believed scientists are 
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not good at communication. Nevertheless, very few adolescents from the ASPIRES 
project reported stereotypical views about scientists’ social skills. However, 
adolescents recruited in the ROSE project still reported little faith in scientists to help 
other people. Furthermore, it is worth noting that questionnaires used in these projects 
often cover a wide range of topics and only a few items tapped into perceptions about 
scientists, not to mention stereotypes about empathy in scientists in particular. Research 
focusing on the image of scientists has mostly been conducted in the US. Last but not 
least, self-report measures are limited to introspective responses which may be affected 
by social desirability concerns. Therefore, the present study addressed these research 
gaps by investigating perceptions of empathy in scientists in the UK using both implicit 
and explicit measures.  
 
3.2.2.3. Recent research on stereotypes of scientists using implicit measures 
As presented before, in the late 1990s, researchers began to differentiate between 
implicit and explicit stereotypes, thus the Draw-a-Scientist Test, as well as the Implicit 
Association Test, have been used in recent decades as implicit measures to capture 
people’s unconscious beliefs about scientists.  
3.2.2.3.1. Draw-a-scientist studies 
The Draw-a-Scientist Test (DAST), in which no introspective verbal responses are 
required, only a drawing of a person is made and evaluated with reference to a selection 
of stereotypes, was developed by Chambers (1983) and used mostly to measure 
children’s perceptions of scientists. This instrument can be regarded as an implicit 
measurement given that test takers are unlikely to be aware of the purpose of the study.  
The DAST can be advantageous in developmental research because children may learn 
stereotypes before reporting them explicitly (Galdi, Cadinu, & Tomasetto, 2014).  
 
As presented earlier in the context of study chapter, the stereotypical image of a scientist 
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that people often draw is an older or middle-aged man who wears a white coat and 
glasses doing experiments alone in a laboratory (Finson, 2002). Evidence from the 
DAST studies revealed that such stereotypical image of scientists can be formed very 
early in life, by the time children reach the second grade in elementary school (Losh, 
Wilke, & Pop, 2008; Newton & Newton, 1998). Moreover, Finson's (2002) meta-
analysis of studies utilizing DAST reveals a remarkable consistency in the image of 
scientists drawn by people across nations, across age groups, across education levels. 
The latest meta-analysis of DAST studies conducted by Miller, Nolla, Eagly and Uttal 
(2018) found that children depicted female scientists more often in later decades, but 
they still associate science with men as they grow older.  
 
Despite being successfully utilised in many studies for a long time, DAST has been 
criticized for its limited application to older age-groups and being prone to the 
experimenter bias in terms of coding (Finson, 2002). Moreover, the DAST also entails 
a prerequisite of drawing skills and boys’ drawings have been found more abstract than 
girls’, which often provided little information for researchers to extract important traits 
such as the drawing’s gender (Thomas et al., 2006). 
 
3.2.2.3.2. Gender-Science IAT studies  
Another popular implicit measurement that has been used to gather unconscious 
stereotypes about scientists is the Gender-Science Implicit Association Test (GS-IAT; 
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002b). The GS-IAT captures people’s automatic 
associations between men and science by assessing different reaction times to stimuli 
that are either paired in a stereotypical way (i.e., men and science) or not (i.e., women 
and science). Research using the GS-IAT has shown that people’s implicit association 
between men and science emerges early in childhood (Cvencek et al., 2011), is 
developmentally stable (Nosek et al., 2002b), ubiquitous across different cultures 
(Nosek et al., 2009), but also substantially variable across different individuals (Smyth 
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& Nosek, 2015).  
 
Existing studies have found that the implicit male-science stereotype predicts judgment 
and behaviour that contribute to the gender gap in science-related activities and 
occupations. These studies have found significant relationships of implicit male-science 
stereotypes with participants’ math engagement (Nosek & Smyth, 2011), performance 
and achievement, intentions to choose scientific major subjects (Lane et al., 2012; 
Nosek et al., 2009; Zitelny, Shalom, & Bar-Anan, 2017), and careers (Cundiff, Vescio, 
Loken, & Lo, 2013). These relations were usually moderated by gender. Among women, 
stronger implicit male-science stereotypes were usually correlated with worse math 
performance and achievement, as well as weaker identification with math and science.  
 
Nevertheless, among men, the implicit male-science stereotypes sometimes had no 
correlations with relevant outcomes, and on other studies, stronger implicit male-
science stereotypes could, in turn, be correlated with better performance, achievements, 
and the stronger identification with math and science (Zitelny et al., 2017). In their 
meta-analysis examining seventeen studies using both implicit and explicit measures 
for gender-science stereotypes, Zitelny et al., (2017) reported that fifteen of those 
studies found that the implicit male-science stereotype had a stronger relationship with 
an outcome variable than the explicit stereotype. It was speculated that implicit 
stereotypes may “shape choices by subtly constraining preferences without the 
individual’s awareness or conscious exertion of choice” (Nosek et al., 2002b, p. 50) and 
“sincere and conscious beliefs that men and women are equally well suited for STEM 
fields do not preclude internalization of the beliefs at a less conscious level” (Lane et 
al., 2012, p. 222). 
 
Moreover, Smyth and Nosek (2015) conducted an online survey with 176,000 college-
educated participants examining relations between gender ratios and male-science 
stereotyping. They argued that gender-science stereotypes should change as conditions 
in local environments change, including gender ratios. Higher female proportion of a 
 51 
STEM major should be correlated with weaker science-male stereotyping. Evidence 
from their study only supported this hypothesis for the explicit stereotype, but not the 
implicit stereotype. Participants from high-female disciplines including biological and 
health sciences showed weaker explicit male-science stereotype than those from low-
female disciplines such as computer sciences, physics and engineering. However, 
implicit male-science stereotype did not correspond with disciplines’ gender ratios, but 
was correlated with scientific intensity, positively for men and negatively for women. 
That is to say, women who majored in subjects perceived as more science-intensive 
(e.g., physics) showed weaker implicit male-science stereotype than did men in the 
same disciplines. Furthermore, particularly among women, those who identified with 
more science-intensive subjects (e.g., physics) showed weaker male-science implicit 
stereotypes than women majoring in less science-intensive subjects (e.g., biology). 
Existing research using the Gender-Science IAT has found evidence for relations 
between implicit gender-science stereotypes and scientific academic achievement and 
career aspirations. On the basis of these findings, we propose to examine whether 
stereotypes of empathy in scientists also correlate with participants’ science career 
aspirations. Moreover, given that variations in implicit and explicit male-science 
stereotypes have shown different relationships with gender ratios of the discipline and 
scientific intensities, the present study will also discuss the individual differences in the 
stereotypes of empathy in scientists differently by whether they are measured implicitly 
or explicitly.  
 
To sum up, previous studies looking at stereotypes of scientists have three main 
limitations. Firstly, most self-report questionnaires used in projects investigating 
attitudes toward science in the UK covers a broad range of topics (e.g., attitudes toward 
school science) and only a few items tapped into perceptions about scientists in 
particular. Secondly, research focusing on the image of scientists has mostly been 
conducted among children and adolescents in the US using DAST. The DAST could 
only provide a general picture of a scientist and was unable to systematically examine 
a specific trait in the scientist. It remains unknown how young adults in the UK perceive 
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scientists nowadays and a new instrument is in need to measure stereotypes of empathy 
in scientists in particular. Last but not least, most existing studies only used the IAT to 
measure implicit gender stereotype of scientists. Though we have found a robust link 
between men and science, further investigation is required to figure out which specific 
stereotypical trait of scientists prevents people from associating science with women. 
As discussed earlier in Section 3.1, women have been found to rate themselves high in 
empathy but scientists usually rate themselves low in empathy (Baron-Cohen, 2002; 
Manson & Winterbottom, 2012). This contradictory evaluations of empathy among 
women and among scientists may serve as a gatekeeper for women to pursue science. 
Research could be fruitful to examine whether stereotypes of empathy in scientists are 
related to gender, major subject selection as well as career aspirations in science. Given 
that there is a lack of reliable measurement to capture people’s perceptions of empathy 
in scientists, the first goal of the present study is thereby to develop a measurement that 
taps into stereotypes of empathy in scientists using the Implicit Association Test (IAT) 
paradigm. The following sections present how IATs differ from self-report 
questionnaires as well as existing studies about psychometric properties of the IAT, 
providing background information for further development and testing of the new IAT 
for stereotypes of empathy in scientists in the present study.  
 
3.3. Implicit association test (IAT) 
Unlike self-report questionnaires that ask participants directly how they think or feel 
about the given research topic, IAT utilizes alternative response parameters, that is the 
reaction time, to indirectly infer an individual’s underlying beliefs. The mechanism of 
the IAT is to compare the strengths of associations among concepts without 
introspection on the part of the participant. The test assesses the strength of associations 
between target categories (e.g., Science versus Humanities) and attribute categories 
(e.g., women versus men), which are arranged on two separate dimensions. For example, 
when using the IAT to measure gender-science stereotyping, participants are asked to 
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categorise words representing Humanities versus Sciences (e.g., physics, chemistry, 
history, etc.,), and pictures representing women and men, as rapidly as possible, using 
designated response keys. On certain trials, the categories Science and women would 
be paired on the same response key (while Humanities and men on the other), whereas 
on other trials Science and men would be paired together (and Humanities with women). 
 
Categorisation response times would then be compared across these two conditions to 
infer the nature of gender stereotypes of scientists held by participants. For example, if 
one responded faster to respond when items representing Science paired with images of 
women, it would be assumed that one held a counter-stereotype implicit belief about 
the gender of scientists. In contrast, if one was faster to respond when items 
representing Science paired with images of men, it would be assumed that one held 
stereotype-congruent implicit views about the gender of scientists. The rationale behind 
the IAT procedure is that individuals should be faster to respond when strongly 
associated constructs are paired on the same response key, than when they are separated 
across response keys. Therefore, The IAT is argued to reflect automatic cognitive 
associations held by respondent and may have the potential to overcome some of the 
limitations of self-report measures (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998)  
 
3.3.1. What can IAT tell us that differ from self-report questionnaires?  
3.3.1.1. Unconscious versus conscious representations 
A major difference between the IAT and self-report measures is that IATs avoid 
introspection for the assessment of mental representations. Thus, IATs have the 
potential to tap unconscious representations that are inaccessible to introspection 
(Asendorpf et al., 2002; Bosson, Swann Jr., & Pennebaker, 2000; Greenwald & Banaji, 
1995). One empirical finding that is often interpreted as evidence supporting the 
unconscious nature of the implicit representations measured by IATs is that IAT scores 
often diverge from those obtained on corresponding self-report questionnaires (Lane, 
 54 
Banaji, Nosek, & Greenwald, 2007; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007).  
 
However, it is worth mentioning that low correlations between the two kinds of 
measurements can also be the result of many other factors other than the lack of 
introspective access (Gawronski, LeBel, & Peters, 2007). For example, some 
researchers argue that the low correlations between IATs and self-reports may be partly 
due to the lack of conceptual correspondence (i.e., the extent to which the attitudes are 
measured at the same level of abstractness and with the same degree of specificity; 
Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977) as well as structural fit (i.e., the degree of methodological 
similarity between different tests, Payne, Burkley, & Stokes, 2008) between implicit 
and explicit measures (Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005).  
 
That is to say, in most explicit self-reports, participants are required to make evaluations 
on a series of propositional statements. In contrast, the IATs avoid all the propositions 
involved in the self-reports, and instead only assess relative attitudes toward two 
different target concepts based on the comparisons between reaction time to register 
different responses. For example, many standard self-report scales for racial prejudice 
(e.g., Modern Racism Scale, McConahay, 1986) assess participants' political opinions 
on issues such as affirmative action or the discrimination of ethnic minority members. 
In contrast, racism IATs typically assess participants' responses to members of ethnic 
minority groups (e.g., faces of Black and White individuals). Thus, even though general 
evaluations of ethnic minority members may be systematically related to people's 
political opinions (Gawronski, Peters, Brochu, & Strack, 2008), the low correlations 
between these self-report racial prejudice scales and the IAT measures are very likely 
resulted from their conceptual and structural distinctnesses, not necessarily because one 
is tapping unconscious representations (Gawronski et al., 2007; Hofmann et al., 2005). 
Therefore, cautions are stressed on the content and structure of the applied self-report 
measures in the present study when interpreting their correlations with the IAT.  
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3.3.1.2. Uncontrolled versus controlled representations 
Another primary difference between the IAT and self-report explicit measures resides 
in their differing susceptibility to self-presentation and social desirability. Specifically, 
it is assumed that performance on IATs is uncontrollable by participants as they are 
either unaware that their perceptions are being assessed or do not have enough cognitive 
capacity to alter their immediate spontaneous responses (Asendorpf et al., 2002; Fazio 
et al., 1995). Therefore, IAT scores are resistant - or at least less susceptible – to such 
motivational distortions. Building upon this assumption, a group of researchers claimed 
that implicit measures may provide a "bona fide pipeline" to people's true attitudes and 
beliefs (Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 2006; Rutland, Cameron, Milne, & McGeorge, 
2005; Teachman, Gapinski, Brownell, Rawlins, & Jeyaram, 2003). 
 
Although implicit measures such as the IAT tap into mental associations that an 
individual may not want to report, or may not be able to report, a number of articles 
have criticized the misuse of the implicit measures as lie-detectors or revealing more 
"true" or "real" mental representations than self-reports (Arkes & Tetlock, 2004; 
Gawronski et al., 2007; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). It has been argued that the IAT and 
self-report results can differ for multiple reasons: one can be unaware of the implicit 
bias and report a unique explicit responses; or one is aware of the implicit bias, but 
genuinely reject them as not consistent with his or her beliefs so chooses to report an 
alternative response; or one is aware of the implicit bias but chooses to report an 
alternative response due to self-presentation concerns and social desirability. Only the 
third possibility would fit the assumption that implicit measures detect a deliberate 
concealing of endorsed explicit attitudes and beliefs (Nosek, Greenwald, et al., 2007). 
Moreover, evidence has shown that participants were often surprised by their IAT 
results when revealing undesirable implicit bias and reported feelings of guilt especially 
for implicit racial bias (Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2001; Monteith, Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, 
& Czopp, 2002).  
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Therefore, though IATs are resistant to deliberate attempts to control responses, it is 
inappropriate to classify IAT and self-reports as having distinguished degrees of access 
to reality or truth (Lane et al., 2007). Having implicit bias does not make an individual 
a racist, sexist or any other accusation. When interpreting findings of the present study, 
it is important to bear in mind not to regard explicit attitudes as "fake" or "unreal" but 
treat the implicit bias as the "real" or "true" attitude. 
3.3.1.3. Old versus new representations 
Another common assumption in research using implicit measures is that the IATs assess 
highly stable old representations that have their roots in long-term socialization 
experiences, whereas standard self-report measures tap newly acquired attitudes, at 
least as long as people are motivated and able to retrieve their new attitudes from 
memory (Conner & Barrett, 2005; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Petty, 
Tormala, Briñol, & Jarvis, 2006; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Sinclair, Dunn, & Lowery, 
2005). Some researchers have proposed that recently acquired attitudes often do not 
overwrite old attitudes, but instead coexist with old, ostensibly stable, implicit ones 
(Petty et al., 2006; Wilson et al., 2000). The proposed matching of measurement 
procedures with "old" versus "new" attitudes implies that implicitly assessed 
evaluations should exhibit a higher level of robustness against attempts to change 
attitudes than do self-reported evaluations (Gawronski et al., 2007).  
 
However, it is important to note that existing empirical studies revealed mixed evidence 
for this assumption. Some researchers found that experimental attempts to change 
attitudes affect only explicitly self-reported but not implicitly assessed attitudes 
(Gawronski & Strack, 2004). But several other studies found corresponding changes in 
both explicitly and implicitly measured attitudes (Gawronski, Walther, & Blank, 2005; 
Olson & Fazio, 2001; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004). There are also some studies 
revealing that conditioning manipulation affected implicit but not explicit attitudes 
(Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Olson & Fazio, 2006).  
 
 57 
Moreover, the IATs have also demonstrated a relatively high level of context sensitivity 
(e.g., Blair, 2002; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). For example, Wittenbrink, Judd, 
and Park (2001) found that implicitly measured attitudes toward Black people differ as 
a function of the background context in which these individuals are presented (e.g., at 
a barbeque or against a graffiti wall). Taken together, these findings suggest that the 
proposed equation of implicit measures versus self-report measures with old versus new 
representations (respectively) is empirically unfounded. When interpreting the findings 
of the present study, it is important to bear in mind not to regard implicit attitudes as 
more stable and long-lasting than the explicit ones.  
 
3.3.1.4. Activation of associations versus validation of judgments 
Following a more recent conceptualization, implicit measures are regarded as providing 
a proxy for activation of associations in memory (i.e., associative processes), whereas 
self-reports reflect the propositional outcome of validation processes (i.e., propositional 
process; (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014). Both processes reflect different aspects of 
mental representations, and the activation of associations can occur independently of 
whether an individual considers these associations as accurate or not (Gawronski et al., 
2007). That is to say, the validation process is concerned with assessing the truth or 
falsity of the activated information, but the rejection of a given proposition as invalid 
does not necessarily lead to a deactivation of associations the proposition is based on. 
In this case, rejections of propositions can affect judgments assessed with self-report 
measures but not necessarily the activation of associations assessed with implicit 
measures (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014; Gawronski et al., 2007). In other words, 
having automatically activated stereotypical associations of concepts does not mean 
that one will acknowledge those activations when making reflective judgments.   
 
To sum up, when interpreting the findings of the present study, it is important to bear 
in mind that both the implicitly and explicitly measured stereotypes are "real" to some 
extent and reflect different kinds of cognitive processes. Both the automatic associative 
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and validated propositional attitudes are real attitudes and they can coexist at the same 
time. The IATs are more resistant to deliberate attempts to control responses due to 
social desirability bias than the self-report measures, but they are still sensitive to 
manipulations of contextual factors and do not reveal higher-level stability than self-
report measures. Therefore, it is of great importance to carefully control construct-
unrelated factors which may affect the reliability and validity of the measurement when 
developing an IAT. The following sections review studies of the psychometric 
properties of IAT measures.  
 
3.3.2. Psychometric properties of the IAT 
Because the IAT represents a procedural paradigm for measuring implicit cognition 
rather than a single measure of a specific construct, there is no single incarnation of the 
IAT to be validated. Given that the IAT can be adapted to measure different constructs 
(e.g., racial attitudes, gender attitudes, food preference, etc.,), two IATs may have little 
in common other than the basic structure of the task. Although the IAT paradigm 
produces many reliable and valid tasks, this does not mean that any single IAT is 
necessarily a good measure of the target construct. Given that the present study aims to 
develop a new IAT to assess individual differences in stereotypes of empathy in 
scientists, it is especially important to evaluate whether the newly developed IAT can 
meet relevant psychometric criteria. The following sections review the most common 
psychometric properties for the IAT in general.   
 
3.3.2.1. Reliability 
The concept of reliability is very much tied up with the repeatability or reproducibility 
of any assessment. For any measure to be useful, it needs to have consistency so that it 
produces more or less the same result for a person each time it is used (Coaley, 2010). 
High reliability means that a measure gives similar results on different occasions.  
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3.3.2.1.1. Internal consistency 
As a measurement based on response latencies measured in milliseconds, error variance 
can be easily introduced into studies using IATs - a sneeze, a car horn, or even an 
eyeblink can add unwanted variance in response latency (Lane et al., 2007). Indeed, 
evidence has shown that the internal consistency of measures based on reaction time is 
generally lower than that of those based on self-reports (Buchner & Wippich, 2000). 
Even so, IATs have gained exponential popularity partly due to their superior reliability 
over other latency-based implicit measures such as the Go/No-Go Association Task 
(averaged split-half reliability r = .20; Nosek & Banaji, 2001) or the priming method 
(e.g., split-half reliability r = .06, Bosson, Swann & Pennebaker, 2000). The split-half 
method used to test internal consistency is to create two parallel tests from the items 
within one test, then to compute a composite score for each subtest and correlate the 
two composite scores (Furr & Bacharach, 2008). According to the rule of thumb, an 
estimate of 0.6 to 0.7 indicates acceptable reliability, and 0.8 or higher indicates good 
reliability. The split-half reliability for existing IAT measures tends to range from .70 
to .90 (Schmukle & Egloff, 2005).  
 
The split-half approach is based on the perspective that two halves within a test 
represent parallel subtests, and the reliability of the complete test is based on the 
associations between the two subtests. From the "item-level" perspective, Chronbach's 
alpha takes the logic of internal consistency a step farther by conceiving of each item 
as a subtest. Consequently, the associations among the items can be used to estimate 
the reliability of the complete test (Furr & Bacharach, 2008). In one study examining 
the internal consistency of a number of implicit measures, the IAT showed satisfactory 
internal consistency (Chronbach's alpha = .78), which is relatively rare for other implicit 
measures such as the evaluative priming task (Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001). 
A meta-analysis of 50 studies using IATs has also reported an acceptable averaged 
internal consistency of the IAT with Chronbach's alpha = .79 (Hofmann et al., 2005).  
Based on these findings, the newly-developed IAT in the present study is expected to 
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show satisfactory internal consistency around the rule of thumb of .70.  
 
3.3.2.1.2. Test-retest reliability 
On the other hand, the test-retest reliability (i.e., the consistency of measurement at 
different time points; Furr & Bacharach, 2008) of the IAT has been found less 
satisfactory, ranging from .25 to .69 with a mean estimate of about .50 (Lane et al., 
2007). That is to say, when we use the same measure in the same population at two 
different time points, the measure is expected to produce similar results which should 
demonstrate strong positive correlations with each other. For example, a measurement 
producing the same data output at every time would, therefore, show a perfect test-
retest reliability of r = 1. The satisfactory test-retest value for the self-report 
questionnaire is usually above .70.  
Though the IAT shows somewhat low test-retest reliability as compared to self-report 
measures, it is important to note that other implicit measures also demonstrate relatively 
weak test-retest reliability compared to explicit measures and it is not uncommon for 
implicit measures to show test-retest reliability below .50 (Bosson et al., 2000). The 
IAT even showed superior averaged test-retest reliability (.69) over other implicit 
measures, which ranged from -.05 (e.g., Stroop task) to .63 (e.g., Initials birthday 
preference task) and averaged .03 (Bosson et al., 2000). Given that the IAT usually 
showed low test-retest reliability as well as the limited time scope of a PhD project, the 
test-retest reliability of the newly developed IAT is not examined in the present study.   
 
3.3.2.2. Validity 
Construct validity concerns the evidence which shows that the test really is a measure 
of what it claims to measure (Coaley, 2010). In statistical terms, construct validity 
represents the extent to which a measure's variance is linked with the variance of its 
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underlying construct (Barrett, Phillips, & Alexander, 1981). There is no single 
correlation for this and validation requires review of a range of correlations and whether 
they match what would be expected. For example, the simplest method is to examine 
the correlation of scores with other accepted measures of the same thing (Coaley, 2010). 
Therefore, construct validity depends on all the evidence gathered to show that a test 
does relate to its construct. The following sections review a series of validity criteria as 
well as construct-unrelated variance that may violate the validity of the IAT.  
3.3.2.2.1. Known-groups validity 
A valid measurement needs to be able to reliably differentiate between members of 
different groups, based on prior knowledge or predictions about them. It is important 
for an IAT to successfully discriminate between groups in order to be regarded as a 
measure of personal attitudes rather than shared stereotypes embedded in the culture 
that one lives in (Nosek, Greenwald, et al., 2007). For example, consistent with the 
prevailing gender role expectations, women indeed were found to implicitly associate 
self more with arts as compared to math than men did (Nosek et al., 2002b). Such 
finding can be interpreted as evidence that the IAT is able to predict known group 
differences.  
 
Moreover, existing evidence has shown that the IAT is sensitive to more subtle 
differences in the societal evaluation of different groups despite the ambiguity of 
ingroup preference. Using the IAT method, African Americans showed reduced 
ingroup preference as compared to European Americans (Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2003), 
and over-weight and poor people even showed an outgroup preference instead (Rudman, 
Feinberg, & Fairchild, 2002). Successful discrimination between group members even 
extends to groups that are defined by behaviours rather than demographics. For example, 
smokers showed more positive implicit attitudes toward and stronger identity with 
smoking than non-smokers (Houwer, Custers, & Clercq, 2006). In the present study, it 
is hypothesized that the IAT can differentiate between science majors and humanities 
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majors by showing different implicit attitudes toward empathy in scientists.  
 
3.3.2.2.2. Relationship with explicit measures 
The convergent-discriminant validity is one type of subordinate validity which is based 
on the idea that a measure needs to correlate with others of the same thing but not with 
those measuring other constructs (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). One of the important 
criteria to evaluate the convergent-discriminant validity of IAT is to examine its 
correlations with explicit measures, in other words, self-report measures (Greenwald, 
Nosek, & Banaji, 2003; Nosek, Greenwald, et al., 2007). The relationship between 
implicit and explicit attitudes has received a great deal of attention that has produced 
mixed evidence for the original proposed question: "Do implicit and explicit attitudes 
relate to one another?" 
 
Some of the initial research efforts with the IAT emphasized the distinctiveness of the 
implicit and explicit cognitions in finding weak to weak relations between IAT and self-
report measures (Greenwald et al., 1998). However, with the accumulation of research 
on the relationship between implicit and explicit measures, recent studies have 
produced mixed evidence regarding implicit-explicit correlations. As reported by Lane 
et al. (2007), across 17 IATs that were available at public websites, correlations 
between implicit and explicit measures range from r = .13 to r = .75 (median r = .22). 
Laboratory studies have also shown similar variability, with some studies revealing 
slight or moderate (but generally positive) correlations between IAT and self-reports of 
the same construct (Bosson et al., 2000; Egloff & Schmukle, 2002), and other studies 
showing strong and robust correlations between IAT and self-reports (e.g., 
Cunningham et al., 2001; Jellison, McConnell, & Gabriel, 2004; McConnell & Leibold, 
2001). A meta-analysis of IAT studies found that across 126 studies, implicit-explicit 
correspondence ranged from r = -.25 to r = .60, with an average implicit-explicit 
correlation ofcit .19 (Hofmann et al., 2005).  
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Even when IATs and explicit measures do correlate, evidence shows that implicit and 
explicit attitudes are still distinct constructs (Wilson et al., 2000). Using structural 
equation modelling, across 57 different pairs of attitude objects, Nosek and Smyth 
(2007) found that implicit and explicit attitudes were better fit by a model in which they 
loaded onto two separate factors, rather than a single, latent factor even when implicit 
and explicit attitudes were highly correlated with one another.  
 
Given that the extent to which implicit and explicit attitudes are correlated varied 
widely across studies, the more appropriate question for future research to answer 
should be "Under what conditions, and for what kind of people, are implicit and explicit 
measures related?" (Olson & Fazio, 2004). The hunt for the convergent-discriminant 
validity of the IAT may also be more successful when large samples and advanced 
statistical techniques, such as meta-analysis or latent variable modeling, are used. In the 
present study, the relationship between implicit and explicit measures of the stereotypes 
of empathy in scientists are still examined. Following the idea that implicit and explicit 
stereotypes are distinct constructs, we still hypothesize the implicitly measured 
stereotypes of empathy in scientists to show weak correlation with explicitly measured 
self-report stereotypes in the present study. However, it is important to bear in mind 
that the simple correlations between one IAT and self-report measures should not be 
interpreted as robust evidence for the convergent-discriminant validity of the IAT. 
 
3.3.2.2.3. Predictive validity 
Given that a long-standing interest of psychologists is to understand how attitudes 
predict behaviour, it is not surprising much research effort has been put on examining 
whether attitudes captured by IATs are related to meaningful behaviours. The ability to 
successfully predict behaviours is also an important aspect of psychometric properties 
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theoretical models of the implicit and explicit stereotypes (i.e., double-dissociation, 
addictive and interactive; see Section 3.2.1.3) and each model entails a distinct 
hypothesis about the predictive validity of the IAT.  
 
According to the double-dissociation model, IATs and self-report measures should 
predict spontaneous and controlled behaviours respectively. Indeed, there is evidence 
showing that IATs are capable of successfully predicting less controlled behaviours 
when participants are under a high cognitive load (Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009) 
or under the influence of alcohol (Hofmann & Friese, 2008). Furthermore, Greenwald, 
Poehlman, Uhlmann and Banaji (2009) meta-analysed 184 independent samples and 
found that both implicit and explicit stereotypes were related to a range of behaviours 
but implicit bias measured by IATs were superior to explicit bias measured by self-
reports in predicting physiological responses and non-verbal discriminant behaviours, 
whereas explicit measures were superior to IATs in predicting more deliberate 
behaviours such as political candidate choices and brand preferences. 
 
As suggested by the additive model, the IAT and the explicit measures should be seen 
as different measures of the same attitudes. From this point of view, attitudes can be 
compared to icebergs, with explicit attitudes residing above the surface of conscious 
control and implicit attitudes residing below it (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). If we follow 
this assumption of a single cognitive system but two different measures, both implicit 
and explicit measures of the same attitudes should provide a distinctive prediction of 
behaviours. However, no empirical evidence to date has been found supporting this 
hypothesis (Perugini, 2005).  
 
According to the interactive model, implicit and explicit processes should work 
together in a multiplicative way in order to influence behaviours, possibly when 
individuals feel ambivalent towards something. For example, a study by Frost, Ko, and 
James (2007) revealed that individuals who were most likely to be passive aggressive 
when interacting with others showed high implicit aggression when completing a 
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conditional reasoning task but scored low in self-report aggression questionnaire. 
Similarly, Jordan and his colleagues (2003) found that individuals displayed the highest 
level of narcissistic behaviours scored low in implicit self-esteem measured by an IAT 
but high in explicit self-esteem measured by a self-report questionnaire. 
 
To sum up, existing evidence has shown that IATs can predict a range of meaningful 
behaviours. It is possible to articulate three predictive models that reflect the relations 
between implicit and explicit attitudes and behaviours. Empirical studies have found 
evidence for both the double-dissociation model and interactive model, but not the 
additive model. The present study will also examine the predictive power of the newly 
developed IAT for stereotypes of empathy in scientists by looking at its relationship 
with career aspirations in science. 
 
3.3.2.2.4. Construct-unrelated variance 
Several studies have revealed a number of construct-unrelated variables that may have 
influence on the IAT validity include: order of the compatible and incompatible tasks; 
cognitive fluency; and prior experience with the IAT.  
 
Firstly, the most commonly observed extraneous factor is the order of the compatible 
and incompatible task. In the IAT, the compatible task is the task when participants are 
required to pair items in a stereotypical way, whereas the incompatible task refers to 
the task when participants are required to pair items in a counter-stereotypical way. 
Regardless of the content of the tasks, the performance of the preceding pairing task 
tends to interfere with the performance of the subsequent pairing task. IAT effects are 
found slightly biased toward indicating that the associations drawn upon in the first-
performed task are stronger than those drawn upon the later-performed task (Back, 
Schmukle, & Egloff, 2005; Klauer, 2005). This extraneous effect will be controlled by 
counterbalancing the task order as well as adding more trials for practice in the present 
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study (See later Section 4.3.4).  
 
The second extraneous influence is the individual difference in average response 
latency, or so-called cognitive fluency (i.e., the ease with which information is 
processed; Mierke & Klauer, 2003). Participants who react generally more slowly tend 
to show larger IAT effects (representing stronger implicit bias) than those who react 
more quickly (McFarland & Crouch, 2002). This extraneous effect can be reduced by 
applying an advanced scoring algorithm (Greenwald et al., 2003; See later Section 
5.2.5). 
Moreover, existing evidence also suggests that effect magnitudes with the IAT tend to 
decline for participants who have prior experience taking an IAT (Greenwald & Nosek, 
2001). The advanced scoring algorithm has also been proposed as an effective way to 
reduce the influence of this factor (Greenwald et al., 2003). The present study will apply 
this algorithm and test its ability to control the extraneous order variance (see later 
Section 5.3.6) and prior experience variance (see later Section 5.3.7).  
 
3.4. Research questions and overview of the present study 
The Literature Review chapter has summarised 1) existing research on relations 
between gender, empathy and science, 2) theories about implicit and explicit 
stereotyping as well as empirical research on stereotypes of scientistsand, 3) literature 
regarding the Implicit Association Test and its psychometric properties. It has been 
found that existing research on stereotypes of scientists has been mostly focused upon 
the gender stereotype of scientists, stereotypes of empathy in scientists are 
underinvestigated. Considering the lack of measurement to assess stereotypes of 
empathy in scientists, the first goal of the present study is to apply the IAT paradigm to 
develop a new IAT to capture implicit perceptions about empathy in scientists.  
 
Using the newly developed IAT as well as self-report questionnaires, the present study 
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aims to investigate three main research questions as follows:  
1. What are the implicit and explicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists among UK 
university students nowadays? 
2. What are the individual differences in the implicit and explicit stereotypes of 
empathy in scientists by gender and major subject? 
3. How do the implicit and explicit stereotypes of empathy relate to students’ career 
aspirations in science?   
An overview of the present PhD project is summarised in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1 Research stages of the present PhD project 
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Stages Research aims Participants 
Stage one Designing and developing an IAT for stereotypes 
of empathy in scientists 
-  Select appropriate categories and stimulus 
items for the Science-Empathy IAT (SE-IAT) 
-  Design the procedures of the SE-IAT 
-  Create a website to implement the SE-IAT 
online 
32 participants for item 
selection and a focus 
group of 6 participants to 
test the website 
 
 
Stage two Testing and modifying the newly-developed IAT 
-  Examine the validity and reliability of the SE-
IAT 
-  Modify the SE-IAT to the Single-category SE-
IAT (SSE-IAT) accordingly 
485 participants from four 
Russell Group universities 
Stage three Applying the SSE-IAT and self-report 
questionnaires to investigate the implicit and 
explicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists 
- Apply the SSE-IAT and self-report 
questionnaires to explore contemporary implicit 
and explicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists  
-  Examine individual differences in the implicit 
and explicit stereotypes by gender and major 
subject 
-  Examine the interplay of the implicit and 
explicit stereotypes in science career aspirations 
1448 participants from 
eight Russell Group 
universities 
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Chapter 4  Stage One: designing and developing an online Implicit 
Association Test to measure stereotypes of empathy in scientists 
4.1.  Introduction 
In Stage one, the two main research goals are 1) to systematically apply the IAT 
paradigm to develop a new Science-Empathy IAT (SE-IAT) to assess the implicit bias 
toward empathy in scientists and 2) to create a website to administer the new SE-IAT 
online. To date, very few studies have reported the specific steps of designing and 
developing an IAT. However, many problems may occur in the development process 
leading to additional construct-unrelated variance to the IAT effects. Therefore, it is 
considered of great importance to inform readers of how the SE-IAT was built and the 
specific methods used during the process to control for the potential confounds. In this 
chapter, three major steps to design and computerize the SE-IAT are presented in detail. 
In Step I, appropriate categories and stimulus items were firstly selected according to 
ratings of a focus group. In Step II, elements of the SE-IAT procedure, such as the order 
of the blocks and the number of trials, were designed in a mindful way to avoid the 
potential confounds as much as possible. In Step III, by comparing the pros and cons 
of different IAT software packages, the SE-IAT website was finally implemented 
online using the Project Implicit virtual lab service. The newly developed website was 
piloted with another focus group to test its face validity and updates were made 
accordingly.  
 
4.2.  Step I: Selecting Appropriate Categories and Items  
4.2.1. Category label selection 
The critical materials of an IAT are four categories defined by category labels (e.g., 
Flower and Insect as target categories; Pleasant and Unpleasant as attribute categories) 
and the stimulus items that serve as exemplars for those categories (e.g., pictures of 
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flowers and insects as a stimulus items for target categories; positive and negative 
adjectives as a stimulus item for attribute categories). Two initial choices in developing 
an IAT arise in determining how to represent the chosen categories. Both chosen 
category labels, and the specific representative items, determine the construal of the 
concept (Lane et al., 2007). Existing evidence has shown that category membership, 
rather than the valence of individual exemplars, is most important in determining IAT 
effects (De Houwer, 2001; Mitchell, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). For example, with the 
same stimulus items, when categorization is based on occupation, participants were 
found to prefer (well-liked) Black athletes to (disliked) White politicians, but when 
categorization is based on race, participants preferred White politicians to Black 
athletes instead (Mitchell et al., 2003). Such findings imply that the nature and construal 
of the categories play a large role in determining IAT effects and researchers must be 
precise in defining the constructs of interest and should carefully choose the appropriate 
category labels to represent the constructs (Lane et al., 2007).  
 
Given the IAT structure requiring contrasting categories, choosing a companion 
category label to the category of interest is inevitable. The counterpart category labels 
should be sensible, mutually exclusive categories that are ideally from the same domain, 
such as choosing family as the counterpart target category for career (Lane et al., 2007).   
 
In the present study, Liberal arts was selected as the counterpart target category to 
Science in SE-IAT. The phrases STEM and non-STEM were not adopted in order to 
keep instructions clear and easy to understand for participants (Cohen, Manion, & 
Morrison, 2003). Compared to ‘science’, an everyday vocabulary, STEM is more 
complex as an abbreviation for Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics. It 
cannot be guaranteed that every participant could quickly comprehend the word ‘STEM’ 
during the test. The incomprehensive jargon may add extra cognitive processing burden 
for participants and slow down their responses, resulting in construct-unrelated 
variance to the IAT effects. As such, it is not recommended to use STEM and Non-
STEM as target category labels. Moreover, the category labels of Science and Liberal 
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arts have been successfully used in the well-established Gender-Science IAT (Nosek 
et al., 2009). It is safer to use the existing labels that have been successfully validated 
in previous studies than to adopt untested new labels.  
 
Regarding attribute categories, rationality was selected as the counterpart label to 
Empathy. Rationality has been used as the contrasting category to Emotionality in the 
Gender-Reasoning IAT (Smeding, 2012). Though emotionality is not completely 
identical to empathy, they are closely related concepts. Rationality serves well as a 
sensible, mutually exclusive concept to both emotionality and empathy, thereby it was 
borrowed from the Gender-Reasoning IAT to be used in the SE-IAT. It is worth noting 
that apathy or indifference may also work well as the counterpart to empathy. However, 
it is not preferred for two reasons. First, rationality has been validated in the Gender-
Reasoning IAT while apathy and indifference have never been used in any existing IAT, 
therefore rationality enjoys a psychometric advantage over the other two options. More 
importantly, both apathy and indifference are prefixed words that simply mean "not 
empathy". It has been pointed out by Lane et al. (2007) that the use of negations of 
words or phrases such as "unintelligent" requires additional time for participants to 
correctly differentiate the contrasting concepts, therefore causing undesired construct-
unrelated variance to the IAT effects. In this case, it is not recommended to simply use 
the negations of words as counterparts when selecting contrasting category labels.  
 
4.2.2. Stimulus item selection 
Furthermore, the items representing categories also matter to the IAT effects and so 
they need to be selected carefully as well. Researchers found varied IAT effects when 
they held the category labels constant but changed the items used to represent these 
categories (Govan & Williams, 2004; Mitchell et al., 2003; Nosek, Greenwald, & 
Banaji, 2005; Steffens & Plewe, 2001). For example, when pictures of disliked Blacks 
and liked Whites presented the categories Black and White, participants exhibited 
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strong and significant preference for Whites over Blacks. However, the typically seen 
preference for Whites was significantly diminished when liked Blacks and disliked 
Whites represented the categories (Govan & Williams, 2004; Mitchell et al., 2003; 
Steffens & Plewe, 2001). Such findings indicate that selected stimulus items should 
represent the category in the same way. Consistency among stimulus items can prevent 
drastic changes in the elicited implicit attitudes, thus ensuring the reliability of the IAT. 
As such, in order to produce the most valid measure of corresponding implicit cognition, 
stimulus items that best represent the construal of the construct of interest without the 
confounding valence should be carefully generated first.  
 
In addition, when using IAT as an individual difference measure, it is also important to 
make sure that participants can readily identify each item as denoting the appropriate 
category without extensive deliberation. By conducting a pilot study to select the items 
that can be quickly sorted into the corresponding category, we tried to maximize the 
variance of interest: that due to individual differences in the cognition but not task-
specific variability (Lane et al., 2007). Ambiguity about an item's appropriate 
categorization may slow reaction time, adding construct-unrelated variance to the IAT 
effects (Nosek, Greenwald, et al., 2007). As such, items should be categorised solely 
on the basis of their membership in the corresponding category and not be confounded 
with any of the other categories (Steffens & Plewe, 2001).  
 
According to the above-mentioned criteria for stimulus items, a two-step procedure was 
followed in the present study to choose the most appropriate stimulus items for the SE-
IAT. In the first step, an item pool was generated on the basis of the words used in 
relation to the Gender-Science IAT, Gender-Reasoning IAT as well as the Empathy 
Quotient (EQ) questionnaire from earlier studies. In the second step, a focus group was 
organized to rate items on their representativeness of categories. Only items that could 
best represent one category without any ambiguous double memberships were kept as 
the final items. The two-step item selection procedure is explained in detail below.  
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4.2.2.1. Item generation 
When generating the stimulus item pool for the SE-IAT, different approaches were 
employed for target categories (i.e., science and liberal arts) and attribute categories 
(i.e., rationality and empathy). The items for science and liberal arts were directly 
adapted from the Gender-Science IAT. The only change is that in the Gender-Science 
IAT, stimulus items are subjects (e.g., physics) but in the initial SE-IAT version created 
for the present study, stimulus items were adapted to professions (e.g., physicist). This 
change was made due to the purpose of examining stereotypes of individuals in STEM 
instead of specific subjects. See Table 4.3 in later Section 4.2.2.2.4 for the selected 
items representing science and liberal arts.  
 
The attribute stimulus items for rationality were generated from the Gender-Reasoning 
IAT. Some synonyms of the original stimulus items from the GR-IAT were also 
included. As for the items representing empathy, keywords, including adjectives and 
nouns, were derived from the Empathy Quotient (EQ) questionnaire (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004). For example, "caring" was extracted from the question "I really 
enjoy caring for others" in EQ as a candidate item for empathy. Finally, the item pool 
consisted of 30 items, 11 nouns, 18 adjectives and 1 two-word phrase. Table 4.1 
presents the attribute item pool for SE-IAT. 
Table 4.1 Attribute item pool for the preliminary SE-IAT 
Rationality 
Analytical Calculative Consistent Coherence Deduction 
Insight Induction Logical Ordered Organised 
Rational Reasoning Systematic Sanity Standardised 
Empathy 
Affection Appreciation Caring  Concern Considerate 
Comprehensive Ethical  Empathetic Emotion  Feeling 
Intuitive Soul  Sensitive Understanding Perspective-taking 
 74 
4.2.2.2. Item selection  
In order to select the attribute stimulus items that can best represent rationality and 
empathy without ambiguous category membership, a small group of university students 
was organized to rate the generated items about their representativeness of rationality 
and empathy.  
 
4.2.2.2.1. Participants and procedure 
Participants were recruited by oral invitation. The study was introduced as a short 
survey about vocabulary categorisation to random students from two colleges at the 
University of Cambridge. Participants were offered chocolate bars for their 
participation in the study.  
 
The survey was carried out in the common rooms of the recruited participants' colleges 
using the traditional paper-and-pencil administration. Each participant was given a 
questionnaire comprising the written instructions, item categorization questions and 
personal information questions. The researcher was present at the survey session to 
guarantee that participants understood the instructions and completed the questionnaire 
independently. It took each participant less than 5 minutes to complete the questionnaire.  
 
A total of 32 participants took part in the study, of which 2 had to be removed from 
further analysis for not having finished the questionnaire. The final sample of 30 
participants consisted of 16 (53.4%) women and 14 (46.6%) men. The mean age was 
25.9 years (SD = 5.2), ranging from 19 to 39 years. Regarding their major subjects, 20 
(66.7%) participants were majoring in liberal arts and 7 (23.3%) participants were 
majoring in science, the remaining 3 participants did not report the major subject. 
Though information about their nationality and English levels was not collected, around 
80% of the participants were Caucasians and 20% were Asians. Given that all overseas 
students enrolled in the University of Cambridge are required to demonstrate 
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competence in the English language at a very high level by taking a standard English 
language test (e.g., The language requirements are 7.5 out of 9 for the International 
English Language Testing System (IELTS) and 110 out of 120 for the Test of English 
as a Foreign Language (TOEFL), all participants were deemed to speak proficient 
English so were eligible to evaluate the items.  
 
4.2.2.2.2. Materials 
A vocabulary categorisation scale was developed by the researcher to assess each item's 
representativeness of rationality or empathy. Following the item rating method 
introduced by Fleischhauer, Strobel, Enge and Strobel (2013), participants were asked 
to rate how much they associate each item with rationality or empathy on a 7-point 
Likert scale with the attribute anchors 'strongly rationality' versus 'strongly empathy' 
(See Appendix I for the full attribute item selection scale). Items associated with 
rationality were scored 1 to 3, the smaller the score the more representative was the 
item of rationality. On the contrary, items associated with empathy were scored 5 to 7, 
the bigger the score the more representative was the item of empathy. Items in the 
middle that scored close to 4 were the ambiguous ones that participants found could be 
associated with both empathy and rationality. 
 
4.2.2.2.3. Results 
Table 4.2 presents the mean categorisation ratings of the attribute items. Items with 
mean scores smaller than 4 are listed on the left as more associated with rationality in 
an ascending order, and items with mean scores bigger than 4 are listed on the right as 
more associated with empathy in a descending order. Items presented in the top rows 
were those with clear category membership rated closest to the two extreme scores (1 
and 7) while those in the bottom rows were those with ambiguous category membership 
that rated close to the middle point (4).  
 76 
 
Table 4.2 Mean ratings for attribute items associated with rationality or empathy 
Rationality Mean  Empathy Mean  
Rational 1.42 Empathetic 6.30 
Logical 1.69 Emotion 6.18 
Reasoning 1.79 Feeling 6.18 
Organised 1.81 Affection 6.06 
Deduction 2.00 Sensitive 5.97 
Systematic 2.09 Caring 5.87 
Coherence 2.51 Considerate 5.70 
Consistent 2.52 Perspective-taking 5.27 
Induction 2.75 Concern 5.25 
Ordered 2.75 Appreciation 5.24 
Analytical 2.85 Soul 5.06 
Calculative 2.85 Understanding 4.72 
Standardised 3.71 Intuitive 4.42 
Insight 3.72 Ethical 4.18 
Sanity 3.90 Comprehensive 3.85 
 
4.2.2.2.4. Discussion 
There are three rules in selecting the appropriate stimulus items for empathy and 
rationality. First and foremost, the selected items should be representative of only the 
corresponding category (Nosek, Greenwald, et al., 2007). Based on the results of the 
present study, items with mean ratings ranging from 2.75 to 5.25 were considered to 
have ambiguous double memberships of rationality and empathy, therefore were 
dropped from the final selection.  
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The second rule is to avoid items that can be categorised on the basis of irrelevant 
stimulus features. Specifically, selected items should have similar word length with 
different initials. For example, if all rationality items were less than 5 letters and the 
empathy items were more than 10 letters, participants could sort the items based on 
evaluative word length rather than the word meanings. Similarly, if all rationality items 
were words with the same initial "c", participants could sort these items based on 
similarities in initials rather than the category membership of the words. Such 
confounding valences of the items were taken into consideration and carefully avoided. 
For a good overview of the influence of valence variety and similar letter length on IAT 
effects, see Teige-Mocigemba, Klauer, & Sherman (2010).  
 
The third rule is to ensure that the category membership of selected attribute items is 
clear and will not be confounded with target categories (Nosek, Greenwald, et al., 2007). 
For example, using "subject-related" rationality and empathy items such as 
"calculative" and "appreciation" could introduce confusion about whether to categorise 
the items on the basis of their membership to academic discipline or the attribute 
evaluation. Therefore, items with confounding membership to science and liberal arts 
were also dropped. 
 
Furthermore, regarding the number of items in each category, evidence has shown that 
varying the number of items in both the target and attribute categories had no significant 
influence on the IAT effect magnitude (Greenwald et al., 1998; Nosek et al., 2005). 
Greenwald et al. (1998) reported no difference of IAT effect magnitude between 
stimulus sets of 25 items and of 5 items. As long as the number of stimulus items for 
each category is more than 2, the overall magnitude of implicit biases was consistent, 
and smaller number of items did not impair the reliability of the task, nor did it increase 
the influences of potential confounding factors. Such findings suggest that the 
magnitude and reliability of IAT effects were relatively unaffected by the number of 
stimulus items per category, except that effects were somewhat weaker when only a 
single stimulus item per category was used (Nosek et al., 2005). The common amount 
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of stimulus items per category in the existing IATs is between 5 to 8. As such, we 
decided to choose 8 items (per category) that meet the three rules mentioned before. 
Table 4.3 presents the final selected items for the preliminary SE-IAT (1st version). 
 
Table 4.3 Selected items for the preliminary SE-IAT (1st version) 
Science  Liberal arts Rationality Empathy 
Scientist Artist Consistent Affection 
Chemist  Linguist Coherence Considerate 
Physicist  Philosopher Deduction Caring 
Mathematician Historian Logical Emotion 
Engineer Educator Organised Empathetic 
Computer scientist Anthropologist Rational Feeling 
Astronomer Sociologist Reasoning Perspective-taking 
Biologist Musician Systematic Sensitive 
Note: Science and Liberal arts are target categories, and Rationality and Empathy are 
attribute categories 
 
4.3. Step II: SE-IAT Procedural design 
After having selected the materials for the SE-IAT, the next step was to design the 
procedure of how to administer the test. IAT has been used with procedural variations, 
usually without any intention to collect data to discriminate alternate versions. It is 
important to consider that measurement procedures are tools and different types of 
research require different kinds of tools (Gawronski & De Houwer, 2013). There is no 
procedure as the "best" one, only the most suitable paradigm for particular research 
aims. The present study followed the most widely used standard IAT procedure 
recommended by the founder of the test, Nosek et al.(2007), which has shown good 
psychometric properties in many existing studies. Potential construct-unrelated 
variables that need extra vigilance are also tackled with various means during the 
procedure. Different aspects with the procedure design, including the IAT structure, the 
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number of trials, the inter-trial intervals and the order of compatible and incompatible 
tasks are explained in detail in the following sections. 
4.3.1. Seven-block design 
First of all, the SE-IAT adopts the standard 7-block structure design. There are three 
main categorization tasks in the SE-IAT: single-category classification (Block 1, 2, and 
5), compatible configuration of double categorization (Block 3 and 4), and incompatible 
configuration of double categorization (Block 6 and 7).  
 
The SE-IAT starts by training participants to press the left response key ("E" on 
keyboard) when a Science item appears on the screen and the right response key ("I" 
on keyboard) when a Liberal arts item appears on the screen. In the following Block 2, 
participants are trained to press left for Rationality items and right for Empathy items. 
The next Blocks 3 and 4 combine both discrimination tasks, making the so-called 
compatible combined blocks in which items representing Science and Rationality share 
the same right response key, whereas those representing Liberal Arts and Empathy 
share the left response key. The following Block 5 is again a single discrimination task 
and switches the positions of target categories, such that Liberal Arts items are assigned 
to the left and Science items are assigned to the right this time. The final Blocks 6 and 
7 again combines the attribute and the previously reversed target discrimination, 
making the so-called incompatible combined blocks in which the Liberal arts and 
Rationality now share the same right response key and the Science and Empathy items 
share the left key. It is worth noting that in both combined blocks, the first set (Block 3 
and 6) is for practice and the second set is the actual testing set (Block 4 and 7). Table 
4.4 presents a schematic overview of the 7 blocks of the SE-IAT.  
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Table 4.4 Seven blocks in the SE-IAT 
 
Block 
 
N trials 
 
Task 
Response Key Assignment 
Left key (E) Right key (I) 
1 20 Target discrimination Science Liberal Arts 
2 20 Attribute discrimination Rationality Empathy 
3 20 Initial combined task 
Science, 
Rationality 
Liberal Arts, 
Empathy 
4 40 Initial combined task 
Science, 
Rationality 
Liberal Arts, 
Empathy 
5 40 
Reversed target 
discrimination 
Liberal Arts Science 
6 20 Reversed combined task 
Liberal Arts, 
Rationality 
Science, 
Empathy 
7 40 Reversed combined task 
Liberal Arts, 
Rationality 
Science, 
Empathy 
Note. Nosek, Greenwald, and Banaji (2005) recommend increasing the number of trials 
in the fifth block to 40, in order to combat compatibility-order effect. As such, the SE-
IAT has adopted this change and involved 40 instead of 20 trials in this particular block. 
 
For participants who possess a stereotype-congruent belief that empathy is more related 
with liberal arts than with science, the incompatible combined blocks should be more 
difficult than the compatible combined blocks. On the contrary, the incompatible 
combined blocks should be easier for participants who possess a counter-stereotype 
belief that empathy is more associated with science than with liberal arts. Magnitude of 
associations is indexed both by the speed of responding (faster responding indicating 
stronger associations) and the frequency of errors (fewer errors indicating stronger 
associations).  
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4.3.2. Number of trials 
A trial is defined as the time from the onset of a single stimulus item to the correct 
categorization of that item (Nosek, Greenwald, et al., 2007). For each trial, participants 
rapidly classify one item into the corresponding category. Regarding the number of 
trials in each block, evidence indicates that including 20 trials in Block 1, 2, 3 and 6 
(that are blocks for practice) and 40 trials in Block 5 (that is the Block of reversed target 
discrimination) and critical Block 4 and 7 (that are Blocks of combined tasks for test) 
yields good psychometric properties (Lane et al., 2007; Nosek, Greenwald, et al., 2007). 
There is no evidence for any benefit of using more trials. A total number of 200 trials 
are included in the SE-IAT.  
 
As can be seen from Table 4.4, the number of trials for practice in Block 5 (40 trials) 
of the subsequent combined blocks doubles the amount of trials for practice in Block 3 
(20 trials) of the precedent combined blocks. This is designed with the aim of reducing 
the undesirable order effect of combined blocks. Considering that the precedent 
combined task usually interferes with the performance of the subsequent combined task, 
Nosek et al., (2005) suggested to double the number of trials for practice in the 
subsequent combined task to provide more time for participants to get prepared for the 
upcoming new categorization task in the subsequent combined blocks, as such to reduce 
the order effect.  
 
4.3.3. Intertrial intervals 
The interval between occurrence of one trial and the following trial – the intertrial 
interval – is set as 150 milliseconds in the SE-IAT. Though Greenwald et al., (1998) 
found no appreciable effect of using longer intertrial interval (750ms), a relatively short 
interval allows shorter test time, which is important to reduce the fatigue effect (Cohen 
et al., 2003). In this way, the procedure of the seven blocks can be administered within 
five minutes (Nosek, Greenwald, et al., 2007).  
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4.3.4. Order of combined blocks 
As mentioned before, one of the common construct-unrelated effects observed on the 
IAT is the tendency for the precedent combined task to interfere with performance in 
the subsequent combined task (Klauer, 2005; Lane et al., 2007; Nosek et al., 2005). 
Specifically, participants who complete the compatible combined blocks first and the 
incompatible combined blocks later usually showed larger IAT effects than those who 
complete the combined blocks in a reversed order. Nosek et al. (2005) reported that the 
well-documented order effects on the IAT could not always be eliminated by extra 
practice trials in the subsequent combined blocks. Therefore, the order of the two 
critical combined tasks is also counterbalanced across participants with the purpose of 
controlling the order effect.  
 
To conclude, the SE-IAT adopted the standard 7-block structure design with two single-
categorisation blocks, two compatible combined blocks, one reversed target 
categorization block, and two incompatible combined blocks. There are 200 trials in 
total and the intertrial interval is set as 150 milliseconds. The order of the compatible 
and incompatible combined blocks is counterbalanced for the purpose of controlling 
the undesired order effect.   
 
4.4. Step III: Creating and testing the SE-IAT website 
4.4.1. Web versus Lab-based research 
As a computer-based timed task, SE-IAT was administered using a customized website 
so that all the data for the current PhD project could be collected online. There are three 
reasons for the decision of utilising web-based technology. Firstly, a web-based survey 
can guarantee anonymity and minimize the respondent's feelings of jeopardy by 
avoiding the observation of human administrators (Coutts & Jann, 2011). Given that 
stereotype is a sensitive topic, self-administrated online surveys can increase responses 
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and yield more honest, candid answers (Coutts & Jann, 2011). Secondly, a web-based 
study can easily incorporate complex skip patterns to randomise study items 
automatically. In the present study, not only the order of IAT test and the questionnaires 
but also the order of the items within each test and questionnaire were required to be 
counterbalanced. Web-based technology allows relatively easy implementation of 
counterbalanced items online. Thirdly, a web-based study enables fast and large data 
collection (Bethlehem & Biffignandi, 2011). Compared to the traditional lab-based 
study requiring experimenters to administer studies to participants at the same time in 
the same place, a web-based study is more flexible allowing multiple participants to run 
studies from their home computers at the same time at different locations. Though some 
data cleaning is necessary, online survey data can be ready to analyse very soon after 
the field work is carried out (Couper, Traugott, & Lamias, 2001). 
 
Nevertheless, disadvantages of a web-based study were not ignored and remedies to 
these disadvantages were involved. One major concern regarding web-based studies is 
whether data collected online is comparable to data gathered in lab-based settings. 
Online testing makes it impossible to have a standardised testing environment for all 
participants. Whether it is at home, at work, at a café or wherever, participants are 
potentially in environments full of distractions, which may threaten the validity of the 
study (Couper et al., 2001). To reduce such environmental bias, a statement requiring 
participants to complete the present study on their own in a quiet environment with 
stable Internet access was included in the introduction webpage (see Appendix IV) at 
the beginning of the study. Concerns have also been raised that in online studies 
participants may easily succumb to careless responding, experiencing a lack of focus, 
or even deceive in their answers as they are not monitored by the experimenters (Kraut 
et al., 2004). Given the present study includes a timed IAT task, data from participants 
who respond too fast or make too many mistakes can be identified as unqualified and 
removed from further analysis. In addition, though studies have shown that multiple 
submissions are rare in web-based research, it can occur that the same participant may 
attempt to repeat the study whether deliberately or not (Stieger & Reips, 2010). Multiple 
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submissions are controlled for in the present study by recording the user's IP addresses 
and devices.  
 
Aside from the participants' internal factors that may affect the reaction time in a web-
based study, various external factors may cause unsystematic errors as well. Concerns 
are raised that the reaction times are very likely to vary depending on the different 
computer hardware and software that the participants use. For example, keyboards have 
been found to have different sampling rates and monitors have been found to have 
various refresh rates. Furthermore, different web browsers also contribute to the 
uncertainty in precision timing. Similarly, timing may also be influenced by the 
operating system running multiple processes at the same time thus slowing its 
processing time down (Cek, 2015). Researchers suggest that increasing the sample size 
is the easiest way to reduce the nonsystematic noise in terms of timing, which might 
affect the sensitivity to small effects of reaction time (Barnhoorn, Haasnoot, Bocanegra, 
& van Steenbergen, 2015).  
 
Despite all the mentioned pros and cons of web-based study, studies have shown that 
traditional laboratory findings can be replicated in online samples, suggesting that the 
differences in timings online are relatively trivial. A recent study by Houben and Wiers 
(2008) comparing IAT effects obtained via the Internet and those obtained using 
Inquisit (standard reaction time software used in the laboratory) revealed no difference 
between the two conditions. Such results indicate that the online IAT versions are as 
sensitive to individual differences as are the IAT versions in the standard laboratory 
settings, which is in line with the initial findings by Nosek, Banaji and Greenwald 
(2002a) showing that data regarding attitudes and stereotypes in a laboratory did not 
differ significantly from data collected via a website. Considering the above-mentioned 
advantages of web-based research, the present PhD project adopted the web-based 
approach and implemented all the study materials online in one website. Instruments 
were included in the website for participants to self-administer the study on their own 
personal computers.  
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4.4.2. Creating the SE-IAT website 
4.4.2.1. Brief overview of major existing software packages for timed test 
There are a number of reaction time packages, both commercial as well as open-source, 
that are available for computerizing IAT nowadays. Either option comes with a certain 
trade-off. Open-source software packages usually require researchers to have 
knowledge of certain programming language(s) in order to create a customized test. 
Whilst most commercial software packages offer a user-friendly interface with drag-
and-drop features, they do not require any programming skills. But those commercial 
software packages are often not offered online like most open-source packages. Table 
4.5 summarised the advantages and disadvantages of current available reaction time 
software packages. 
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Table 4.5 A brief overview of reaction time software packages (Cek, 2015) 
Softwares Online? Requiring 
Programming skills? 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Commercial     
DirectRT No Yes Simple syntax to follow to customize test Can only be used offline 
E-Prime No No No programming skill needed Can only be used offline; need to 
become acquainted with a multi-window 
visual user interface first 
Inquist for Web Yes Yes Can be used with third party questionnaire 
software such as Survey Monkey 
Requiring relatively complex syntax to 
program tests 
Superlab No No No programming skill needed; 
questionnaires can be implemented at the 
same time 
Can only be used offline 
Open-source     
FreeIAT No No Avoids Internet reaction time issues Can only be used offline; available only 
with Windows system 
WebIAT Yes Yes Tested on most systems and browsers Requiring researchers to host a Web 
server 
WEXTOR Yes No Fulfills all ethical requirements for web-
based studies 
Hasn't been tested for reaction time 
studies 
OpenSesame No Yes Highly flexible and adaptable Not online; requiring relatively complex 
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Softwares Online? Requiring 
Programming skills? 
Advantages Disadvantages 
programming 
jsPsych Yes Yes Fulfills all ethical requirements for web-
based studies 
Requiring researchers to host a Web 
server; requiring extensive 
programming skills 
Tatool 
 
 
Yes Yes Avoids Internet reaction time issues Requiring complex programming 
knowledge; incompatible with third 
party questionnaire software 
WebExp Yes Yes Fulfills all ethical requirements for web-
based studies 
Requiring extensive programming 
skills; incompatible with third party 
questionnaire software 
JATOS Yes No Very simple user-friendly graphical 
interface 
Hasn't been tested for reaction time 
studies; incompatible with third party 
questionnaire software 
ORTEngine Yes No Very simple user-friendly graphical 
interface 
Less flexible; requiring complex 
programming knowledge to be used with 
third party questionnaire software 
ScriptingRT Yes Yes Validated for reaction time studies Requiring extensive programming 
knowledge; incompatible with third 
party questionnaire software 
Note. This table is adapted from Cek (2015).
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4.4.2.2. Using the Project Implicit virtual lab to implement SE-IAT online 
There are three requirements when selecting the appropriate software to create the SE-
IAT website. First, due to the time constraints of the present PhD project, it is 
impractical to expect the researcher to put much effort in learning a new programming 
language from scratch, thus software packages requiring programming skills including 
Inquisit for Web, OpenSesame, Webexp, ORTEngine, and ScriptRT were ruled out. 
Second, the SE-IAT needs to be administered with self-report questionnaire, reaction 
time software packages that cannot be used with third party questionnaire software 
including Tatool and JATOS were not selected. Third, software packages that can only 
be used offline including DirectRT, E-Prime, Superlab and FreeIAT were dropped as 
well. The remaining open-source software packages WebIAT and WEXTOR fulfill all 
the three requirements, but neither was selected because WebIAT requires researchers 
to host a personal web server and WEXTOR had not been tested with any reaction time 
task before.  
 
Under such circumstances, the task of creating a website to administer SE-IAT and self-
report questionnaires online was outsourced to the technical service team from Project 
Implicit (PI), a virtual lab managed by IAT experts from Harvard University. The 
homepage link to PI is implicit.harvard.edu. 
 
The Project Implicit Virtual Lab was selected because 1) both implicit measures and 
questionnaires could be easily implemented in one web browser; 2) the virtual lab 
possesses a mature and stable implicit measure infrastructure that has been used and 
tested successfully by many other researchers; 3) anonymity and security in 
transmission of individual responses are secured and 4) large data storage is provided.  
 
Before implementing the study, the researcher was required to sign a contract with the 
PI team to set up the number of studies and the time length for data collection. In the 
current project, the researcher was allowed to conduct two rounds of data collection. 
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Before each round of data collection, the researcher would be given a test link to 
examine and modify all the implemented research materials. The website would be 
valid for only one year.  
 
The first test link to the website was sent to the researcher on 14th June, 2016.  
The test link is as below: 
 
https://app-prod-
03.implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/Launch?study=/user//nlofaro/contract.qin.empathy/m
anager.expt.xml&refresh=true 
 
Figure 4.1 is a screenshot for the incompatible pairing block of the online SE-IAT. 
When conducting the SE-IAT task, the category labels appear on the top left and right 
of the computer screen to remind participants of the response key mapping rules. The 
target and attribute labels are in different colours for the purpose of enhancing the 
distinctiveness of nominal features of given stimulus. Specifically, the Liberal arts and 
Science labels and items are in green while the Rationality and Empathy labels and 
items are in blue. The stimulus items for sorting are put in the middle of the screen. 
When a stimulus item is correctly categorised, a new item will immediately appear. But 
when the stimulus item is incorrectly categorised, a red "X" below the stimulus item 
will appear and the participants are obliged to fix the error before proceeding.  
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Figure 4.1 A screenshot for the SE-IAT incompatible pairing block 
 
4.4.3. Testing and modifying the SE-IAT website 
Before using the newly developed website to collect data, it is important to test the 
practicality and face validity of the implemented study materials online. A focus group 
was organized to go through all the measures in the website using their own computers 
to see if they can successfully complete the study online.  
 
4.4.3.1. Participants  
A focus group of 6 participants was organized to test the link. According to Morgan 
(1997), the optimum size of a focus group should be 6 to 10. Moreover, Krueger and 
Casey (2009) have also urged caution of the use of homogeneous group - a group of 
people who have a common background, position or experience – because 
homogeneous groups have their own well-established dynamics that can influence 
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contributions. Considering these requirements, the gender and academic majors of the 
participants in the focus group are balanced. Moreover, the focus group must be able to 
represent participants in the main study. Given that I proposed to investigate stereotypes 
of empathy in scientists among UK university students, the final participants in my 
focus group were 6 students from the University of Cambridge. The information about 
age, gender, major subjects and nationality of the 6 participants is shown in Table 4.6. 
 
Table 4.6 Demographics of the focus group for testing the initial IAT website 
No. Gender Age Subject Nationality 
1 Female 32 Pathology Chinese 
2 Female 26 Education British 
3 Female 27 Psychology British 
4 Male 23 Economics Chinese 
5 Male 21 Mathematics British 
6 Male 21 Medicine British 
 
4.4.3.2. Procedure 
The focus group was required to go through all the study materials implemented in the 
website using their own personal computers. The main purpose is for them to review 
the practicality and face validity of the online SE-IAT. Face validity is the degree to 
which a measure appears to be related to the specific construct it is supposed to measure, 
in the judgment of non-experts such as test takers (Furr & Bacharach, 2008). Before 
participants start the test, they were informed of the research aim and were encouraged 
to give detailed advice on how to improve the test website in terms of revising the 
content of SE-IAT as well as making the whole procedure easier to self-administer from 
the perspective of test takers. Participants were asked to give answers to the question 
"Did you have any difficulty completing the study? If so, what would you suggest the 
researcher to do to improve the study?". This open question was intended for 
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stimulating discussion among participants to bring up any important issues that had not 
been identified in the design phase. As a result, several problems were pointed out and 
modifications were made accordingly. Any item that the focus group suggested to be 
unrelated to the supposed construct were dropped or revised. Instructions that were 
found unclear were rephrased. The detailed updates are presented in the following 
paragraphs. 
 
4.4.3.3. Results and updates 
The newly developed online SE-IAT was successfully run with all participants' 
personal computers with different operating systems including Microsoft Windows and 
Mac OS. Reaction time was recorded accurately in milliseconds. However, there are 
six issues observed and the website was updated accordingly.  
 
4.4.3.3.1. Items for Science and Liberal arts were changed from occupations to subjects 
After discussion of the focus group, items representing target categories were changed 
back from occupations to subjects for two reasons. First, the test takers reported that 
they found it easier for them to associate subjects than occupations with target 
categories of Science and Liberal arts. One of the test takers reported: "I would prefer 
subjects to occupations as the stimulus items. I think the subjects are related to the label 
Science and Liberal arts more directly. Instead, occupations are more likely to be 
related to the label Scientists and Artists." Moreover, some occupations were found too 
ambiguous for test takers to sort into just one category. For example, one test taker who 
studies mathematics reported: "I found Philosopher could be sorted into both Science 
and Liberal arts because several mathematicians were also known as philosophers, 
such as Bertrand Russell and Rene Descartes." On the contrary, he said "But I would 
have no problem sorting Philosophy into the category Liberal arts given that 
philosophy is generally known as a subject in liberal arts." In this case, the stimulus 
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items for Science and Liberal arts were changed from occupations to subjects, which 
are again in line with the items in the well-established Science-Gender IAT and 
Science-Rationality IAT.  
 
4.4.3.3.2. Ambiguous items with double membership were identified and dropped 
In addition, discussion of the focus group also revealed certain ambiguous items that 
could be sorted into more than one category. The item anthropologist and educator 
were reported to be confusing because some anthropology research also draws upon 
physical and biological sciences and some educators can be specialized in science 
education. Therefore, these two items were replaced with items of little confusion such 
as Literature and Fine arts to represent the target category Liberal arts. Test takers 
reported no confusion with stimulus items for attribute categories of empathy and 
rationality. 
 
4.4.3.3.3. Wording of the attribute items for Empathy and Rationality was polished up 
Regarding wording and phrasing of the test, English native speakers in the focus group 
also gave three suggestions. First, all items for attribute categories of Empathy and 
Rationality were unified into adjectives. For example, the word emotion was adjusted 
to emotional to be identical with all the other adjective items representing the category 
Empathy. Second, the compound word "perspective-taking" was replaced by its 
synonym "thoughtful" for it was the only two-word phrase, making it different from all 
the other one-word items that might lead to construct-unrelated variance. Third, one of 
the test takers pointed out that the adjective "affective" in the Empathy category was 
easily mistaken for "effective", which could be sorted into the opposite Rationality 
category. To avoid a confounding effect, the word "affective" was replaced by a more 
frequently-used word "affectionate". Table 4.7 displays the updated items for the SE-
IAT.  
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Table 4.7 Updated items for the preliminary SE-IAT (2nd version) 
Science  Liberal arts Rationality Empathy 
Chemistry Fine arts Consistent Affectionate 
Physics Linguistics Coherent Considerate 
Mathematics  Philosophy Deductive Caring 
Engineering History Logical Emotional 
Computer science Literature Organised Empathetic 
Astronomy Sociology Rational Feeling 
Biology Politics Reasoning Thoughtful 
Geology Music Systematic Sensitive 
 
4.4.3.3.4. Device requirement was added in the instructions 
Some participants tried to click on the test link with their tablets and found it unable to 
be run on tablets or smartphones. Therefore, a requirement specifying the valid devices 
for the test was added in the instructions. Participants are asked to use desktop or laptop 
computers to complete the test. Smartphones or tablets without a physical keyboard 
were warned to be invalid for the test.  
 
4.4.3.3.5. A test progress indicator was added for participants to track their progress 
When completing 200 trials in the SE-IAT, participants reported feeling bored and 
impatient during the process for they had no idea how long it would last.  A test 
progress indicator (e.g.,"Block/Question 1 of 7"), which shows the current phase of the 
study, was added for participants to track their progress during the test in order to reduce 
the fatigue effect and improve concentration on the study.  
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4.4.3.3.6. A question for academic discipline identification was added 
A question asking the participants' self-identification with science or liberal arts was 
added considering the situation that some participants may major in integrated subjects. 
It has been considered not only inappropriate but also impossible for the researcher to 
judge the academic discipline that the participants affiliated to. Therefore, it is essential 
for participants themselves to report their identified academic discipline.  
 
4.5. Limitations and suggestions for future research 
The current approach of designing and developing the SE-IAT website has several 
limitations. Firstly, in neither pilot study were the participants truly representative of 
the target population in the main studies. When selecting items for SE-IAT, participants 
were mainly graduate students from two colleges at Cambridge University. Similarly, 
when testing the website, participants were limited to 6 students from Cambridge 
University. Though the gender and major ratio were balanced in each pilot study, the 
limited number of participants may restrict the generalisability of their ratings and 
opinions on the test. 
 
Secondly, though the face validity of the SE-IAT was tested with a focus group, the 
specific SE-IAT scores were not calculated. It remains unknown whether the newly 
developed SE-IAT can successfully capture implicit bias toward empathy in scientists. 
Moreover, psychometric properties of the SE-IAT (e.g., split-half reliability) were not 
examined. Future research is required to validate the SE-IAT with participants of a 
larger sample size by checking the SE-IAT effect and other indices of its psychometric 
properties. 
 
Thirdly, only one version of the SE-IAT was tested and updated in the current study. 
However, systematic variations of task features (e.g., different items, number of trials, 
intertrial intervals) may alter performances (Baron & Banaji, 2006; Fleischhauer et al., 
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2013; Lane et al., 2007). For example, Fleischhauer et al., (2013) tested and examined 
the psychometric properties of four preliminary IAT versions with different category 
and stimulus item labels in their preliminary study to finalize a new IAT measuring 
cognitive motivations. All the four preliminary IAT versions yielded different results 
when examining their construct-unrelated variances. Future studies should take a more 
rigorous approach when develop new IATs by examining alternative preliminary IAT 
versions with different task features.  
 
Finally, the SE-IAT website was established using a paid implicit test development 
service. The commercial online IAT lab is costly and inflexible because researchers are 
not allowed to modify the IAT directly. However, more flexible open-source software 
packages for timed tests usually require programming expertise (Cek, 2015). 
Considering the rapid growth of the need to use IAT in various research fields, future 
efforts are called for to develop user-friendly open-source IAT online platforms for 
researchers with limited programming skills to customize IAT websites for various 
research purposes.  
 
4.6. Conclusion 
The current preliminary study designed and created a preliminary SE-IAT website for 
the purpose of making up the lack of implicit measures for stereotypes of empathy in 
scientists. With this newly developed implicit measure, we can have a better 
understanding of the up-to-date stereotypes of empathy in scientists by examining the 
underlying bias toward empathy in scientists that people are unable to report in 
questionnaire.  
 
This chapter reports the systematic procedure of developing an IAT. As a relatively 
novel implicit method which effect can be contaminated by many construct-unrelated 
variables, many problems may occur during the process of developing an IAT, obliging 
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researchers to show scientific responsibility in using the IAT paradigm to customize 
their own implicit tests. Therefore, it is deemed important for researcher to provide a 
holistic approach of designing an IAT and highlights several important remedies for the 
respective contaminants. The three-step approach to develop the SE-IAT website has 
been presented as a good example for future researchers to follow the steps to create 
their own IAT.  
 
In line with previous findings that the IAT effect is influenced by variations in valence 
of category labels and items (Bluemke & Friese, 2008; De Houwer, 2001; Fleischhauer 
et al., 2013; Gast & Rothermund, 2010), the current study has also found evidence that 
both definitions as well as morphological features of items can affect the face validity 
of an IAT. Methods such as using item ratings to examine membership of categories as 
well as using focus group to re-evaluate representativeness of items have been applied 
in the current study to reduce such construct-unrelated variance. After the SE-IAT was 
designed and developed in the current stage, the new test needs to be validated by 
examining its psychometric properties in the next stage. 
  
 98 
Chapter 5  Stage Two: Testing and modifying the IAT to measure 
stereotypes of empathy in scientists 
5.1. Introduction 
The present PhD project aims to investigate individual differences in the implicit and 
explicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists. As no implicit measure on stereotypes of 
empathy in scientists has been created to date, a preliminary Science-Empathy IAT was 
systematically designed and created in previous Stage 1 (see Chapter 4). As mentioned 
in the literature review, controversial evidence has been found for certain psychometric 
properties (e.g., explicit-implicit correlations) of different kinds of IATs, therefore 
heated debate has never stopped on whether IAT can pass as a sound tool to capture 
variations in implicit social cognition. Under such circumstances, it is of paramount 
importance to evaluate whether the newly developed IAT meets relevant psychometric 
criteria before using it to assess individual differences.    
 
In this chapter, the preliminary SE-IAT was tested against certain psychometric criteria. 
Given the limited scope of the present study, not all psychometric criteria, such as the 
convergent validity with other implicit measures, could be assessed. But the following 
critical criteria were applied and examined in order to validate the appropriateness of 
IAT to address relatively stable individual differences in the stereotypes of empathy in 
scientists. Firstly, the measure should be able to replicate an IAT effect, which means 
that there should be significant differences in response latencies between the 
incompatible and compatible blocks. That is to say, participants are expected to respond 
slower as well as to make more mistakes when completing the incompatible combined 
blocks as compared to the compatible combined blocks of the IAT. Meanwhile, the 
measure should demonstrate acceptable reliability and validity. As for the reliability, 
the split-half reliability, which is the most commonly examined reliability for IAT, was 
drawn on. As for the validity, various indicators were scrutinized to evaluate the IAT 
including the face validity (i.e., the extent to which the wording of items matches the 
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concept assessed); Known-groups validity (i.e., the extent to which the measure is able 
to differentiate between members of groups based on prior knowledge or predictions 
about them); Implicit-explicit correlations (i.e., the extent to which the IAT is similar 
or different from related self-reports); and construct-unrelated variance that may 
threaten the validity (e.g., order effect and effect of prior experience with IAT).   
5.2. Method 
5.2.1. Sampling and participants 
All participants were recruited through their departments or colleges from four Russell 
Group universities located in or close to London. The Russell Group universities were 
selected because these universities are all comprehensive universities providing a wide 
range of academic courses. Given that one of the main purposes of the present study is 
to investigate variations in stereotypes between different academic majors, it is essential 
to recruit participants in both STEM and non-STEM fields from each university. 
However, when examining the subjects available in universities with lower rankings, it 
has been found that these universities usually do not provide math-intensive subjects 
such as physics or mathematics, therefore only Russell Group universities that provide 
both STEM and non-STEM courses were targeted.  
 
The opt-in sampling method was adopted to recruit participants. An advertisement 
email containing a brief introduction to the project and the link to the study website (see 
Appendix III for the study advertisement) was sent out to all the students in the target 
departments or colleges by their department administrators or college student 
representatives from 9th August to 3rd December, 2016 (see Appendix II for the 
participant recruitment email).  
 
Before the demographic information of the present sample is presented, it is necessary 
to clarify three things. Firstly, concerning the potential replicated responses, 
information about the IP addresses, the computer systems, the web browsers, and the 
 100 
time when the study had been done for each participant was routinely recorded (see 
Appendix VIII for an example of the session record). Participants were informed about 
this action in the consent form and the collected information was kept strictly 
confidential and only available to the researcher. A thorough examination of the 
recorded IP addresses revealed no replication of the responses in the present study.  
 
Secondly, the academic fields of the participants are decided by their own 
identifications rather than categorised by the researcher. Participants were asked to 
choose "the academic field you mostly identified with" from four options of science, 
liberal arts, others, and don't know and were also asked to provide information about 
their specific majors. Nevertheless, it was found that participants who were in the same 
majors could be identified with different academic fields. Such situation may happen 
due to the fact that students in the same majors can have various concerns about the 
topic or take different methodological approaches to do research, therefore may be 
identified with either science or liberal arts. For example, students in Human 
Geography are more likely to be identified with Liberal arts while others in Physical 
Geography are more likely to be identified with Science. Also, it was not uncommon 
that postgraduate students could have studied more than one subject from different 
academic fields. Under such circumstances, it is considered more appropriate to let 
participants identify their own academic fields than to use their reported majors to 
classify participants into different academic fields.   
 
Thirdly, it is necessary to clarify that not all, but most, participants in the present study 
are native UK citizens. Although the present study initially planned to target only UK 
domestic students, it was deemed rather troublesome by the gatekeepers of the 
participating universities to identify them to send the invitation email. As a result, the 
invitation email containing the study link was sent to both domestic and international 
students altogether for the convenience of the gatekeepers. Although it was stated in 
the email that native English speakers were preferred, it turned out that quite a few non-
native students still clicked on the study link and decided to take part in the study. 
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Therefore, questions regarding the nationality and English level of the participants were 
added. All non-native participants showed sufficient English language ability to 
complete the study (International English Language Testing System [IELTS] scores 
above 6.5). The detailed demographic information is presented as below.  
 
Among 1098 clicks on the study link, 580 students continued to participate in the study. 
However, 50 participants who did not finish the IAT test were removed from the final 
sample. Moreover, according to guidelines created by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji 
(2003), 10 participants who made too many errors in the IAT test, meaning that they 
sorted the items into the wrong categories too many times (error rates > 20%) as well 
as 35 participants who did the IAT test too fast (reaction time in each trial less than 300 
milliseconds > 10% ) were also dropped from the final sample. There was no trial in 
the IAT test greater than 10,000 ms in the present study.  
 
Consequently, the final sample is comprised of 485 participants. The female to male 
ratio is 60.0% to 38.4% (291 females to 186 males, missing data 8). The science to 
liberal arts ratio is 58.4% to 34.8% (283 identified with science to 169 identified with 
liberal arts, the rest 25 identified with other academic field occupying 5.2% and missing 
data 6). The respective female to male ratio of participants identified with science and 
liberal arts is presented in Table 5.1. As can be seen from the table, the female to male 
ratio with participants identified with liberal arts in the sample is imbalanced with only 
29.0% participants being male. The gender ratio is more balanced for participants 
identified with science.  
Table 5.1 Female to male ratio in Science and Liberal arts of Stage 2 final sample 
Gender           Science (n = 282)      Liberal arts (n = 169) 
N Percentage N Percentage 
Female 152 53.3% 120 71.0% 
Male 130 46.7% 49 29.0% 
Note: There are 25 identified with other academic field, and 9 missing values 
 102 
The majority of participants (86.2%) were in the age range of 18 to 25 years old (See 
Table 5.2 for details). Also, in terms of education level, three quarters of participants 
were pursuing Bachelor degrees whereas 24.3% were postgraduates in the final sample 
(See Table 5.3 for details). 
 
Table 5.2 Age range of the Stage 2 final sample 
Age range N Percentage 
< 18 4 0.9% 
18 - 20 279 59.2% 
21 - 25 127 27.0% 
26 - 35 52 11.0% 
36 - 45 4 0.8% 
> 45 5 1.1% 
Note: There are 14 missing values. 
 
Table 5.3 Education level of the Stage 2 final sample 
Education level N Percentage 
Bachelor’s degree 351 74.7% 
Master’s degree 63 13.4% 
Doctoral degree 51 10.9% 
Postdoc 5 1.0% 
Note. There are 7 participants identified with other education levels, and 2 missing 
values. 
 
In terms of ethnicity, participants were asked to directly fill in their ethnicity in the 
blanks of the question. According to the classification of ethnicity by the Higher 
Education Statistics Agency (HESA, 2018), participants were classified into four ethnic 
groups. The majority of participants (74.2%) were White (See Table 5.4 for details). 
The proportions of different ethnic groups of Stage 2 study are also in consistent with 
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the national data (HESA, 2018). Finally, regarding the English level, most participants 
(77.4%) were native English speakers as shown in Table 5.5.  
 
Table 5.4 Ethnic group of the Stage 2 final sample 
Ethnic group N Percentage 
White 329 74.3% 
Asian/Asian British 47 10.6% 
Black/African/Caribbean/Black 
British  
5 1.1% 
Mixed/Multiple/Other 62 14% 
Note. There are 42 missing values 
 
Table 5.5 English level of the Stage 2 final sample 
English level N Percentage 
Native English speaker 367 77.4% 
Non-native speaker 107 22.6% 
Note. There are 11 missing values 
 
5.2.2. Procedure 
As explained before, the online survey approach was adopted to collect data throughout 
my PhD project (see Section 4.4.1 for the reasoning of taking online survey approach). 
Starting from 17th May, 2016, participant recruitment emails (see Appendix II) were 
firstly sent to the gatekeepers of the colleges and departments from the target 
universities. After gaining approval from the gatekeepers, the recruitment emails, 
which contains the link to the study website, were sent to all the students from their 
institutions. According to the record, the first response was gained on 9th August and 
the last on 3rd December, 2016. 
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After clicking on the study link, an introduction webpage providing instructions about 
the study was presented first before participants proceeded to the actual study. 
Participants were informed that the present study is to look at individual differences in 
attitudes toward or beliefs about scientists and they would be required to answer some 
questions and a timed task in which they need to sort words into categories as quickly 
as possible. Only once they have read the instructions and agreed to take part in the 
study were the participants able to move on to the next step by clicking the "continue" 
button at the right bottom of the page (see Appendix IV for the introduction webpage).  
 
The order of the IAT and the self-report questionnaire is counterbalanced. Little 
evidence has shown that the order in which self-report and IAT measures are completed 
would affect IAT performance as well as self-report (Hofmann et al., 2005). Thus, the 
present study followed the procedural guideline composed by Nosek, Greenwald, and 
Banaji (2007) to counterbalance the order of IAT and self-report measures in the 
absence of reasons for using just a single order.  
 
The order of the compatible and incompatible blocks in the IAT is also counterbalanced, 
given that the precedent combined task usually interferes with the performance of the 
subsequent combined task (Klauer, 2005; Lane et al., 2007; Nosek, Greenwald, et al., 
2007). Demographic information was gained after participants completed both the IAT 
and the self-report questionnaire.  
 
Participants were not informed of their own results. A debriefing was provided to 
explain what an implicit attitude is and how the IAT works. Cautions were also stressed 
that implicit bias captured by the IAT may not be consciously endorsed in order to 
prevent participants from misinterpreting the test and overworrying about their 
performance (See Appendix VII for the full debriefing). At last, participants were also 
asked to provide their email addresses if they would like to take part in the lottery draw. 
At the end of the study, 10 participants who participated in the lottery draw were 
randomly selected and given Amazon vouchers as incentives. It usually took 
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participants 10 to 15 minutes to complete the whole procedure. The link to the present 
study website is as below (See Appendix V for screenshots of the SE-IAT procedures): 
 
https://app-prod-
03.implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/Launch?study=/user//nlofaro/contract.qin.empathy/m
anager.expt.xml&refresh=true 
 
5.2.3. Ethical issues 
5.2.3.1. Ethical Approval 
Guidance for conducting ethical research within the British Psychological Society Code 
of Ethics and Conduct (BPS, 2009) and the Revised Ethical Code for Educational 
Research (BERA, 2018) was carefully followed. Study documentation including a 
research proposal, consent form and ethics and risk assessment form, was submitted to 
the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Education, University of Cambridge.  
 
5.2.3.2. Valid consent 
In the recruitment letter (See Appendix II), a brief explanation of the present project 
was provided. Once they clicked on the test link included in the recruitment letter, 
participants were first led to the introduction webpage (See Appendix IV). This 
webpage detailed the voluntary nature of the research, confidentiality within the 
research process and the right to withdraw at any minute during the process without 
any question. All participants were deemed capable of giving valid consent to 
participate in the study. After they agreed to take part in the study, participants then 
proceeded to the test by clicking the "continue" button on the bottom of the webpage.  
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5.2.3.3. Confidentiality 
Data were collected and analysed in accordance with the Data Protection Act (2018). 
Online data were protected by SSL encryption. Participants did not provide their names 
and each response was given a reference number automatically. IP addresses were 
routinely recorded but were accessible only to the researcher. The raw study data were 
securely stored in a password protected account on the Project Implicit website, which 
only the researcher and the Project Implicit team had access to. The Project Implicit 
team was not allowed to use or distribute the data without permission of the researcher 
for any other purpose. Data were saved and analysed using the researcher's password-
protected personal laptop.  
 
5.2.3.4. Debriefing  
There was no anticipated negative impact of the research on participants. Inevitably, 
the research may draw the attention of the participants to both conscious and 
unconscious bias about scientists. But it is considered beneficial rather than detrimental. 
However, in order to prevent participants from misinterpreting their performance, they 
were not provided with their own scores. Participants were debriefed in the end of the 
study about the nature of implicit attitudes and the difference between these and 
consciously endorsed attitudes (See Appendix VII). A link to the Frequently Asked 
Questions webpage was provided. Contact information of the researcher was provided 
for the participants to contact the researcher if they have any issue relating to the study.  
 
5.2.4. Measures 
In the present study, both the IAT and the explicit self-report measures are applied. As 
introduced in the Literature Review chapter, IAT is designed to assess relatively 
automatic mental associations that are difficult to gauge with explicit self-reports. One 
important indicator for the success in assessing unconscious attitude representations is 
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the finding that implicit measures often show rather low correlations with explicit 
measures (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Gawronski et al., 2007; Hofmann et al., 2005). Given 
the main purpose of the present study is to validate an IAT for implicit stereotype of 
empathy in scientists, it is essential to include related explicit self-reports to check if 
there is any distinction between the outcomes of implicit and explicit measures.  
 
In terms of selecting and adapting the appropriate self-reports for stereotypes of 
empathy in scientists, three aspects were taken into consideration. To begin with, the 
selected self-report measures should focus on examining similar concepts that the SE-
IAT claims to measure, that is, in this study, perceptions about empathy in scientists, 
not other characteristics such as the stereotype about appearance or working 
environment of the scientists. Evidence has shown that the conceptual correspondence 
( i.e., the extent to which the attitudes are measured at the same level of abstractness 
and with the same degree of specificity; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977) between implicit and 
explicit measures have significant influence on their correlations (Hofmann et al., 2005). 
For example, many standard self-report scales for racial prejudice (e.g., Modern Racism 
Scale, McConahay, 1986) assess participants' political opinions on issues such as 
affirmative action or the discrimination of ethnic minority members. In contrast, racism 
IATs typically assess participants' responses to members of ethnic minority groups (e.g., 
faces of Black and White individuals). Thus, even though general evaluations of ethnic 
minority members may be systematically related to people's political opinions 
(Gawronski et al., 2008), the low correlations between these self-report racial prejudice 
scales and the IAT measures are very likely to be resulted from their conceptual 
distinctness, not necessarily because one is tapping unconscious representations 
(Gawronski et al., 2007; Hofmann et al., 2005). Therefore, cautions are stressed on the 
content of the selected self-report measures to be consistent with what the SE-IAT 
intends to address in the present study.  
 
In addition, the structural fit (i.e., the degree of methodological similarity between 
different tests, Payne, Burkley, & Stokes, 2008) between the explicit measures and the 
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IAT also deserves extra attention. By the structure of a measure, researchers mean the 
parts that make it up and how they work together to measure attitudes (Payne et al., 
2008). In most explicit self-reports, participants are required to make evaluations on a 
series of propositional statements. In contrast, the IATs avoid all the propositions 
involved in the self-reports, and instead only assess relative attitudes toward two 
different target concepts based on the comparisons between reaction time to register 
different responses. As concluded by Payne et al. (2008), the structures of IATs and the 
self-reports differ in three key ways, including the stimuli presented (e.g., propositions 
vs. simple words or pictures), the level of abstractness of the judgments to be made 
(e.g., broad social opinions vs. concrete classifications), and the metric in which 
responses are measured (e.g., numerical scales vs. response latencies). Moreover, IATs 
assess relative rather than absolute attitudes. That is to say, given that IATs consist of 
two groups of contrasting concepts (e.g., target concepts: liberal arts and sciences; 
attribute concepts: empathy and rationality), instead of measuring the absolute 
evaluation of the target concept (e.g., whether scientists have good empathy), they 
actually can only measure comparative evaluations of the target concepts (e.g., whether 
empathy is more correlated with liberal arts as compared to science). Accordingly, 
correlations with the IAT may be higher for self-reports assessing corresponding 
relative attitudes as compared to those measuring absolute propositional opinions 
(Gawronski et al., 2007; Hofmann et al., 2005). In this case, it is deemed necessary to 
incorporate both relative and absolute self-reports in the present study for the purpose 
of clarifying the correlations between implicit and explicit measures, which have 
usually been used as an index for the convergent or discriminant validity of an IAT 
(Lane et al., 2007; Nosek, Greenwald, et al., 2007).  
 
Last but not least, the selected self-report measures should have demonstrated 
consistently acceptable reliability and validity across studies. Though very few self-
reports have been developed to target stereotypes of empathy in scientists in particular 
to date, it is sensible to select empathy-related items from existing self-report measures 
for general stereotypes of scientists to be adapted to the present study. As for the relative 
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self-report, a paradigm that has been widely used to develop self-report questions with 
similar structure to the corresponding IAT is applied (e.g., Fleischhauer,et al., 2013; 
Greenwald et al., 2003). The following sections provide readers with more detailed 
information about how each measure was selected and adapted. The items of each 
measure are presented in the appendices for reference. Table 5.6 illustrates the implicit 
and explicit measures applied in the present study. 
 
Table 5.6 Explicit and implicit measures applied in Stage 2 
Explicit measures Implicit measure 
• Relative self-report: Science - 
Empathy Explicit Scale (SE-
Explicit)  
• Absolute self-report: Interpersonal 
Subscale of the Stereotype of 
Scientists (ISSOS) questionnaire 
• Science Empathy - Implicit 
Association Test 
(SE-IAT) 
 
5.2.4.1. Interpersonal Subscale of the Stereotype of Scientists questionnaire 
(ISSOS) 
As discussed in the literature review, stereotypes about scientists have been measured 
in different ways in different context. The criteria for selecting the absolute explicit 
measure in this study are that the measure should: 1) be suitable to capture stereotypes 
among adults in the UK context; 2) assess up-to-date stereotypes of scientists and 3) 
target corresponding constructs with the SE-IAT, that is the stereotype about empathy 
in scientists. Existing explicit measures for stereotypes of scientists were examined 
carefully against the three criteria: The Draw-a-Scientist Test (DAST) (Chambers, 1983) 
has often been used among children to provide qualitative information about the image 
of scientists; the Women in Science Scale (WiSS) (Erb & Smith, 1984) targets only 
perceptions about female scientists; and The Image of Scientists Scale (ISSS) 
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(Krajkovich & Smith, 1982) has often been used among middle school students and to 
measure general negative and positive images of scientists, so that all the three 
measures were deemed either age-inappropriate for college students or measuring non-
corresponding content with the SE-IAT, therefore were dropped from the present study. 
Finally, the Interpersonal Subscale of the Stereotype of Scientists (SOS) questionnaire 
(Schneider, 2010) is selected. Table 5.7 summarises the existing explicit measures for 
stereotypes of scientists. 
 
Table 5.7 Summary of existing explicit measures for stereotypes of scientists 
Name  Time Participants Content 
DAST 1983 Children Qualitative information about the image of scientist 
(e.g., gender, glasses, lab coat, facial hair, products of 
research) 
WiSS 1984 Adolescents Attitudes about  
1) Women's scientific ability 2) Sexism 
ISSS 1982 Adolescents Attitudes about  
1) Positive image of scientists 
2) Negative image of scientists 
3) Science avocation 
SOS 2010 College 
students 
Attitudes about scientists' 
1) Professional competence 
2) Interpersonal competence 
Note: DAST, Draw-a-Scientist Test; WiSS, Women in Science Scale; ISSS, Image of 
Science and Scientists Scale; SOS, Stereotypes of Scientists Scale; K-12, publicly 
supported school grades from kindergarten to the 12th grade. 
 
The SOS questionnaire was first developed in 2010 to explore the contemporary images 
of scientists among college students in the US (Schneider, 2010; Wyer et al., 2010). 
The questionnaire was designed to identify the characteristics and content of 
contemporary college students' image of scientists, both what they "do" in their daily 
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work life and who they "are" as people. The Confirmatory Factor Analysis (SEM) on 
SOS conducted by Schneider (2010) with 1061 US college students revealed two 
subscales: one indicates attitudes toward scientists' professional competence (e.g., 
whether scientists are perceived as technically competent and logical), and the other 
indicates attitudes toward scientists' interpersonal competence (e.g., whether scientists 
are perceived as cooperative and able to maintain good friendships). For the US sample, 
consistently high reliability of the two subscales were reported (Cronbach α = .81 for 
the professional competence subscale and Cronbach α =.77 for the Interpersonal 
competence subscale). 
 
Considering the three criteria for the explicit measures, the Interpersonal Subscale of 
the Stereotypes of Scientists (ISSOS) is selected as the psychometrically sound absolute 
explicit measure suitable for assessing up-to-date stereotypes about empathy in 
scientists among adults in the UK. Despite the fact that empathy is not an identical 
concept with social competence, numerous studies have found systematically strong 
positive correlations between empathy and social competence, suggesting an important 
role for empathy in facilitating social interactions (Allemand et al., 2015; Eisenberg, 
2002). For example, adolescents who reported higher empathy also reported more pro-
social behaviours, were less aggressive, and had more supportive peer relationships 
(Eisenberg et al., 2009). Moreover, adults who reported higher empathy were more 
willing to volunteer (Davis et al., 2001), more grateful to others (Mccullough, Emmons, 
& Tsang, 2002), donated more to charity (Wilhelm & Bekkers, 2010), and were more 
likely to forgive others (McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997). Supported by 
these findings, measuring explicit attitudes toward social competence of scientists is 
considered an alternative way to assess explicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists in 
the present study.  
 
The ISSOS is comprised of 9 items tapping attitudes toward various aspects of 
scientists' social life. Participants are required to rate on a 7-point Likert scale from 
"strongly disagree" to "strongly agree" on statements describing either a positive or a 
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negative view about scientists' interpersonal relationships, such as "Scientists have fun 
with colleagues at work" or "scientists are out of touch with what is happening in the 
world" (See Appendix VI for the full scale). The internal consistency of the ISSOS in 
the present study is acceptable (Cronbach's α = .72).  
 
5.2.4.2. Science-Empathy Explicit Scale (SE-explicit) 
Given that no adequate self-report questionnaire was available to measure the similar 
relative attitudes toward associations between Science-Liberal arts and Empathy-
Rationality in the SE-IAT, a new scale was constructed using one of the most popular 
ways to measure relative explicit attitudes in the IAT literature: the combination of 
Feeling Thermometer ratings and Likert ratings (e.g., Blair, Judd, Havranek, & Steiner, 
2010; Fleischhauer et al., 2013; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Karpinski & Hilton, 
2001; Payne et al., 2008). In the Feeling Thermometer, participants express their 
feelings toward a given person, group or issue in terms of degree, with their attitudes 
corresponding to temperature. Ratings below the midpoint of the thermometer are 
considered as a "cold" attitude, which indicates a negative view of a person, group, or 
issue; conversely, ratings above the midpoint are considered as a "hot" attitude, which 
indicates a positive view of a person, group, or issue. The midpoint of the feeling 
thermometer is reserved to indicate a neutral attitude towards a person, group, or issue 
(Nelson, 2011). Feeling Thermometer is a very popular survey instrument in the 
stereotype field for it enables researchers to collect information about the direction, as 
well as intensity, of participants' attitudes toward a specific person, group or issue.  
 
In the present study, the Feeling Thermometer method is used to capture whether 
participants hold stereotype-congruent or counter-stereotype views about the 
associations between Science-Liberal arts and Empathy-Rationality as well as how 
strong their attitudes are. Specifically, the Feeling Thermometer item was as follows:  
 
 113 
 
 
Participants choosing the first three options were regarded to hold stereotype-congruent 
attitudes; conversely, participants choosing the last three options were regarded to hold 
counter-stereotype attitudes; and those who chose the middle option were regarded to 
hold a neutral attitude. 
 
Using the Likert ratings, participants can express how much they agree or disagree with 
certain statements. In the present study, participants were asked to rate on a 7-point 
Likert scale from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree" for two SE-IAT content-
corresponding statements, including "Scientists are less empathetic than humanity 
majors" and "Scientists are more rational than humanity majors".  
 
Combining the Feeling Thermometer item and the Likert items, the SE-explicit is 
comprised of 3 items in total. Though the 3-item scale using different kinds of questions 
may not have a good internal consistency, the SE-explicit is irreplaceable in the present 
study for its corresponding relative structure to the SE-IAT. As explained earlier, the 
distinctness in structures may partly account for the differences between the outcomes 
of implicit and explicit measures (Hofmann et al., 2005; Payne et al., 2008). In order to 
control for the impact of the lack of fit in structure, SE-explicit is designed to resemble 
the SE-IAT on purpose. Nevertheless, given that SE-IAT incorporates two groups of 
Which statement best describes your view? 
• I strongly associate liberal arts with empathy and science with rationality. 
• I moderately associate liberal arts with empathy and science with rationality. 
• I slightly associate liberal arts with empathy and science with rationality. 
• I associate empathy and rationality with science and liberal arts equally. 
• I slightly associate science with empathy and liberal arts with rationality. 
• I moderately associate science with empathy and liberal arts with rationality. 
• I strongly associate science with empathy and liberal arts with rationality. 
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relative concepts, it is inevitable to create the so-called "double-barreled" question ( i.e., 
a question asks about more than one construct; Olson, 2011) in the SE-explicit, which 
is usually regarded as an informal fallacy in a survey. Specifically speaking, in the 
Thermometer Feeling item, the statement "I associate liberal arts with empathy and 
science with rationality" asks two attitude targets (e.g., the attitude towards empathy in 
different majors as well attitude towards rationality in different majors) as one construct 
(e.g., Do you prefer liberal arts + empathy and science + rationality or liberal arts + 
rationality and science + empathy?). Although it is clear that such "double-barreled" 
question could violate the reliability and validity of the SE-explicit, considering the 
purpose of encompassing the relative explicit measure is to deal with the structural fit 
effect, the structural resemblance to the SE-IAT has taken priority over the 
psychometric soundness of the SE-explicit questionnaire itself. Given this, despite its 
poor internal consistency, the SE-explicit questionnaire is still treated as an appropriate 
relative explicit measure in the present study.    
 
5.2.4.3. Implicit measure: Science – Empathy IAT (SE-IAT) 
In previous chapter, the design of the updated version of the SE-IAT was described.  
It was created to capture participants' underlying beliefs about the associations between 
science-liberal arts and empathy-rationality. This newly developed SE-IAT is applied 
in the present study. See Section 4.3 for the detailed procedure and Table 4.7 for the 
updated items in the SE-IAT.  
 
As discussed in the literature review, IAT has been the most widely used implicit 
measure in various fields due to its superior reliability over other implicit measures 
such as the evaluative priming procedure (e.g., Cunningham, et al., 2001), the Go/No-
Go Association Task (GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2001) or the dot probe task (Schmukle, 
2005). The internal consistencies of the IAT have been reported to be satisfactory 
(internal reliabilities averaged .79 across 50 studies in a meta-analysis conducted by 
Hofmann et al., 2005) ranging from .70 to .90 (Nosek, Greenwald, et al., 2007). In terms 
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of its discriminant validity, a number of studies looking at various domains have 
reported somewhat low correlations between the IAT and explicit measures in a range 
from r = -.25 to r = .60 (Hofmann et al., 2005) or from r = .13 to r = .75, with median 
r = .22 (Lane et al., 2007). Only a handful of studies have shown strong correlations 
between the IAT and explicit measures (e.g., Asendorpf et al., 2002; Cunningham et al., 
2001; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Wiers, Van Woerden, Smulders, & De Jong, 2002). 
See Section 3.3.2 in the Literature Review chapter for a summary about studies of the 
psychometric properties of the IAT. In the present study, the reliability and validity of 
the SE-IAT will be examined against a series of criteria as well as compared with 
previous findings.   
 
5.2.5. Data preparation 
In this section, the procedure of how to calculate the scores for each measure is 
explained in detail. The IAT scores were calculated using an improved algorithm to 
reduce the influence of construct-unrelated variance. Comparisons between the 
conventional algorithm and the improved algorithm for the IAT are presented. As for 
the self-report explicit measures, scores were calculated in accordance with the IAT 
results with positive scores representing stereotype-congruent attitudes (i.e., associate 
science with rationality and liberal arts with empathy) and negative scores representing 
counter-stereotype attitudes (i.e., associate science with empathy and liberal arts with 
rationality).  
5.2.5.1. SE-IAT scoring 
The so-called improved D scoring algorithm (Greenwald et al., 2003) has been selected 
to calculate the SE-IAT effect in the present study. Unlike the conventional algorithm, 
which only uses data from the correct trials in the critical testing blocks, the improved 
D scoring algorithm takes all trials in both the practice and testing blocks into account, 
therefore displaying better resistance to construct-unrelated variance such as order 
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effect and cognitive fluencies (Greenwald et al., 2003). Table 5.8 compared the steps 
of the conventional algorithm and the improved D scoring algorithm in detail.    
Table 5.8 Conventional and improved IAT scoring algorithms compared 
Step Conventional Algorithm Improved D Algorithm 
1  Use data from B4 & B7 Use data from B3, B4, B6, & B7 
2  Nonsystematic elimination of 
subjects for excessively slow 
responding and/or high error rates 
Eliminate trials with latencies > 
10,000 ms; eliminate subjects for 
whom more than 10% of trials have 
latency less than 300 ms  
3 Drop first two trials of each block Use all trials 
4 Recode latencies outside 300/3000 
ms boundaries to the nearer 
boundary value 
No extreme value treatment (beyond 
Step 2) 
5  Compute mean of correct latencies for 
each block 
6  Compute one pooled SD for all trials 
in B3 & B6; another for B4 & B7  
7  Replace each error latency with block 
mean (computed in Step 5) + 600 ms  
8 Log-transform the resulting values No transformation 
9 Average the resulting values for 
each of the two blocks 
Average the resulting values for each 
of the four blocks 
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Step Conventional Algorithm Improved D Algorithm 
10 Compute the difference B7-B4 Compute two differences: B6-B3 and 
B7-B4 
11  Divide each difference by its 
associated pooled-trials SD from Step 
6 
12  Average the two quotients from Step 
11 
Note. Block numbers (e.g., B1) refer to the procedure shown in Table xxx. The 
conventional algorithm has no procedures corresponding to Steps 5 – 7 or Steps 11 – 
12 of the improved D algorithm. SD = standard deviation. Adapted from Greenwald et 
al., (2003). 
For both algorithms, the basic logic for calculating the IAT effect is to compare the 
reaction times between the congruent pairing blocks and the incongruent pairing blocks. 
The conventional scoring algorithm (Greenwald et al., 1998) log-transforms the 
response latencies as well as recodes latencies greater than 3000 ms or smaller than 300 
ms to 3000ms and 300ms respectively. The conventional scoring algorithm has been 
criticized for (1) being contaminated by extraneous variables such as cognitive fluency, 
thus inflating the IAT scores for slow responders (Cai, Sriram, Greenwald, & 
McFarland, 2004; Hilgard, Bartholow, Dickter, & Blanton, 2014), (2) requiring a large 
sample size to yield power of .80 to reject the null hypothesis for studies looking at the 
correlations between IAT and other explicit measures (Greenwald et al., 2003), (3) the 
reduction in magnitudes of IAT scores with repeated administrations (Greenwald & 
Nosek, 2001), and (4) low internal consistency (Greenwald et al., 2003).  
In response to such criticisms, Greenwald et al. (2003) developed a new set of scoring 
algorithm, the so-called D scoring algorithm that has three substantial changes from the 
conventional procedure: (1) use of practice-block data (Step 1 in Table 5.6), (2) use of 
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error penalties (computed in Steps 5 and 7), and (3) use of individual-respondent 
standard deviations to provide the measure's scale unit (Computed in Step 6 and applied 
in Step 11). The D scoring algorithm therefore displays better internal consistency, and 
better resistance to a number of extraneous procedural influences such as order effects 
and cognitive fluencies than the conventional scoring method (Cai et al., 2004; 
Greenwald et al., 2003; Hilgard et al., 2014). The D scoring algorithm has become the 
most commonly used scoring method for the IAT and is used in the present study for 
the SE-IAT as well. The SPSS syntax for computing IAT effects using the improved D 
algorithm can be obtained from http://faculty.washington.edu/agg/iat_materials.htm. 
For the SE-IAT, a positive D score represents a stereotype-congruent implicit belief 
that science is associated with rationality and liberal arts with empathy, but a negative 
D score represents a counter-stereotype implicit belief that science is associated with 
empathy and liberal arts with rationality. The value of the D score shows the strength 
of the associations. The bigger the value of the D score is, the stronger the associations 
between the concepts are. The D score ranges from -2 to +2. The strength of the IAT 
effect can be described as 'strong' (.80), 'medium' (.50), 'slight' (.20), or 'little or no' 
when interpreting the D scores. These cut-offs are in correspondence to results meeting 
conventional criteria for small, medium, and large effect size of Cohen's d (1988) 
measure (Nosek et al., 2005).  
5.2.5.2. SE-explicit scoring 
For the SE-explicit questionnaire, responses were collected on 7-point Likert scales 
ranging from "strongly disagree" (coded as -3) to "strongly agree" (coded as +3). The 
middle point "neither agree nor disagree" was coded zero. Consistent with the SE-IAT 
scores, stereotype-congruent responses associating science with rationality and liberal 
arts with empathy were coded with positive integers while counter-stereotype responses 
associating science with empathy and liberal arts with rationality were coded with 
negative integers. The sum of the scores of the three questions in the scale was regarded 
as the final score of the SE-explicit, ranging from -9 to +9.  
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5.2.5.3. ISSOS scoring 
For the ISSOS scale, responses were also collected on 7-point Likert scales ranging 
from "strongly disagree" (coded as -3) to "strongly agree" (coded +3). The middle point 
"neither agree nor disagree" was coded zero. Negatively worded items were reverse 
scored. Positive ISSOS scores thus represented counter-stereotype responses (i.e. that 
scientists have good social skills) and the negative ISSOS scores represented 
stereotype-congruent responses (i.e. that scientists do not have good social skills). The 
sum of the scores of the nine items in the questionnaire was regarded as the final score 
of the ISSOS, ranging from -27 to +27. However, in order to make the valence of scores 
consistent with the other two measures, we then reversed the total scores such that 
counter-stereotype responses were reflected by negative ISSOS scores and the 
stereotype-congruent responses were reflected by positive ISSOS scores. 
 
5.2.6. Data analysis 
In order to preserve credibility of the results, rigorous procedures of data analysis were 
followed in the present study. For the statistical tests of the present study, sources of 
bias (e.g., missing data and outliers) were treated using techniques justified with 
reference to a variety of literatures. Assumptions of tests (e.g., normality and 
homogeneity of variance) were also checked before using any parametric test with the 
data (e.g., t-test and correlation; Field, 2013).  
5.2.6.1. Missing data 
Firstly, Missing Value Analysis (MVA) in SPSS was performed with the dataset. The 
results suggest that in the present dataset 7% of the cases have missing values in 
academic identification, meaning that 7% of participants did not report their 
identification with science or liberal arts. In this case, independent t-tests were 
conducted to see if there are significant differences between those who have reported 
their academic identification and those who hadn't in terms of their SE-IAT, SE-explicit 
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and ISSOS performances. No significant difference was found on any of the three 
measures, indicating that the patterns of missing values do not depend on the data values.  
The missing values can therefore be deemed as missing at random (Little & Rubin, 
2002). Moreover, as for other variables (e.g., age, gender, individual item in the three 
measures), the MVA results suggest less than 5% of the cases have missing values and 
are missing at random as well.  
 
According to Field (2013), there are several methods to deal with missing data under 
this condition, such as case deletion, mean imputation, and regression imputation. Each 
method has its advantages and disadvantages. Case deletion, especially listwise deletion, 
is one of the most commonly used methods, which can avoid the drawback of 
introducing bias to the data. However, it inevitably reduces the sample size, which 
results in the decreased power of analysis (Field, 2013). In contrast, imputations retain 
the original sample size by replacing missing data with values generated in different 
ways. For example, mean imputation uses the variable mean of all other cases to replace 
the missing value. However, this poses a potential problem of attenuating correlations 
between variables. Given that the present study proposes to examine the implicit-
explicit correlations, this method is deemed inappropriate. Regression imputation, on 
the other hand, makes up the pitfall of mean imputation by using a predicted regression 
model to generate possible values for the missing data. Yet, this may mask the 
uncertainty of imputed values and lead to over identified relationships between 
variables (Field, 2013). In this case, the present study adopted the simpler and more 
straightforward way of handling missing data by deleting the cases with missing values. 
Besides, as the sample size of the present study is relatively large (= 485) and the 
number of cases with missing values is very small (< 7%) the effect on sample size is 
acceptable. Therefore, listwise deletion was adopted in the present study as the 
technique to handle missing data.  
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5.2.6.2. Outliers 
One thing that usually affects normality is outliers. An outlier is a score very different 
from the rest of the data (Field, 2013). To spot the outliers, z-scores were calculated for 
each measure and cases with z-scores greater than 3.29 in absolute value were regarded 
as potential outliers (Field, 2013). No outlier was spotted for the SE-IAT and SE-
explicit results and only 3 outliers were found for the ISSOS results. In terms of how 
to deal with outliers, one can either delete the case or transform data values. Given that 
there were only a very small number of outliers identified in the present study, these 
cases were removed from the dataset on the grounds that they might have represented 
rather idiosyncratic situations. 
 
5.2.6.3. Normality 
Before using any parametric tests with the data (e.g., t-test and correlation), the 
assumption of normality is checked by examining the Skew and Kurtosis of the data. 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test or Shapiro-Wilk test is not used because in a large 
sample of the present study (n = 485) these tests can be significant even when the scores 
are only slightly different from a normal distribution (Field, 2013). Instead, Histograms, 
P-P plots and the values of skew and kurtosis are examined. Data for SE-IAT, SE-
explicit and ISSOS are all normally distributed with skew and kurtosis values very close 
to 0.  
 
5.2.6.4. Homogeneity of variance 
Another important assumption for parametric tests is the homogeneity of variance 
because unequal variances could create bias and inconsistency in the estimate of the 
standard error associated with the parameter estimates in linear models (Hayes & Cai, 
2007). Statisticians used to recommend testing for homogeneity of variance using 
Levene's test, if the assumption was violated, using an adjustment to correct it (Field, 
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2013). However, like the aforementioned problem with significant tests of normality, 
Levene's test can also be significant even for small and unimportant effects in large 
samples. As suggested by Field (2013), in a large sample like the present study, the 
assumption of homogeneity of variance is pretty much irrelevant, and can be ignored 
(Field, 2013). 
 
5.2.6.5. Criteria for evaluating the SE-IAT 
As discussed in the literature review, controversial evidence has been found for the 
psychometric properties of different IATs. Before applying the newly developed SE-
IAT to investigate implicit stereotypes about empathy in scientists, it is important to 
assess whether the SE-IAT met relevant psychometric criteria. Selected criteria, 
hypotheses and applied statistical analyses to evaluate the reliability and validity of the 
SE-IAT are displayed in Table 5.9 below.  
 
Table 5.9 Summary of the criteria, hypotheses and statistical analyses to evaluate the 
SE-IAT 
Criteria Hypotheses Statistical 
analyses 
Replicating the 
IAT effect 
H1: Both the reaction time (H1a) and errors 
(H1b) should be increased for the incompatible 
task as compared to the compatible task due to 
the theory that the incompatible task requires 
more cognitive capacities. 
Paired sample T-
test 
Internal 
consistency 
H2: SE-IAT is expected to show similar internal 
consistency with other IATs ranging from .70 
to .90. 
Split-half 
reliability 
Relationship with 
explicit measures 
H3: SE-IAT is expected to show little or no 
correlation with SE-explicit (H3a) or ISSOS 
Pearson's 
correlation 
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Criteria Hypotheses Statistical 
analyses 
(H3b). However, if correlated, the correlation is 
expected to be stronger for SE-explicit than 
ISSOS because the SE-explicit has better 
structural fit with the SE-IAT than ISSOS 
(H3c).  
Ability to capture 
individual 
differences 
H4: Both gender and major are expected to have 
influence on the SE-IAT performance. Women 
are expected to have weaker SE-IAT effect than 
men due to their advantage in social sensitivity 
(H4a). Students identified with sciences are 
expected to have weaker SE-IAT effect than 
liberal arts due to the ingroup favouritism 
(H4b). If there is an interaction between gender 
and major, individuals with unconventional 
identities (women in science and men in liberal 
arts) are expected to have weaker SE-IAT effect 
than those with conventional identities (women 
in liberal arts and men in science) due to the role 
incongruity theory (H4c). 
Two-way 
ANOVA 
Resistance to order 
effect 
H5: No difference is expected in SE-IAT results 
between participants who did the incompatible 
task first and the compatible task later and those 
who completed the test in a reversed order.  
Independent t-test 
Resistance to prior 
IAT experience 
effect 
H6: No difference is expected in their SE-IAT 
results between participants who had done an 
IAT before and those who had no prior 
experience with IAT. 
Independent t-test 
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5.3. Results  
5.3.1. Descriptive statistics  
First of all, descriptive data of the involved variables are presented so the readers can 
gain general knowledge of the status of the current sample on each variable. Table 5.10 
illustrates the mean (M), standard deviation (SD) and the range of current participants' 
SE-IAT, SE-explicit and ISSOS scores.  
 
  Table 5.10 Descriptive data of the SE-IAT, SE-explicit and ISSOS results 
    Range 
Variable n M SD Potential Actual 
SE-IAT 485 0.60 0.36 -2 − 2 -.79 − 1.51 
SE-explicit 475 2.26 2.87 -9 − 9 -6.0 − 9.0 
ISSOS 476 -10.34 6.49 -27 − 27 -26 − 14 
Note. The variation in sample size is due to the variation in the number of participants 
who completed each measure. Negative scores reflect stereotype-congruent views and 
positive scores reflect counter-stereotype views. 
 
The data showed that the average SE-IAT score was positive (M = .60, within the 
medium effect range of .50 to .80), meaning that current participants held a moderate 
stereotype-congruent implicit mental association of science – rationality and liberal 
arts – empathy. For the explicit stereotypes, the data showed that the average SE-
explicit score was also positive (M = 2.26, within the medium effect range of 2.25 to 
4.5), meaning that current participants explicitly endorsed moderate stereotype-
congruent associations of science – rationality and liberal arts – empathy. On the 
contrary, the data showed that the average ISSOS score was negative (M = -10.34, 
within the slight effect range of 6.75 to 13.5), meaning that current participants 
explicitly held a weak counter-stereotype view about scientists' interpersonal skills. In 
other words, current participants reported slight positive attitudes about scientists' 
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interpersonal skills, but they still believed scientists were less empathetic but more 
rational than humanists, both implicitly and explicitly.  
 
5.3.2. Replicating the IAT effect 
As explained in the literature review, the incompatible combined blocks of the IAT are 
supposed to draw more heavily on cognitive capacities than the compatible combined 
blocks and as such cause higher response latencies (i.e., reaction time and errors) than 
compatible combined blocks. Hypothesis 1a predicted that participants would take 
longer to complete the incompatible task (i.e., science – empathy and liberal arts - 
rationality) than compatible task (i.e., science – rationality and liberal arts – empathy) 
of the SE-IAT. The results of a two-tailed paired sample t-test supported this hypothesis, 
(t(484) = 28.57, ***p < .001, Cohen's d = .46, marking a small effect size.) Reaction 
time was significantly increased in the incompatible combined blocks (M = 1205.12 
(ms)) as compared to the compatible combined blocks (M = 897.67(ms)). Figure 5.1 
depicts the means and standard errors for reaction time of the compatible and 
incompatible combined blocks.  
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Figure 5.1 Mean reaction times of the compatible and incompatible SE-IAT blocks 
Error bars are standard error of the mean. Compatible task is to associate science 
with rationality and liberal arts with empathy. Incompatible task is to associate 
science with empathy and liberal arts with rationality. 
 
Hypothesis 1B predicted that the participants would make more mistakes (i.e., failed to 
sort the item into the affiliated category) in the incompatible combined blocks than the 
compatible combined blocks. Results of a two-tailed paired sample t-test also supported 
this hypothesis, (t(484) = 9.85, ***p < .001, Cohen's d = .53, marking a medium effect 
size.) Error rate was significantly increased in the incompatible combined blocks (M = 
10.34 (%)) as compared to the compatible combined blocks (M = 7.33 (%)). Figure 5.1 
depicts the means and standard errors for error rates of the compatible and incompatible 
combined blocks.  
0
300
600
900
1200
1500
Compatible Incompatible
Re
sp
on
se
	la
te
nc
y	
in
	m
ill
is
ec
on
ds
(m
s)
CompatibleIncompatible
*** 
 127 
 
Figure 5.2 Mean error rates of the compatible and incompatible SE-IAT blocks 
Error bars are standard error of the mean. Compatible task is to associate science 
with rationality and liberal arts with empathy. Incompatible task is to associate 
science with empathy and liberal arts with rationality. 
 
5.3.3. Internal consistency 
The internal consistency is examined using the split-half reliability method. To 
calculate the SE-IAT’s split-half reliability, the D scoring algorithm was applied to two 
mutually exclusive subsets of the critical trials, using an odd-even divide. Hypothesis 
2 predicted that the SE-IAT would display an internal consistency ranging from .70 
to .90 according to a meta-analysis of existing IATs (Nosek, Greenwald, et al., 2007). 
However, the result of the Pearson's correlation between the two sub tests did not 
support this hypothesis (r(485) = .44, *p < .05). Although the two subtests were 
significantly correlated, the coefficient is smaller than the expected .70, meaning that 
the SE-IAT has weak internal consistency.  
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5.3.4. Relationship with explicit measures  
Hypothesis 3 predicted that SE-IAT would show no or low correlations with SE-explicit 
(H3a) and ISSOS (H3b). The results of two Pearson's correlations supported these two 
predictions. There was neither a significant relationship between SE-IAT and SE-
explicit (r(475) = .087, p = .06), nor a significant relationship between SE-IAT and 
ISSOS (r(474) = .039, p = .395).  
 
Moreover, Hypothesis 3c also predicted that SE-IAT would show stronger correlation 
with SE-explicit than with the ISSOS (H3c). However, given that no significant 
correlation was detected, it was deemed pointless to compare the correlation 
coefficients.  
 
5.3.5. Ability to capture individual differences  
Hypothesis 4 predicted that both gender and major would have an influence on the SE-
IAT performance. Women were expected to show a weaker SE-IAT effect than men 
due to their advantage in social sensitivity (H4a). Students identified with science were 
expected to have weaker SE-IAT effect than those identified with liberal arts due to the 
ingroup favouritism (H4b). However, the results of the 2 (female vs. male) * 2 (science 
vs. liberal arts) ANOVAs did not support these two predictions. There was neither a 
significant main effect of gender, F(1, 450) = .086, p = .77, ω2 = .000 nor a significant 
main effect of major, F(1, 450) = 3.03, p = .082, ω2 = .000. There was no significant 
interaction between gender and major either, F(1, 450) = .054, p = .816, ω2 = .000.  
 
5.3.6. Resistance to undesired influence of order of combined tasks  
Hypothesis 5 predicted no difference in their SE-IAT results between participants who 
did the incompatible task first and the compatible task later and those who completed 
the test in a reversed order. The results of an independent t-test support this prediction. 
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On average, participants who completed the incompatible task first and the compatible 
task later showed slightly greater SE-IAT scores (M = .64, SE = .023), than those who 
completed the compatible task first and incompatible task later (M = .56, SE = .023). 
This difference, .08, BCa 95% CI [0.0105, 0.1366], was not significant (t(483) = .089, 
p = .766), and it represented only a small-sized effect, Cohen's d = 0.208. 
 
5.3.7. Resistance to undesired influence of prior IAT experience  
Hypothesis 6 also predicted no difference in their SE-IAT results between participants 
who had done an IAT before and those who had had no prior experience with any IAT. 
The results of an independent t-test also support this prediction. On average, 
participants who had no prior IAT experience showed slightly greater SE-IAT scores 
(M = .60, SE = .018), than those who had (M = .57, SE = .040). This difference, .03, 
BCa 95% CI [-0.1131, 0.0502], was not significant (t(474) = .489, p = .485), and it 
represented a trivial effect, Cohen's d = 0.09. 
 
5.4. Discussion 
The aim of this chapter was to test the newly developed SE-IAT against certain 
psychometric criteria to see if it would be eligible for investigating individual 
differences in stereotypes of empathy in scientists in the next stage. Specifically 
speaking, SE-IAT was tested for its 1) ability to replicate an IAT effect, 2) internal 
consistency, 3) relationship with explicit measures, 4) ability to capture individual 
differences, 5) resistance to an undesirable order effect, and 6) resistance to prior 
experience of IAT.  
 
Results showed that the SE-IAT successfully replicated an IAT effect (i.e., significantly 
greater reaction time and errors in incompatible blocks than in compatible blocks), 
captured implicit attitudes that were different from the explicit attitudes assessed by 
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self-report measures, and resisted construct-unrelated variance such as order effect and 
prior IAT experience. However, results also showed that the SE-IAT displayed low 
internal consistency and had failed to detect any gender or major difference in implicit 
attitudes.  Some improvements to the test’s internal consistency, in particular, would 
be desirable in the final version.   
 
In this section, the results of the current study will be synthesized and discussed with 
reference to the wider literature. Problems with the SE-IAT and limitations of the 
current study are identified to inform the future directions of research in this field. 
Finally, on the basis of the identified problems, corresponding modifications are made 
on the SE-IAT and lead to a single-category SE-IAT (SSE-IAT) before applying it on 
the next stage to investigate individual differences.  
 
5.4.1. Validated aspects of the SE-IAT 
The present study found significant differences in reaction time and error rates between 
compatible and incompatible blocks of the SE-IAT, with the incompatible blocks 
resulting in significantly greater reaction time and error rates than the compatible blocks. 
Hypothesis 1 has been successfully confirmed and in line with previous research which 
states that incompatible blocks draw more heavily on cognitive capacities and as such 
result in higher response latencies than the compatible blocks (e.g., Conrey, Sherman, 
Gawronski, Hugenberg & Groom, 2005; Klauer, Schmitz, Teige-Mocigemba, & Voss, 
2010; McFarland & Crouch, 2002; Mierke & Klauer, 2003). As depicted in Table 5.9, 
the positive SE-IAT effect showed that there was a significant stereotype-congruent 
implicit preference for liberal arts over scientists in terms of their empathy among 
participants in the present study. As such, the SE-IAT has shown its ability to replicate 
an IAT effect and reflect implicit associations between concepts. 
 
Furthermore, confirming Hypothesis 3, results showed non-significant low correlations 
 131 
between the SE-IAT and explicit measures (r = .087 with SE-explicit and r = .039 with 
ISSOS), indicating that the SE-IAT reflected implicit automatic mental representations 
that were different from attitudes reported in a rather controlled or reflective manner in 
explicit measures (Back, Jordan, & Thomas, 2009; Lane et al., 2007). Such findings are 
in accordance with a previous meta-analysis that revealed a somewhat low correlation 
between IATs and explicit measures with an average of r = .19 (range: r = -.25 to r 
= .60; Hofmann et al., 2005). However, it is also worth mentioning that although both 
the SE-explicit and ISSOS showed non-significant low correlations with SE-IAT, SE-
explicit (M = 2.26, out of 9) yielded the same positive mean score with SE-IAT (M = 
0.60, out of 2) while ISSOS yielded a negative mean score in the opposite direction (M 
= -10.34, out of 27). The directional convergence between SE-IAT and SE-explicit, and 
the directional divergence from ISSOS, supports the aforementioned structural fit 
account for the implicit-explicit correlations (Payne et al., 2008). As discussed before, 
SE-explicit was seen to have a better structural fit with SE-IAT than the ISSOS. This 
is because both SE-explicit and SE-IAT measure relative attitudes based on the 
comparisons between science and liberal arts in terms of their empathy and rationality. 
In contrast, ISSOS involves only absolute propositional judgments focusing on social 
skills in scientists. Therefore, cautions must be stressed when interpreting implicit-
explicit correlations as evidence for underlying cognitive processes. The low 
correlation between SE-IAT and ISSOS might therefore be partly indicative of 
structural misfit of the measures themselves in addition to the underlying cognitive 
processes (Hofmann et al., 2005; Payne et al., 2008). Nevertheless, SE-IAT still showed 
low correlation with SE-explicit regardless of the similarity in their task demands.  
 
As regard to construct-unrelated variance, SE-IAT showed good resistance to both 
order effect and the influence of prior experience with other IATs. One of the most 
commonly observed types of construct-unrelated variance in the IAT is that participants 
are often slower in the subsequent combined blocks than in the preceding combined 
blocks, regardless of whether it is compatible or incompatible (Lane et al., 2007; Nosek, 
Greenwald, et al., 2007). However, such order effect was not observed in the present 
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study, thereby confirming Hypothesis 5, and showing alignment with previous research 
suggesting that D scoring algorithm could reduce the block order effect (Greenwald et 
al., 2003). This finding also adds to the evidence that adding extra practice trials to the 
later combined blocks could effectively reduce the order effect of combined blocks in 
IATs (Nosek et al., 2005). Several researchers have proposed that the order effect is 
due to the impact of cognitive inertia (i.e., the tendency for beliefs or set of beliefs to 
endure once formed; Klauer, 2005). Once the preceding task categorization rule has 
been activated in one's mind it maintains a heightened state of activation for substantial 
amounts of time, as such makes it difficult for participants to suppress it and switch to 
the opposite categorization in the second task (Baker, Friedman, & Leslie, 2010; Klauer, 
2005; Klauer et al., 2010). In the present study, the number of practice trials in the 
precedent combined blocks doubled the amount of practice trials in the subsequent 
combined blocks, allowing more time for participants to switch the categorisation rules 
between tasks, thus successfully reduced the order effect.  
 
Moreover, confirming Hypothesis 6, the influence of prior IAT experience was not 
significant in the present study either. The concern about prior IAT experience comes 
from the possibility that subjects could attempt to exert cognitive control in order to 
either suppress or overcome their automatic associations if they know how IAT works 
in the first place (e.g., Asendorpf et al., 2002; Banse, Seise, & Zerbes, 2001; Steffens, 
2004). It was known from previous analyses that prior experience with IAT could lead 
to reduction in IAT scores using conventional scoring algorithms (Greenwald & Nosek, 
2001). Consistent with previous findings, using the improved D-scoring algorithm, the 
present study also found that participants who had prior IAT experience showed slightly 
smaller SE-IAT scores (M = .57) than those who had no IAT experience before (M 
= .60). But the difference was not statistically significant and can be ignored. Thus, the 
D-scoring algorithm has been shown to be an effective method to reduce sensitivity to 
prior IAT experience for SE-IAT.  
 
To conclude, findings from the present study have validated several aspects of the SE-
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IAT as an effective measurement for assessing implicit stereotypes about empathy in 
scientists. Firstly, it has successfully replicated an IAT effect thus showing the ability 
to detect implicit attitudes by measuring their underlying automatically activated 
associations between concepts. Moreover, the low correlations between SE-IAT and 
explicit measures even after controlling for the structural fit effect suggests that the SE-
IAT indeed captures unconscious attitudes that are very likely to be independent from 
the self-reported beliefs gauged by explicit measures. Last but not least, construct-
unrelated variances such as order effect and prior IAT experience were found to exert 
no significant influence on SE-IAT effect, thus cast little harm to the validity of SE-
IAT. 
 
5.4.2. Limitations of the SE-IAT and modifications  
5.4.2.1. Limitations of the SE-IAT 
Unfortunately, findings from the present study also suggest several problems with the 
SE-IAT. First of all, unlike most existing IATs which displayed satisfactory internal 
consistency ranging from .70 to .90 (Hofmann et al., 2005), the newly developed SE-
IAT presented here showed an unacceptable internal consistency of .44, thereby 
violating Hypothesis 2. The poor internal consistency indicates that the items in the SE-
IAT do not contribute equally to what is being measured and items that are unrelated to 
the target construct should either be removed or modified (Robson, 2002). 
 
Furthermore, SE-IAT did not produce any individual difference as most existing IATs 
did (e.g., Gender-Science IAT, Race IAT and Age IAT, see the review paper by Nosek, 
Smyth, et al., 2007), therefore not supporting Hypothesis 4. It is important for SE-IAT 
to be able to capture variations in implicit mental representations for two reasons. 
Firstly, IAT needs to serve as more than a mirror of the culture (Lane et al., 2007; Nosek, 
Greenwald, et al., 2007). That is, it cannot be simply a tally of "the associations a person 
has been exposed to in his or her environment" (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001, p. 774). The 
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lack of variations in the SE-IAT scores makes it plausible that the test may not reflect 
a person's own attitude toward empathy in scientists, but merely the popular belief 
residing in the culture. Secondly, the known-group approach to construct validity also 
argues that SE-IAT should reliably distinguish between members of different groups, 
based on a priori predictions or knowledge about those groups (Lane et al., 2007). 
Hypothesis 4a, that predicted women to have weaker SE-IAT effect than men due to 
their advantages in social sensitivity, was not supported. Hypothesis 4b, that predicted 
students identified with sciences to have weaker SE-IAT effect than those with liberal 
arts due to the ingroup favouritism (i.e., the tendency to favouring one's ingroups over 
out-group members; Tajfel & Turner; 2001), was also not supported. Thus, known-
group validity for SE-IAT was not established. In this case, SE-IAT should not be used 
in its present form in the next stage, but instead needs modifications to be useful in 
evaluating individual differences in stereotypes of empathy in scientists. 
 
These two psychometric issues with the SE-IAT may arise from a fundamental problem 
with the features of the SE-IAT. Notably, the attribute category "rationality" is not a 
natural counterpart to "empathy" like "female" to "male" or "good" to "bad" in other 
psychometrically sound IATs. A widely recognized limitation to the traditional IAT is 
the assessment of contrasting categories (Karpinski & Steinman, 2006; Lane et al., 2007; 
Nosek, Greenwald, et al., 2007; Schnabel, Asendorpf, & Greenwald, 2008). In the SE-
IAT, it is unclear if an individual's score is due to a strong preference toward empathy 
in one group, or an aversion toward rationality in the other group, or a combination of 
both preference and aversion. Unlike "male" and "female" which are the two 
dimensions of one concept "gender", "rationality" and "empathy" are two independent 
concepts, therefore leading the SE-IAT to measure more than one construct. Instead of 
focusing on associations between empathy and science, it lumps the evaluations of 
associations of science-empathy, science-rationality, liberal arts-empathy and liberal 
arts-rationality altogether, thus creating much "noise" in the test, and potentially 
reducing its reliability and validity. As such, the unsatisfactory internal consistency 
could very likely be a result of the extraneous rationality items in the SE-IAT.  
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Furthermore, some native participants also reported having doubts about the use of 
liberal arts as the companion category label for science. They pointed out that 
“humanities” is the more commonly used word in the UK education system whereas 
“liberal arts” is more familiar with people in the US. Also, Fleischhauer et al. (2013) 
have found evidence that using more than one word as labels or stimuli in IATs may 
increase the complexity of processing, leading to unwanted sources of variance. 
Therefore, the use of the two-word category label liberal arts may also play a role in 
violating psychometric soundness of the SE-IAT.  
 
To conclude, findings from the present study revealed two main psychometric problems 
with the SE-IAT, which are 1) the unsatisfactory internal consistency and 2) the lack of 
ability to capture individual differences in implicit cognition. As such, SE-IAT should 
be modified before being used in the next stage of the work. In the light of existing 
literature, two features of the SE-IAT were considered inappropriate that might have 
led to construct-unrelated variance. One is the artificially selected contrasting category 
rationality leading to ambiguity about the SE-IAT construct, and the other is the two-
word category label "liberal arts" adding extra processing burden to participants when 
completing the test.  
 
5.4.2.2. Modified Single-category SE-IAT (SSE-IAT) 
To address the above-mentioned problems with SE-IAT, modifications were made 
leading to a Single-category SE- IAT (SSE-IAT; Karpinski & Steinman, 2006). Rather 
than presenting two pairs of contrasting concepts in the traditional IAT, a single-
category IAT consists of only one pair of bipolar concepts and one unipolar concept. In 
a single-target IAT, there is 1 target (e.g., flower), and 2 attributes (pleasant - 
unpleasant), whereas in a single-attribute IAT, there are 2 targets (e.g., flower and insect) 
and 1 attribute (e.g., pleasant). By adopting the single-category IAT paradigm, the 
attribute category rationality and the items belonging to it were all dropped. The label 
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liberal arts was replaced by humanities. The new modified Single-category SE-IAT is 
abbreviated as SSE-IAT for the convenience of interpretation in this thesis. It is worth 
mentioning that there are also other implicit procedures that may be adopted to assess 
unipolar concept. The detailed rationale for using the SSE-IAT will be explained in 
section 6.2.4.3 in the next stage. Table 5.11 presents the stimulus items in the new SSE-
IAT. 
 
Table 5.11 Stimulus items in the SSE-IAT 
Science  Humanities Empathy 
Chemistry Fine arts Affectionate 
Physics Linguistics Considerate 
Mathematics  Philosophy Caring 
Engineering History Emotional 
Computer science Literature Empathetic 
Astronomy Sociology Feeling 
Biology Politics Thoughtful 
Geology Music Sensitive 
 
As a variant to the traditional IAT, the procedure design of the new SSE-IAT is very 
similar to SE-IAT except dropping two blocks, resulting in a 5-block design. First, the 
rationality - empathy discrimination block (Block 2, see Table 4.4) in SE-IAT was 
removed. Given that SSE-IAT uses only empathy as the unipolar attribute concept, the 
discrimination between attribute concepts will no longer be needed. Second, the 
reversed target discrimination (Block 5, see Table 4.4) in SE-IAT was also removed. In 
the SSE-IAT, positions of target labels (i.e., science and humanities) remain the same, 
it is only the attribute label empathy needs to change position. As such, the reversed 
discrimination of target concepts will not be required either, and therefore should be 
removed. Table 5.12 presents the 5-block design of the SSE-IAT. 
 
 137 
 
 
Table 5.12 Sequence of blocks in the SSE-IAT 
 
Block 
 
N trials 
 
Task 
Response Key Assignment 
Left key (E) Right key (I) 
1 20 Target discrimination Humanities Science 
2 40 Initial combined block 
Humanities, 
Empathy 
Science 
3 50 Initial combined block 
Humanities, 
Empathy 
Science 
4 40 Reversed combined block Humanities 
Science, 
Empathy 
5 50 Reversed combined block Humanities 
Science, 
Empathy 
 
It is worth noting that the number of trials in the critical combined blocks in the SSE-
IAT has almost doubled the amount of trials in the corresponding blocks in the original 
SE-IAT to keep the length of the SSE-IAT the same with the standard IAT procedure 
(200 trials in total). It is important to do so because the full version of Single-category 
IAT has previously shown higher reliability than the short version of only 120 trials 
(Penke, Eichstaedt, & Asendorpf, 2006).  
 
5.4.2.3. Limitations of the present study and suggestions for future research 
The present study has a number of limitations. Firstly, the dichotomization of 
participants’ major subjects when examining the individual differences in SE-IAT by 
academic discipline may lead to potential loss of study power. As discussed in the 
literature review, there are potential variations among different subjects under the 
general science label. For example, recent evidence has shown that students in life 
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science could have comparable empathy with (Thomson et al., 2015) or even superior 
empathy over (Khorashad et al., 2015) those in social science, therefore they are very 
likely to differ from physics or engineering students in terms of the attitudes toward 
empathy in scientists. Future research that is interested in individual difference in 
stereotypes of scientists should address this issue and reveal what the variations are like 
inside the STEM world.  
 
Secondly, participants from different academic fields were not truly representative of 
the university population in the UK. In general, female participants (60%) were 
overrepresented in the current sample as compared with the female proportion (49%) 
of university students from the national data (UCAS, 2017). Only 29% of humanities 
participants were men in the present study, which is lower than the national male 
proportion (39%) in humanities (UCAS, 2017). The overrepresentation of women in 
the current sample is in line with previous findings that university student research 
pools were usually overrepresented by women, students early in their studies and 
psychology majors (Barlow & Cromer, 2006), as they were often given the opportunity 
to self-select into particular research studies (Miller, 1981). As suggested by Dickinson, 
Adelson, and Owen (2012), knowing that male university students are often less willing 
to volunteer in psychology studies than females, researchers should make extra efforts 
to boost response rates among male students (e.g., additional reminders, targeted 
incentives) or seek other sources to recruit participants (e.g., another university) to 
achieve a sample that is representative of the target population.  
 
Thirdly, the present study examined only one SE-IAT version, but it would be more 
rigorous to compare multiple versions of preliminary IATs using different category 
labels and stimulus that purport to measure the same construct to choose the final 
version. For example, when developing an IAT to assess individual differences in 
implicit cognitive motivation, Fleischhauer et al., (2013) developed and tested four 
preliminary IAT versions to validate the final one. As emphasized by many IAT experts, 
characteristics of selected category labels and stimulus materials would exert great 
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influence on the IAT effects (Lane et al., 2007; Nosek, Greenwald, et al., 2007). For 
example, in the present study, rationality was selected as the counterpart to empathy. It 
would be interesting to see how things would work if we use not empathy as the 
counterpart to empathy as a different version of the SE-IAT. Moreover, in the last IAT 
development stage, we had changed all stimulus items representing science and liberal 
arts from professions (e.g., physicist, writers, mathematicians) to subjects (e.g., physics, 
literature, mathematics) simply because some participants reported having difficulty 
sorting certain professions into one discipline for they thought such professions could 
be both (e.g., some participants regarded mathematicians also as philosophers). But it 
would actually produce more informative findings by keeping and testing both versions. 
As such, it is suggested that future studies with more resources should conduct a more 
thorough investigation among different versions of potential IATs to illuminate their 
distinctiveness in psychometric properties and to determine the most appropriate 
version to fulfill the research purpose.  
 
Last but not least, only a limited set of psychometric criteria was tested, leaving several 
other psychometric properties of the SE-IAT unexamined. Regarding measurement 
consistency, the test-retest reliability was not examined so it remains unknown if the 
SE-IAT could reliably replicate the result more than once in the same situation with the 
same population. Moreover, due to the limitations of time and resources of a PhD 
project, the IAT paradigm is the only applied method in the present study to assess the 
implicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists, therefore we did not check the convergent 
validity among SE-IAT and other implicit measures that purport to measure the same 
construct. More importantly, we did not test the predictive validity of the SE-IAT to 
see if it can predict any meaningful behaviour such as the academic performance or 
aspiration in science. For example, a meta-analysis of 184 independent samples 
(Greenwald et al., 2009) revealed that in studies that assess discrimination toward 
certain social groups, IATs did a superior job than explicit measures of prediction, but 
in studies that assess life style preferences (e.g., smoking, eating, and political candidate 
choices), explicit measures often outperformed IATs in prediction. Future studies may 
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establish the psychometric soundness of a newly developed IAT by testing a full set of 
criteria including: 1) the ability to replicate the IAT effect; 2) Internal consistency; 3) 
test-retest reliability; 4) relationship with explicit measures; 5) relationship with 
implicit measures; 6) ability to predict meaningful behaviours; and 7) resistance to 
construct-unrelated variance (e.g., order effect, prior IAT experience, etc.). 
 
5.4.3. Conclusion 
In this stage, the newly developed SE-IAT was tested against certain psychometric 
criteria. It showed the ability to replicate an IAT effect, to capture implicit attitudes that 
were different from the explicit attitudes, and to resist construct-unrelated variance such 
as order effect and prior IAT experience. However, SE-IAT also showed poor internal 
consistency and was unable to detect any gender or major difference in implicit attitudes. 
Problems yielded by the original SE-IAT were analysed, leading to a modified Single-
category SE-IAT (SSE-IAT) by dropping the rationality dimension. This modified 
SSE-IAT would be used in the next stage to explore individual differences in empathy 
in scientists.  
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Chapter 6  Stage Three: Individual differences of the implicit and 
explicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists and their relationships 
with career aspirations in science 
6.1. Introduction 
As the IAT to measure implicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists was established, 
tested and modified in the previous Stage 1 and 2, this new IAT as well as self-reported 
explicit measures are finally applied to investigate individual differences in stereotypes 
of emapathy in scientists in the present Stage 3. The three main research questions were 
investigated in Stage 3: 1) what are the implicit and explicit stereotypes of empathy in 
scientsits among UK university students nowadays; 2) What are the indivdiual 
differences in the implicit and explicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists by gender 
and major subejct; and 3) How do the implicit and explicit stereotypes of empathy relate 
to students’ career aspirations in science?  
 
6.2. Method 
6.2.1. Sampling and participants 
All participants were recruited through their departments or colleges from eight Russell 
Group universities located in England. As explained in the previous stage, the Russell 
Group universities were selected because, unlike many other universities with lower 
rankings that usually do not provide math-intensive subjects, Russell Group universities 
provide subjects in both STEM and non-STEM fields. Under such circumstances, it is 
important to bear in mind that the generalizability of the present study is limited.   
 
The opt-in sampling method was adopted to recruit participants. A participant 
recruitment email containing a brief introduction to the project and the link to the new 
study website was spread out to all the students in the target departments or colleges by 
 142 
their department administrators or college student representatives from 22nd May to 
29th November, 2017. It is worth mentioning that the four target universities from the 
previous stage were still included in the present study. However, given that this round 
of data collection was conducted almost a year after, it was the fresh students from 
some of the same target departments or colleges that were recruited in the present study. 
Gatekeepers from the previous target universities were asked to avoid sending the email 
to the same students last year. A reminder asking participants who had done the IAT 
test before not to retake the new test was also included in the study advertisement (See 
Appendix III). 
 
Moreover, learning from previous experience, extra effort was made to recruit male 
participants in the present study. By checking the female to male proportions of each 
academic discipline from the national data, the precise number of women and men 
needed in the current sample from each academic field to achieve a similar gender ratio 
to the national data was calculated. The researcher had access to the daily raw data 
collected. Therefore, it was possible for the researcher to monitor the progress of data 
collection and identify the number of participants with particular characteristics in need 
during the process. 
 
After three months of data collection, it was found that the recruited participants were 
overrepresented by women, as they were often more willing than men to volunteer in 
psychology studies (Dickinson et al., 2012). The sample was especially short of men 
from Engineering & Technology as well as Arts & Humanities fields. Therefore, 
additional advertisements (See Appendix IX) addressing men in particular were sent to 
the engineering and humanities departments from target universities. The male 
participant recruitment process lasted around two months. Once the desired number of 
participants was achieved, the data collection was finished by the end of November, 
2017.  
 
Among 3243 clicks on the study link, 1701 students continued to participate in the study. 
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However, 238 participants who did not finish the IAT test were removed from the final 
sample. Moreover, according to guidelines created by Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji 
(2003), 15 participants who made too many errors in the IAT test, meaning that they 
sorted the items into the wrong categories too many times (error rates > 20%), were 
also dropped from the final sample. No participant completed the SSE-IAT too fast 
(reaction time in each trial less than 300 milliseconds > 10%) nor was any participant 
who completed the SSE-IAT too slow (reaction time in certain trial(s) in the SSE-IAT 
test greater than 10,000 ms) in the present study.  
 
Consequently, the final sample is comprised of 1448 participants. The female to male 
ratio is 52.9% to 45.5% (766 females to 659 males, 23 participants who did not report 
their gender were still included, occupying 1.6%). Unlike the previous stage in which 
participants were asked to identify with only Science or Humanities, the current stage 
adopted a more detailed classification of participants' major subjects. Participants were 
identified with Arts & Humanities (n = 326, occupying 22.5%), Social Science & 
Management (n = 241, occupying 16.6%), Engineering & Technology (n = 263, 
occupying 18.2%), Life Science & Medicine (n = 252, occupying 17.4%), and Physical 
Science & Maths (n = 301, occupying 20.8%). There are 40 participants identified with 
other disciplines (occupying 2.7%) and 25 missing data (occupying 1.7%). The 
respective female to male ratio of participants identified with each discipline in the 
current sample as well as from national data is presented in Table 6.1. As can be seen 
from the table, the gender ratio of each academic discipline is not balanced. For 
example, the majority of participants from Engineering & Technology were male 
(77.9%) but the majority from Life Science & Medicine were female (76.2%) in present 
study. However, such imbalanced gender ratio of current sample is consistent with that 
from the national data. Therefore, the current sample is considered representative of the 
wider student population in UK higher education so that ensures the generalizability of 
the present study at least on the basis of gender.  
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Table 6.1 Female to male ratio in different academic fields of Stage 3 final sample 
and national higher education data 
 
Academic Fields 
Current 
Number 
Current 
Gender Ratio 
National 
Gender ratio 
 Total Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Arts & Humanities 326 216 110 66.3% 33.7% 63% 37% 
Social Science & 
Management 
241 148 93 61.4% 38.6% 61% 39% 
Life Science & 
Medicine 
252 192 60 76.2% 23.8% 70% 31% 
Engineering & 
Technology 
263 58 205 22.1% 77.9% 19% 81% 
Physical Science & 
Maths 
299 126 173 42.1% 57.9% 40% 60% 
Total 1381 740 641 53.6% 46.4% 57.5% 42.5
% 
Note. 40 participants identified with other academic disciplines and 27 participants 
who did not report their academic discipline were excluded. The national data is 
generated from the "Higher Education Student Statistics: UK, 2016/17 - Student 
numbers and characteristics" report by Higher Education Statistics Agency (2018).  
 
However, given that we were interested in differences of stereotypes between 
participants majoring in the general science and humanities academic fields, the 
dichotomous groupings of major subjects were still applied as well. Participants 
identified with Engineering & Technology, Life Science & Medicine, and Physical 
Science & Maths were grouped as the science majors, while participants majoring in 
Arts & Humanities and Social Science & Management were grouped as the humanities 
majors. The science to humanities ratio is 56.4% to 39.2% (816 identified with sciences 
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to 567 identified with humanities, the remaining 40 participants identified with other 
academic fields as well as 27 who did not report their identified academic field). The 
respective female to male ratio of participants identified with science and humanities 
majors is presented in Table 6.2. As can be seen from this table, the female to male ratio 
for humanities majors in the sample is slightly imbalanced with only 35.8% participants 
being male. The gender ratio is balanced for participants identified with science majors.  
 
Table 6.2 Female to male ratio in science and humanities majors of Stage 3 final 
sample 
Gender           Science majors 
             (n = 814) 
Humanities majors 
(n = 567) 
N Percentage N Percentage 
Female 376 53.8% 364 64.2% 
Male 438 46.2% 203 35.8% 
Note: 25 participants identified with other academic fields and 9 participants did not 
report their academic field were excluded from the table. 
 
The majority of participants (95.7%) were in the age range of 18 to 35 years old (See 
Table 6.3 for details). Also, in terms of education level, almost half of the participants 
were pursuing bachelor’s degrees whereas the other half were postgraduates in the final 
sample (See Table 6.4 for details).  
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Table 6.3 Age range of Stage 3 final sample 
Age range N Percentage 
< 18 3 0.2% 
18 - 20 427 30.1% 
21 - 25 608 42.8% 
26 - 30 240 16.9% 
31 - 35 84 5.9% 
36 - 45 32 2.3% 
> 45 26 1.8% 
Note: There are 28 missing values. 
 
Table 6.4 Education level of Stage 3 final sample 
Education level N Percentage 
Bachelor’s degree 614 44.8% 
Master’s degree 356 26.0% 
Doctoral degree 399 29.2% 
Note. 56 participants who were not currently university students and 6 who did not 
report their education level were excluded from the table. 
 
In terms of ethnicity, participants were asked to choose their ethnic group from four 
options based on the classification of ethnicity by the Higher Education Statistics 
Agency (HESA, 2018). The majority of participants (72.2%) were White (See Table 
6.5 for details). The proportions of different ethnic groups are inconsistent with national 
data (HESA, 2018). Finally, regarding the language ability, the majority of participants 
(70.0%) were native English speakers as shown in Table 6.6.  
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Table 6.5 Ethnic group of Stage 3 final sample 
Ethnic group N Current   
percentage 
National 
percentage 
White 1022 72.2% 76.0% 
Asian/Asian British 263 18.6% 10.3% 
Black/African/Caribbean/Black British  18 1.3% 6.9% 
Mixed/Multiple/Other 113 7.9% 5.1% 
Note. There are 32 missing values 
 
Table 6.6 English level of Stage 3 final sample 
English level N Percentage 
Native English speaker 996 70.0% 
Non-native speaker 427 30.0% 
Note. There are 25 missing values 
6.2.2. Procedure 
Similar to the previous stage, all tests and questions were self-administered by 
participants online with their own computers. See previous Section 5.2.2 for detailed 
steps.  
 
Below is the link to the Stage 3 study website (See Appendix X for screenshots of the 
SSE-IAT procedures): 
 
https://app-prod-
03.implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/Launch?study=/user/nlofaro/contract.qin.empathy2/m
anager.expt.xml&refresh=true 
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6.2.3. Ethical considerations 
Ethical approval has been obtained from the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of 
Education, University of Cambridge. Participants were asked to give consent by 
reading the instructions and clicking the "continue" button if they agree to proceed to 
the test and questions. All collected data were kept strictly confidential. See previous 
Section 5.2.3 for detailed steps addressing potential ethical issues.  
 
6.2.4. Measures 
To have a thorough investigation about stereotypes of empathy in scientists, both 
implicit and explicit measures were applied to examine the unconscious and conscious 
biases toward scientists' empathy and social skills. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
the Science Empathy-Implicit Association Test (SE-IAT) had been modified to the 
Single-category Science-Empathy Implicit Association Test (SSE-IAT) by dropping 
the rationality category to focus on the evaluation of empathy. This updated SSE-IAT 
was applied in the present study to see if it was able to capture individual differences 
in the implicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists.  
 
In terms of selecting and adapting the self-report measures for explicit stereotypes of 
empathy in scientists, the same two questionnaires used in Stage 2 were applied. The 
only exception was that questions relating to rationality were dropped so that the 
Science-Empathy Explicit (SE-Explicit) scale has been adapted to the Single-category 
Science-Empathy Explicit (SSE-Explicit) scale as well. The absolute explicit stereotype 
was still measured by the Interpersonal Subscale of the Stereotype of Scientists (ISSOS) 
questionnaire. It is important to include both self-report measures for they have 
different structures and assess different aspects of explicit stereotypes of empathy in 
scientists (See Section 5.2.4 for detailed rationale). The SSE-Explicit has similar 
structure to the SSE-IAT and measures relative attitudes by assessing potential 
preferences between science and humanities in terms of their relations with empathy. 
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The ISSOS measures absolute propositional opinions toward the interpersonal skills in 
scientists. It is deemed necessary to include both relative and absolute self-report 
measures in the present study for the purpose of getting a fuller picture of stereotypes 
of empathy in scientists.  
 
Moreover, a brief questionnaire assessing participants' science aspirations was also 
included. This questionnaire was included for the purpose of assessing the interplay 
between implicit and explicit stereotypes as factors in career choices. One of the most 
important hypotheses of the present study is that the stereotypical attitudes against 
empathy in scientists may prevent certain individuals, especially women who usually 
considered themselves of good empathy, from pursuing scientific careers. As such, it is 
considered of great interest to examine the relations between gender, stereotypes, and 
science aspirations. Table 6.7 illustrates the measures applied in Stage 3. Detailed 
information for each measurement is presented in the following sections.  
 
 
Table 6.7 Applied measures in Stage 3 
What to measure? Applied measures 
Implicit stereotypes of empathy in 
scientists 
• Single-category Science-Empathy 
Implicit Association Test (SSE-
IAT) 
Explicit stereotypes of empathy in 
scientists 
• Relative self-report: Science - 
Empathy Explicit Scale (SE-
Explicit)  
• Absolute self-report: Interpersonal 
Subscale of the Stereotype of 
Scientists (ISSOS) questionnaire 
Aspirations in science careers • Career Aspiration in Science 
(SCAS) scale 
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6.2.4.1. Absolute explicit measure: Interpersonal Subscale of the Stereotype of 
Scientists questionnaire (ISSOS)   
The ISSOS was applied again in the current stage for similar reasons presented in 
Section 5.2.4.1. It has been selected because: 1) it is suitable to capture stereotypes 
among adults in the UK context; 2) it assesses up-to-date stereotypes and 3) it targets 
interpersonal relationships in scientists in particular. Moreover, in previous Stage 2, the 
ISSOS displayed good internal consistency (Cronbach's α = .72) and successfully 
captured explicit attitudes that were different from the implicit attitudes. Therefore, it 
is considered of good psychometric soundness.  
 
The ISSOS is comprised of 9 items tapping attitudes toward various aspects of 
scientists' social life. Participants are required to rate on a 7-point Likert scale from 
"strongly disagree" to "strongly agree" on statements describing either a positive or a 
negative view about scientists' interpersonal relationships, such as "Scientists have fun 
with colleagues at work" or "scientists are out of touch with what is happening in the 
world" (See Appendix XI for the full scale). The internal consistency of the ISSOS 
items in current Stage 3 is acceptable (Cronbach's α = .75). 
 
6.2.4.2. Relative explicit measure: Single-category Science-Empathy Explicit scale 
(SSE-Explicit) 
The SSE-Explicit was applied to measure the explicit relative attitudes corresponding 
to the implicit attitudes captured by the SSE-IAT. As mentioned earlier, the relative 
explicit measurement is usually developed in a way to imitate the structure of the IAT 
(See Section 5.2.5.2). In the current study, the SSE-IAT was developed to compare the 
strengths of automatic mental associations between science-empathy and humanities-
empathy. In order to capture the similar relative attitudes explicitly, the SSE-Explicit 
directly asks participants to rate how strong they associate empathy with science and 
humanities.  
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The SSE-Explicit is comprised of 3 items. For the first two items, participants are 
required to rate how strongly they associate empathy with science and empathy with 
humanities on a 4-point Likert scale from "do not associate" to "strongly associate". 
Then they are also required to rate the statement "scientists are less empathetic than 
humanities majors" on a 7-point Likert scale from "strongly disagree" to "strongly 
agree".  
 
Similar to the original SE-Explicit, which resembles the relative structure of SE-IAT, 
the SSE-Explicit also resembles the structure of the modified SSE-IAT. It is worth 
mentioning that, unlike the propositional items in the ISSOS that claim to address the 
same construct (i.e., social skills in scientists), items in the SSE-Explicit measures 
attitudes toward associations between different concepts (i.e., empathy-science or 
empathy-humanities) and together they measure a relative attitude (i.e., scientists have 
better empathy than humanities majors or humanities majors have better empathy than 
scientists). In other words, to resemble the structure of SSE-IAT, the SSE-Explicit 
actually measures the comparison between strengths of attitudes toward two concepts. 
It is of great importance to include this relative explicit measure for the purpose of 
controlling the construct-unrelated variance of structural fit (i.e., the degree of 
methodological similarity between different tests, Payne, Burkley, & Stokes, 2008) 
when examining the relationship between implicit and explicit stereotypes (see 
previous Section 5.2.4 for detailed explanation).  
 
6.2.4.3. Implicit measure: Single-category Science-Empathy IAT (SSE-IAT) 
In the previous chapter, the newly developed SE-IAT has been tested and modified. 
The modified Single-category Science-Empathy IAT (SSE-IAT) was applied in the 
present study to capture variations in implicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists. The 
original SE-IAT was not applied for evidence from Stage 2 indicating two main 
psychometric issues with it, including 1) poor internal consistency and 2) the lack of 
ability to detect individual differences in implicit cognition. These issues were deemed 
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largely owed to the artificially selected contrasting category rationality in the SE-IAT 
that could lead to ambiguity about the measured construct (See Section 5.4.2 for details). 
As such, the category rationality was dropped, so that the SSE-IAT is consisted of only 
one attribute (i.e., empathy) and two target categories (i.e., Science and Humanities). 
Figure 6.1 below is a screenshot of the incompatible task of the SSE-IAT.  
 
 
Figure 6.1 A screenshot of the incompatible task in the SSE-IAT 
 
The Single-category IAT paradigm is utilised for three reasons. First, by dropping 
rationality as the attribute category, the SSE-IAT primes participants to focus on the 
evaluation of empathy. The category rationality may have introduced ambiguity about 
the meaning of the score of the test. It is unclear if a positive SE-IAT score is due to a 
stronger preference for scientists in terms of their rationality or a stereotypical view 
against scientists in terms of their empathy. SSE-IAT avoids such ambiguity and only 
assesses relations of empathy to science and humanities in particular.  
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Second, as a variant to the traditional IAT, it is very easy to modify the SE-IAT to the 
SSE-IAT by simply dropping one category. When there is no natural comparison 
category to the construct of interest, some researchers have suggested using an 
unrelated neutral category (e.g., furniture or animals). This type of alteration assumes 
that the neutral contrasting category contributes no meaningful variability to 
measurement and thus results in a score that can be interpreted as an uncontaminated 
assessment of the target concept (Jajodia & Earleywine, 2003; Sherman, Rose, Koch, 
Presson, & Chassin, 2003). Nevertheless, evidence has shown that the neutral category 
could induce systematic error variance and thus reduce validity to the IAT (Penke et al., 
2006). Moreover, from a practical point of view, it also requires extra effort to select a 
neutral category as well as the items to represent the new category, not to mention the 
fact that there is no standard to decide if the category is truly neutral. On the contrary, 
SSE-IAT completely bypasses the requirement of selecting contrasting category and 
includes only one attribute category from the original SE-IAT.  
 
Third, existing single-category IATs have shown satisfactory reliability and validity. In 
terms of reliability, single-category IATs have shown acceptable internal consistency 
ranging from r = .55 -.85 obtained by Karpinski and Steinman (2006) and r =.65 -.84 
obtained by Bar-Anan and Nosek (2014). In a study comparing psychometric properties 
of seven implicit measures, single-category IAT has shown better discriminant and 
convergent validity than the Sorting Paired Features task, the Evaluative-Priming task, 
and often not far behind traditional IAT (Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2014). The existing 
evidence suggests that single-category IAT is a psychometrically sound tool, 
encouraging its further use, especially for its unique procedural features.  
 
It is worth mentioning that the Go/No-go Association Task (GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 
2001) and the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST; De Houwer, 2003) may also 
serve as an alternative implicit measure to assess single attitudes in a non-relative 
manner. However, the GNAT task was not selected for it is more sensitive to extraneous 
influences, such as cognitive fluency, than IAT and single-category IAT (Bar-Anan & 
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Nosek, 2014). The EAST was not selected for it is less sensitive to individual 
differences in attitudes as compared to IAT (Houwer & Bruycker, 2007). Furthermore, 
both the GNAT and EAST measures tend to have low reliability (Bar-Anan & Nosek, 
2014; De Houwer, 2003), thus were not regarded as appropriate for the present study. 
To sum up, the SSE-IAT was modified and selected because it 1) is able to focus on 
assessment of empathy; 2) is easy to implement by simply dropping one category from 
the original SE-IAT; and 3) has displayed better reliability and validity than other 
alternative implicit measures.  
 
6.2.4.4. Career Aspirations in Science (CAS) scale 
In order to investigate the interplay of implicit and explicit stereotype in career choices, 
a brief Career Aspirations in Science (CAS) scale was applied. The CAS was used to 
capture intentions of pursuing a career in science by asking participants to rate their 
likelihood of doing science-related jobs on a 7-point Likert scale from "very likely" to 
"very unlikely". The three items in the CAS are as below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The three items were adapted from the Intentions of Pursuing a Career in Science 
questionnaire (Schneider, 2010). These items were selected for two reasons. Firstly, the 
original questionnaire is comprised of 12 items and most of them are quite repetitive, 
so that it might invoke the fatigue effect if all items were included in the current study. 
It has been found that tired and bored participants may more often answer "don't know", 
engage in "straight-line" responding (i.e., choosing answers down the same column on 
a page), give more perfunctory answers, or give up answering the questionnaire 
altogether, and as such this could deteriorate the data quality (Bloom, 2008). Secondly, 
In your future career, how likely is it that you will: 
• Get an advanced degree in science? 
• Have a very successful career in science? 
• Have a lifelong career in science? 
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all items in the CIS were found to load on the same factor (Schneider, 2010). The top 
three items with the highest loadings on the one-factor model greater than .90 were 
selected (Schneider, 2010). As such, the selected items should be able to tap on the 
same construct that the original scale assesses.  
6.2.5. Data preparation 
In this section, the procedure of how to calculate the scores for each measure is 
explained in detail. The same D scoring algorithm was applied to calculate the SSE-
IAT effect with data from blocks that are slightly different from the standard IAT. 
Scores for the self-report explicit measures were calculated in accordance with the SSE-
IAT results with positive scores representing stereotype-congruent beliefs against 
empathy in scientists and the negative scores representing counter-stereotype beliefs 
about empathy in scientists. Positive intentions in pursuing science careers were scored 
with positive integers and vice versa.  
 
6.2.5.1. SSE-IAT scoring 
The same improved D scoring algorithm was applied to calculate the SSE-IAT effect 
in the present study. Given that the SSE-IAT has only 5 blocks, the data used for 
calculation is slightly different from the standard SE-IAT. In the SE-IAT, it was the 
data from Block 3,4,6,7 that were used for calculation (See Table 6.8); while in the 
SSE-IAT, it was the data from Block 2,3,4,5 that were used (See Appendix XII for an 
example of the recorded trial latencies in the SSE-IAT). Table 6.8 illustrates the steps 
to calculate the D score for SSE-IAT.   
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Table 6.8 D scoring algorithms for SSE-IAT 
Step  Step  
1  Use data from B2, B3, B4, & B5 7 Replace each error latency with 
block mean (computed in Step 5) + 
600 ms  
2  Eliminate trials with latencies > 
10,000 ms; eliminate subjects 
for whom more than 10% of 
trials have latency less than 300 
ms  
8 No transformation 
3 Use all trials 9 Average the resulting values for 
each of the four blocks 
4 No extreme value treatment 
(beyond Step 2) 
10 Compute two differences: B4-B2 
and B5-B3 
5 Compute mean of correct 
latencies for each block 
11 Divide each difference by its 
associated pooled-trials SD from 
Step 6 
6 Compute one pooled SD for all 
trials in B2 & B4; another for B3 
& B5  
12 Average the two quotients from Step 
11 
Note. Block numbers (e.g., B1) refer to the procedures shown in Table 5.12. SD = 
standard deviation. Adapted from Greenwald et al. (2003). 
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Similar to the SE-IAT, a positive D score of SSE-IAT also represents a stereotype-
congruent belief that empathy is more associated with humanities than science, but a 
negative D score represents a counter-stereotype implicit belief that empathy is more 
associated with science than humanities. The value of the D score shows the strength 
of the associations. The bigger the value of the D score is, the stronger the associations 
between the concepts are. The D score ranges from -2 to +2. The strength of the IAT 
effect can be described as 'strong' (.80), 'medium' (.50), 'slight' (.20), or 'little or no' 
when interpreting the D scores. These cut-offs are in correspondence to results meeting 
conventional criteria for small, medium, and large effect size of Cohen's d (1988) 
measure (Nosek et al., 2005).  
6.2.5.2. SSE-Explicit scoring 
Consistent with the SSE-IAT score, stereotype-congruent responses associating 
empathy more with humanities were coded with positive integers while counter-
stereotype responses associating empathy more with science were coded with negative 
integers. For the first two items in the SSE-Explicit questionnaire, responses were 
collected on 4-point Likert scales ranging from "strongly associated" to "not associated". 
For the science-empathy item, responses were coded negatively with "strongly 
associated" coded as -3 to "not associated" coded as 0. In contrast, for the humanities-
empathy item, responses were coded positively with "strongly associated" coded as +3 
to "not associated" coded as 0.  
 
For the third item "scientists are less empathetic than humanities majors", responses 
were collected on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from "strongly disagree" (coded as -3) 
to "strongly agree" (coded as +3). The middle point "neither agree nor disagree" was 
coded zero. The sum of the scores of the three questions in the scale was regarded as 
the final score of the SSE-Explicit, ranging from -6 to +6.  
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6.2.5.3. ISSOS scoring 
The same scoring method was applied for ISSOS as in Stage 2 (See Section 5.2.5.3). 
The final score of the ISSOS ranges from -27 to +27. The counter-stereotype responses 
(i.e., that scientists have good social skills) were reflected by negative ISSOS scores 
and the stereotype-congruent responses (i.e., that scientists do not have good social 
skills) were reflected by positive ISSOS scores.  
6.2.5.4. CAS scoring 
For the CAS scale, responses were collected on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 
"very unlikely" (coded as 1) to "very likely" (coded as 7). The sum of the scores of the 
three items in the scale was regarded as the final score of the CAS, ranging from 3 to 
21. Final scores smaller than 12 indicate relatively low career aspirations in science 
(unlikely to pursue a career in science) while final scores bigger than 12 indicate 
relatively high career aspiration in science (likely to pursue a career in science). The 
bigger the final score is, the higher career aspirations in science the participant report. 
 
6.2.6. Data analysis 
In order to preserve credibility of the results, rigorous procedures of data analysis were 
followed in the present study. Sources of bias (e.g., missing data and outliers) as well 
as assumptions of tests (e.g., normality and homogeneity of variance) were checked and 
treated using similar techniques in Stage 2 (See Section 5.2.6 for detailed justifications) 
before applying any parametric test with the data (e.g., t-test and correlation).  
 
The Missing Value Analysis results suggest less than 5% of the cases have missing 
values and are missing at random as well. In this case, missing data was deleted listwise 
(Field, 2013). No outlier was spotted for the SSE-Explicit and CAS scores, and only 2 
outliers were spotted for SSE-IAT and 3 outliers for ISSOS scores. These cases with 
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outliers were removed from the dataset on the grounds that they might have represented 
rather idiosyncratic situations. In terms of normality, histograms and P-P plots showed 
that data for all measures are normally distributed with skew and kurtosis values very 
close to 0. Given that the sample size of the present study is fairly large (n = 1448), the 
assumption of homogeneity of variance can be ignored (Field, 2013).  
 
6.3. Results 
The purpose of this section is to provide readers with the statistical facts and results of 
the quantitative analysis. The section starts with illustration of descriptive data of 
variables of the present study. Then, results of comparisons of stereotypes by gender 
and major subject are demonstrated with implicitly measured stereotypes presented first 
followed by explicitly measured stereotypes. Then correlations between implicit and 
explicit stereotypes are examined. Last but not least, the relationship between 
stereotypes and aspirations in science are also investigated. Later in the Discussion 
section, these results are integrated and discussed with reference to existing literatures 
in the field.  
 
6.3.1. Descriptive data: the basic status quo of implicit and explicit stereotypes of 
empathy in scientists in science among UK university students 
First of all, descriptive data of the involved variables are presented so that readers could 
gain a general knowledge of the status of the current sample for each variable. As 
mentioned in the previous methodology section, implicit stereotypes were measured by 
SSE-IAT, which intends to capture implicit bias about empathy in science majors as 
compared to empathy in humanities majors. Explicit stereotypes were measured by 
SSE-Explicit and ISSOS. SSE-Explicit intends to measure the corresponding explicit 
construct that SSE-IAT captures, that is the explicit bias toward empathy in scientists 
as compared to empathy in humanists. At the same time, ISSOS were included to 
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measure the explicit attitude toward social skills in scientists. Table 6.9 illustrates the 
mean (M), standard deviation (SD) and the range of current participants' SSE-IAT, 
SSE-Explicit and ISSOS scores. 
 
Table 6.9 Descriptive data of the SSE-IAT, SSE-Explicit, ISSOS results 
    Range 
Variable n M SD Possible Observed 
SE-IAT 1448 0.28 0.25 -2 − 2 -.73 − 1.16 
SE-explicit 1425 0.84 2.22 -9 − 9 -5.0 − 6.0 
ISSOS 1434 -9.8 7.07 -27 − 27 -27 − 21 
Note. The variation in sample size is due to the variation in the number of participants 
who completed each measure. 
 
The data showed that the average SSE-IAT score was positive (M = .28, within the 
slight effect range of .20 to .50), meaning that participants held a weak stereotype-
congruent implicit bias against empathy in scientists as compared with empathy in 
humanists. For the explicit stereotypes, the data showed that the average SSE-Explicit 
score was also positive (M = 0.83, within the little or no effect range of 0 to 2.25). 
However, the mean SSE-Explicit score was so small that could be ignored, indicating 
little or no explicit preference for scientists or humanists regarding their empathy in 
current sample. Furthermore, data showed that the average ISSOS score was negative 
(M = -9.8, within the slight effect range of 6.75 to 13.5), meaning that current 
participants explicitly held a weak counter-stereotype positive view about scientists' 
interpersonal skills.  
 
In terms of participants’ career aspirations in science, those who have already chosen 
to study humanities subjects at the higher education level, their mean CAS score (M = 
5.75) was smaller than 12, meaning that they reported no career aspiration in science 
Instead, for participants who already study sciences at the higher education level, the 
 161 
mean CAS score was bigger than 12 (M = 16.61), showing that they possess career 
aspirations in science1. Table 6.10 illustrates the mean (M), standard deviation (SD) of 
CAS scores for science majors and humanities majors, respectively. 
 
Table 6.10 Mean and standard deviations of CAS scores for science majors and 
humanities majors 
 Science Humanities 
 M SD M SD 
CAS 16.61 3.54 5.75 4.33 
 
To sum up, participants in general showed stereotype-congruent implicit bias against 
empathy in scientists for they automatically associated empathy more strongly with 
humanities than with sciences. However, participants did not explicitly report any 
preference for scientists or humanists regarding their empathy and they even reported 
counter-stereotype positive views about scientists' interpersonal skills. Moreover, 
participants majoring in humanities subjects showed no science career aspirations 
whereas those majoring in science subjects showed science career aspirations. 
 
6.3.2. Comparisons of the implicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists  
Secondly, variations in the implicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists were under 
examination. In this part, individual differences in the implicit stereotypes of empathy 
in scientists by gender and major subject were examined using the SSE-IAT scores. 
The SSE-IAT assesses the strengths of automatic associations of empathy with science 
and with humanities.  
 
Comparisons between women and men’s implicit stereotypes were conducted first 
                                                        
1 Note: The cut-point of 12 indicates "not sure about pursuing a career in science". Scores smaller than 12 indicate 
"unlikely to pursue a career in science" and scores bigger than 12 indicate "likely to pursue a career in science". 
The bigger the score is, the higher career aspiration in science the participant has. 
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followed by comparisons between science majors and humanities majors’ implicit 
stereotypes. Then the interaction between gender and major subject effects on the 
implicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists were examined. Afterwards, the 
dichotomous groupings of science/humanities academic fields were broken down to 
five specific major subjects and variations in the implicit stereotypes by these specific 
majors were examined. Finally, gender differences of the implicit stereotypes of 
empathy in scientists within each specific major subject were investigated as well.  
6.3.2.1. Women versus men's implicit stereotype of empathy in scientists (SSE-IAT) 
In terms of the gender effect on the implicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists, 
averaged across the entire sample, women (M = .27, SD = .25) displayed smaller mean 
SSE-IAT effect than men (M = .29, SD = .26). However, this difference, -.02, BCa 95 
CI [-.008, .044], was not significant t(1421) = -1.34, p = .18, two-tailed; and represented 
a very small effect, d = 0.07. Such results indicate that women and men in general had 
similar implicit bias against empathy in scientists. Figure 6.2 illustrates the means of 
SSE-IAT scores of women and men. 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Comparisons of women and men's SSE-IAT scores.  
Non-significant difference is marked by n.s. 
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6.3.2.2. Science versus humanities majors' implicit stereotype of empathy in 
scientists (SSE-IAT) 
In the present study, we refer to the dichotomous groupings of Science and Humanities 
as participants' academic fields. Participants identified with Engineering & Technology, 
Life Science & Medicine, and Physical Science & Maths were grouped as the science 
majors, while participants majoring in Arts & Humanities and Social Science & 
Management were grouped as the humanities majors.  
 
In terms of the academic field effect on the implicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists, 
the result of independent-samples t-test showed that science majors (M = .27, SD = .26) 
displayed slightly smaller SSE-IAT effect than humanities majors (M = .29, SD = .24). 
However, this difference, -.017, BCa 95 CI [-.044, .010], was not significant t(1379) = 
-1.269 (two-tailed), p = .196; and represented very little effect, d = 0.07. Such results 
suggest that participants majoring in STEM field and those majoring in Non-STEM 
field had similar levels of implicit prejudice against empathy in scientists. Figure 6.3 
illustrates the means of SSE-IAT scores of participants majoring in STEM and Non-
STEM fields.  
 
Figure 6.3 Comparisons of science and humanities majors' SSE-IAT scores 
Non-significant difference is marked by n.s. 
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6.3.2.3. Interactions of gender and academic field effects on the implicit stereotype 
(SSE-IAT) 
In terms of the interactions between gender and academic field effects on the implicit 
stereotypes of empathy in scientists, the results of 2 (women, men) * 2 (science, 
humanities) ANOVA indicate neither significant effect of gender, F (1, 1379) = .368, 
p = .544 nor significant effect of academic major field, F (1, 1379) = .690, p = .406 on 
SSE-IAT scores. However, there is a significant interaction between gender and 
academic field, F (1, 1379) = 25.574, p = .000, ω = 0.26. This effect indicates that the 
gendered patterns of implicit bias toward empathy in scientists differ by academic field. 
Figure 6.4 illustrates the comparisons between women and men's SSE-IAT scores in 
science and humanities academic fields. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Comparisons between women and men's mean SSE-IAT scores by 
academic field 
Significant gender differences are marked by asterisks (***p < .001; **p < .01) 
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Data indicates that for science majors, women had weaker implicit bias about empathy 
in scientists than men. However, such gendered pattern was reversed for humanities 
majors, with men showing weaker implicit bias against empathy in scientists than 
women. 
 
Specifically, among science majors, women (n = 376, M = .23, SD = .26) showed 
smaller mean SSE-IAT score than men (n = 437, M = .31, SD = .26). This difference, 
-.08, BCa 95% CI [-.12, -.04], was significant t(811) = -4.35 p = .000, Cohen's d = .31, 
representing a small-sized effect. On the contrary, for humanities majors, women (n = 
364, M = .31, SD = .22) showed bigger mean SSE-IAT score than men (n = 202, M 
= .25, SD = .25). This difference, .06, BCa 95% CI [.02, .10], was also significant t(564) 
= 3.05 p = .002, Cohen's d = .25, representing a small-sized effect. 
 
6.3.2.4. Variations of the implicit stereotype (SSE-IAT) by specific major subject 
As mentioned in the Sample section, participants in the present study were asked to 
identify their specific major subjects, namely, Arts & Humanities (N = 326, 23.6%), 
Social Science & Management (N = 241, 17.5%), Life Science & Medicine (N = 252, 
18.2%), Engineering & Technology (N = 263, 19.0%) and Physical Science & Maths 
(N = 299, 21.7%). In the present study, we refer to this more specific groupings as 
participants' major subject. As discussed in the literature review, variations may also 
exist among participants majoring different subjects within the science and humanities 
fields. As such, comparisons among participants with different major subject 
backgrounds were also examined using one-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) of the 
SSE-IAT scores. Meanwhile, given that the sample size for each group is slightly 
different, Gabriel's procedure was selected as the post hoc test to do pairwise 
comparisons between those groups (Field, 2013). 
 
In terms of the variations in implicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists, the results of 
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ANOVA showed no significant difference of SSE-IAT performance among 
participants from different major subjects, F (4, 1376) = 1.982, p = .095. Such results 
suggest that participants with varied academic subject backgrounds did not differ in 
their implicit bias about empathy in scientists, indicating they all associated empathy 
more with humanities than with sciences. Figure 6.5 shows the mean SSE-IAT scores 
of different major subjects.  
 
 
Figure 6.5 Means of the SSE-IAT scores of different major subjects 
Non-Significant difference is marked by n.s 
 
6.3.2.5. Gender difference of the implicit stereotype (SSE-IAT) within each major 
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major subject separately. Significant gender difference of SSE-IAT was only found for 
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4.20, p = .000, Cohen's d = .50, representing a medium-sized effect. Such results 
indicate that, for those majoring in Physical Science & Maths, women showed 
significantly weaker stereotype-congruent implicit bias against empathy in scientists. 
However, as for participants majoring in other subjects, women and men showed 
similar implicit bias against empathy in scientists. Figure 6.6 below illustrates the mean 
SSE-IAT scores of women and men by specific major subject. 
 
 
Figure 6.6 Means of the SSE-IAT scores of women and men by specific major subject 
Significant gender difference is marked by asterisks (***p < .000) 
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Comparisons between women and men’s explicit stereotypes were conducted first 
followed by comparisons between science majors and humanities majors’ explicit 
stereotypes. Then the interaction between gender and major subject effects on the 
explicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists were examined. Afterwards, the 
dichotomous groupings of the science/humanities academic fields were broken down 
to five specific major subjects and variations in the explicit stereotypes by these specific 
major subjects were examined. Finally, gender difference of the explicit stereotypes 
within each specific major subject were investigated as well.  
6.3.3.1. Women versus men's explicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists  
6.3.3.1.1. Women versus men's SSE-Explicit scores 
In terms of the gender difference in participants’ explicit bias about empathy in 
scientists, women (M = .66, SD = 2.24) displayed smaller mean SSE-Explicit score 
than men (M = 1.04, SD = 2.18). This difference, -.38, BCa 95 CI [-.148, .612], was 
significant t(1407) = -3.22 (two-tailed), p = .001; however, it only represented a small-
sized effect, d = 0.17. Such results indicate that women reported significantly weaker 
explicit bias against empathy in scientists than men. Figure 6.7 illustrates the means of 
SSE-Explicit scores of women and men. 
 
Figure 6.7 Comparisons of women and men's SSE-Explicit scores 
Significant difference is marked by asterisks (**p < .01) 
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6.3.3.1.2. Women versus men's ISSOS scores 
In terms of the gender difference in participants’ explicit attitudes about social skills in 
scientists, women (M = -10.30, SD = 7.02) showed more negative ISSOS scores than 
men (M = -9.22, SD = 7.07). This difference, -1.08, BCa 95% CI [.345, 1.821], was 
significant t(1411) = -.004 (two-tailed); however, it only represented a small-sized 
effect, d = 0.15. Such results suggest that women reported significantly stronger 
counter-stereotype positive views about scientists' social skills than men. Figure 6.8 
illustrates the means of ISSOS scores of women and men. 
 
Figure 6.8 Comparisons of women and men's ISSOS scores 
Significant difference is marked by asterisks (**p < .01) 
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6.3.3.2. Science versus humanities majors' explicit stereotype of empathy in 
scientists  
6.3.3.2.1. Science versus humanities majors' SSE-Explicit scores 
In terms of the academic field effect on the SSE-Explicit scores, science majors (M 
= .36, SD = 2.20) displayed smaller SSE-Explicit scores than humanities majors (M = 
1.46, SD = 2.10). This difference, -1.10, BCa 95 CI [-1.337, -.873], was significant 
t(1365) = -9.338, p = .000 (two-tailed); and it did represent a medium-sized effect, d = 
0.52. Such results indicate that science majors reported significantly weaker explicit 
bias against empathy in scientists than humanities majors. Figure 6.9 illustrates the 
means of SSE-Explicit scores of science and humanities majors. 
 
 
Figure 6.9 Comparisons of science and humanities majors' SSE-Explicit scores 
 Significant difference is marked by asterisks (***p < .001)  
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6.3.3.2.2. Science versus humanities majors' ISSOS scores 
In terms of the academic field effect on the ISSOS scores, science majors (M = -11.84, 
SD = 6.62) showed more negative ISSOS scores than humanities majors (M = -7.18, 
SD = 6.76). This difference, -4.658, BCa 95% CI [.345, 1.821], was significant t(1369) 
= -12.699, p = .000; and it did represent a medium-sized effect, d = 0.70. Such results 
indicate that science majors reported significantly stronger counter-stereotype positive 
views about social skills in scientists than humanities majors. Figure 6.10 illustrates the 
means of ISSOS scores of science and humanities majors. 
 
 
Figure 6.10 Comparisons of science and humanities majors' ISSOS scores 
Significant difference is marked by asterisks (***p < .001) 
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significant interaction effect between them, F (1, 1365) = 5.54, p = .019.  
 
For science majors, women reported significantly weaker explicit bias against empathy 
in scientists than their men majoring in science. However, such gender difference was 
not significant for humanities majors. Specifically, for science majors, women (n = 372, 
M = -.08, SD = 2.13) showed smaller mean SSE-IAT score than men (n = 431, M = 
0.74, SD = 2.17). This difference, -.82, BCa 95% CI [-1.12, -.52], was significant t(801) 
= -5.35 p = .000, Cohen's d = .38, representing a small-sized effect. Nevertheless, for 
humanities majors, though women (n = 363, M = 1.37, SD = 2.11) also showed smaller 
mean SSE-Explicit score than men (n = 199, M = 1.62, SD = 2.08), this difference, -.25, 
BCa 95% CI [-.61, .11], was not significant t(560) = -1.34 p = .18. It also worth noting 
that only women majoring in science scored negatively in SSE-Explicit, showing a 
weak counter-stereotype explicit preference for scientists in terms of empathy. All the 
other groups scored positively in SSE-Explicit, showing stereotype-congruent explicit 
bias against empathy in scientists. Figure 6.11 illustrates the comparisons between 
women and men's SSE-Explicit scores in the science and humanities academic fields.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.11 Gender differences in the SSE-Explicit scores by academic field 
Significant gender difference is marked by asterisks (***p < .001) 
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6.3.3.3.2. Interactions of the gender and academic field effects on the ISSOS scores 
Likewise, in terms of the interactions between gender and academic field effects on the 
ISSOS scores, the results of 2 (women, men)* 2 (science, humanities) ANOVA also 
indicate significant effect of gender, F (1,1365) = 28.61, p = .000, ω = 0.13, and 
academic major field, F (1, 1365) = 179.39, p = .000, ω = 0.34, but no significant 
interaction between them, F (1,1365) = .105, p = .746.  
 
For science majors, women (n = 374, M = -12.97, SD = 6.37) scored more negatively 
in ISSOS than men (n = 434, M = -10.85, SD = 6.70). This difference, -2.12, BCa 95% 
CI [-3.03, -1.21], was significant t(806) = -4.59 p = .000, Cohen's d = .32, representing 
a small effect size. Similarly, for humanities majors, women (n = 363, M = -7.84, SD 
= 6.76) also scored more negatively in ISSOS than men (n = 198, M = -5.96, SD = 
6.59). This difference, -1.88, BCa 95% CI [-3.04, -.72], was also significant t(559) = -
3.17 p = .002, Cohen's d = .28, representing a small effect size. Figure 6.12 illustrates 
the comparisons between women and men's ISSOS scores in Science and Humanities 
academic fields. 
 
 
Figure 6.12 Gender differences in the ISSOS scores by academic field 
Significant differences are marked by asterisks (**p < .01, ***p < .001) 
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6.3.3.4. Variations of the explicit stereotypes by specific major subject 
6.3.3.4.1. Variations of the SSE-Explicit scores by specific major subject 
In terms of the variations in the explicit bias about empathy in scientists, significant 
differences among participants with different major subjects were found for the SSE-
Explicit scores, F (4, 1362) = 33.717, p = .000, ω = .29. As can be seen from Figure 
6.13 below, only participants majoring in Life Science & Medicine (M = -.33, SE = .13) 
showed a negative mean score in SSE-Explicit, meaning that they reported attitudes 
that were not congruent with the stereotype, and were deemed to hold little explicit bias 
against empathy in scientists. However, participants majoring in all the other subjects 
scored positively in the SSE-Explicit (ranging from .48 to 1.56), meaning that they 
reported stereotype-congruent explicit bias against empathy in scientists.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.13 Means of the SSE-Explicit scores of different major subjects 
Significant difference is marked by asterisks (***p < .001) 
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significantly different explicit bias about empathy in scientists from their counterparts 
majoring in Arts & Humanities (M = 1.56, SE = .12), p = .000, Cohen's d = .92; those 
in Social Science & Management (M = 1.33, SE = .14), p = .000, Cohen's d = .80; those 
in Physical Science & Maths (M = .48, SE = .13), p = .000, Cohen's d = .37; as well as 
those in Engineering & Technology (M = .88, SE = .13), p = .000, Cohen's d = .59.  
 
Moreover, there is neither significant difference of explicit bias about empathy in 
scientists between participants majoring in Arts & Humanities (M = 1.56, SE = .12) 
and those majoring in Social Science & Management (M = 1.33, SE = .14), p = .915 
nor significant difference between participants majoring in Physical Science & Maths 
(M = .48, SE = .13) and Engineering & Technology (M = .88, SE = .13), p = .223.  
 
6.3.3.4.2. Variations of the ISSOS scores by specific major subject 
Likewise, regarding variations in the explicit attitudes about social skills in scientists, 
significant differences among participants with different major subjects were also found 
for the ISSOS scores, F (4, 1362) = 43.871, p = .000, ω = .33. As can be seen from 
Figure 6.14 below, participants majoring in Life Science & Medicine had smallest 
negative ISSOS mean score among all the major subjects, meaning that they reported 
the strongest counter-stereotype positive explicit attitude about social skills in scientists.  
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Figure 6.14 Means of the ISSOS scores of different major subjects 
Significant difference is marked by asterisks (***p < .001) 
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= .38) and those majoring in Social Science & Management (M = -7.23, SE = .43), p = 
1.0 nor significant difference between participants majoring in Physical Science & 
Maths (M = -11.51, SE = .37) and Engineering & Technology (M = -11.04, SE = .41), 
p = .99.  
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6.3.3.5. Gender difference of the explicit stereotypes within each major subject  
6.3.3.5.1. Gender difference of the SSE-Explicit scores within each major subject 
To examine the gender difference in the explicit bias about empathy in scientists within 
each specific subject major, independent t-tests were conducted with SSE-IAT scores 
between women and men majoring in each major subject, separately. Significant gender 
difference in the SSE-Explicit scores was only found for participants majoring in 
Physical Science & Maths, but not for any other major subject. Specifically, for 
participants majoring in Physical Science & Maths, women (n = 123, M = .08, SD = 
2.20) scored lower than men in SSE-Explicit (n = 169, M = .78, SD = 2.31). This 
difference, -.70, BCa 95% CI [-1.23, -.17], was significant t(290) = -2.60, p = .01, 
Cohen's d = .31, representing a small effect size.  
 
Such results indicate that women majoring in Physical Science & Maths reported 
significantly weaker explicit bias about empathy in scientists than their male 
counterparts. However, as for participants majoring in other subjects, women and men 
reported similar explicit bias against empathy in scientists. It is worth mentioning that 
for those majoring in Life Science & Medicine, women and men reported similar 
counter-stereotype explicit bias about empathy in scientists. Figure 6.15 illustrates the 
comparisons between women and men's SSE-Explicit scores by specific major subject. 
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 Figure 6.15 Means of the SSE-Explicit scores of women and men by major subject 
Significant difference is marked by asterisks (***p < .001) 
 
6.3.3.5.2. Gender difference of the ISSOS scores within each major subject 
As for the gender difference in the explicit attitude about social skills in scientists within 
each specific subject major, significant gender difference of the ISSOS scores were 
found for participants majoring in Physical Science & Maths again and also for those 
majoring in Arts & Humanities. Specifically, for participants majoring in Physical 
Science & Maths, women (n = 125, M = -12.62, SD = 6.21) scored lower than men (n 
= 170, M = -10.65, SD = 6.48) in ISSOS. This difference, -1.98, BCa 95% CI [-3.45, 
-.50], was significant t(293) = -2.60, p = .009, Cohen's d = .31, representing a small-
sized effect. Similarly, for participants majoring in Arts & Humanities, women also (n 
= 216, M = -7.99, SD = 6.82) scored lower than men (n = 108, M = -5.43, SD = 6.52) 
in ISSOS. This difference, -2.53, BCa 95% CI [-3.45, -.50], was significant as well 
t(322) = -3.20, p = .002, Cohen's d = .38, representing a small-sized effect. Such results 
indicate that women reported stronger counter-stereotype explicit positive views about 
social skills in scientists than their male counterparts for those majoring in Physical 
Science & Maths as well as those in Arts & Humanities. As for participants majoring 
in other subjects, women and men reported similar levels of positive attitudes about 
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social skills in scientists. Figure 6.16 illustrates the comparisons between women and 
men's ISSOS scores by specific major subject. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.16 Means of ISSOS scores of women and men by specific major subject 
Significant differences are marked by asterisks (**p < .01) 
 
6.3.4. Comparisons of the career aspirations in science by gender and major 
subject 
To examine the variations in career aspirations in science by gender and major subject, 
a 2 (women, men) * 5 (Arts & Humanities, Social Science & Management, Life science 
& Medicine, Engineering & Technology, Physical Science & Maths) ANOVA was 
conducted. The ANOVA results indicate no significant difference between women and 
men in their science career aspirations, F (1, 1375) = .379, p = .54. But significant 
differences were found by major subject, F (1, 1375) = 589.79, p = .000. There is no 
interaction effect of gender and major subject on the CAS scores, F (1, 1375) = .573, p 
= .68.  
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As explained in the Descriptive data, humanities majors in general reported no intention 
in pursuing science careers but science majors instead showed science career 
aspirations. Confirming this finding, the results of the Gabriel's post hoc test of the CAS 
scores indicate that participants majoring in Arts & Humanities (M = 4.84, SD = 3.47) 
and those in Social Science & Management (M = 6.89, SD = 5.03) reported significantly 
lower science career aspirations than participants majoring in Life Science & Medicine 
(M = 16.70, SD = 3.63), p = .000, those in Engineering & Technology (M = 16.47, SD 
= 3.35), p = .000, as well as those in Physical Science & Maths (M = 16.66, SD = 6.61), 
p = .000. Also, it is worth noting that there is no significant difference in science career 
aspirations between the Life Science & Medicine, Engineering & Technology and 
Physical Science & Maths majors. Figure 6.17 illustrates the means of the CAS scores 
by gender and specific major subject. 
 
 
Figure 6.17 Means of the CAS scores by gender and specific major subject 
Significant differences are marked by asterisks (***p < .001) 
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6.3.5. Correlations among variables 
In order to examine the relationships among implicit and explicit stereotypes of 
empathy in scientists as well as the relationship between stereotypes and career 
aspirations, correlations among focal variables involved in current studies were 
examined. The results are illustrated in Table 6.11. The following correlations are worth 
paying attention to.  
Table 6.11 Correlations between variables of the study 
 1 2 3 4 
1. SSE-IAT -- .137** .039 -.057* 
2. SSE-Explicit [.084, .192] -- .409** -.259** 
3. ISSOS [.027, -.015] [.359, .457] -- -.349** 
4. CAS [-.105, -.003] [-.310, -.208] [-.391, -.306] -- 
Note: Pearson's correlations are presented above the diagonal, and the corresponding 
bootstrap 95% CIs are presented below the diagonal. ** p< .001 
 
Firstly, the correlations among the three different kinds of stereotypes were under 
scrutiny. Results suggest that the implicit bias about empathy in scientists (SSE-IAT) 
has a significant and positive correlation with the explicit bias toward empathy in 
scientists (SSE-Explicit), r(1421) = .37. Statistically correlated and accelerated 
bootstrap 95% CIs are reported as follows: 95% BCa CI [.083, .195], p = .000, r2 = .019. 
However, the implicit bias toward empathy in scientists (SSE-IAT) has no significant 
correlation with the explicit attitude about social skills in scientists (ISSOS), r(1430) 
= .039, p = .117. Meanwhile, there is a significant and positive correlation between 
explicit bias toward empathy in scientists and explicit attitude about social skills in 
scientists, r(1411) = .409, 95% BCa CI [.359, .457], p = .000, r2 = .167. 
 
Secondly, results show that career aspirations in science (CAS) has significant but 
negative correlations with all the three kinds of stereotypes: including implicit bias 
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about empathy in scientists (SSE-IAT), r(1431) = -.057, 95% BCa CI [-.105, -.003], p 
= .033, r2 = .003; explicit bias about empathy in scientists, r(1417) = -.259, 95% BCa 
CI [-.310, -.208], p = .000, r2 = .067 and explicit attitude about social skills in scientists, 
r(1421) = -.349, 95% BCa CI [-.391, -.306], p = .000, r2 = .122. It is worth noting that 
both explicit bias about empathy in scientists (SSE-Explicit) and explicit attitudes about 
social skills in scientists (ISSOS) displayed significant correlations with science career 
aspirations, but implicit bias about empathy in scientists (SSE-IAT) did not correlate 
with science career aspirations, therefore we suspect that explicit stereotypes may be 
more important than implicit stereotype for predicting career aspirations.  
 
Thirdly, in order to identify the covariates for predicting career aspirations in science, 
it is also of necessity to examine whether demographic variables (i.e., gender, academic 
field, major subject, age, and degree level) are significantly correlated with the focal 
independent and dependent variables. Table 6.12 illustrates the correlations between 
demographic variables and the focal independent and dependent variables.  
 
Table 6.12 Correlations between demographic variables and the focal variables 
  Gender Academic 
field 
Major 
subject 
Age Degree 
level 
SSE-IAT -.027 .028 .024 -.047 .005 
SSE-Explicit -.085** .240* .144** -.067* -.015 
ISSOS -.073** .332** .256** .064* -.034 
CAS -.125** -.760* -.68** .121** .123* 
Note: For Degree level, Spearman's correlations are presented. For all the other 
demographic variables, Pearson's correlations are presented. * p< .05, **p< .001 
 
All demographics were found significantly correlated with career aspirations in science. 
Nevertheless, major subject was dropped from the covariate selection for two reasons. 
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Firstly, given that academic field and major subject were closely correlated with each 
other, r(1379) = .870, p = .000, it would violate the multicollinearity assumption if both 
of them were included as covariates in the regression model (Field, 2013). Secondly, 
as presented before, the main difference in science career aspirations relied on whether 
one majored in humanities field or science field. There is no significant difference in 
career aspirations within subjects of each field. As such, only academic field was 
included as one of the covariates in the regression model. As a result, demographic 
variables that were significantly associated with the focal variables (namely, gender, 
age, academic field and degree level) were selected as the covariates in the regression 
model predicting career aspirations in science.  
 
6.3.6. Multiple regression analyses 
To answer the research question "if variations in the stereotypes of empathy in scientists 
can predict intentions in pursuing science careers", multiple regression analyses 
predicting career aspirations in science from implicit and explicit stereotypes were 
carried out.  
 
In the present study, hierarchical regression method is selected because it allows the 
researcher to decide in which order to enter the predictors into the model based on 
existing work or theory (Field, 2013). Given that most of our predictors are correlated, 
the order of independent variables entry is crucial. As a general rule, covariates should 
be entered into the model first in order to control for their effects. After covariates have 
been entered, focal predictors can be entered hierarchically (such that the focal predictor 
suspected to be the most important is entered first).  
 
In this regression model, predictors that explain career aspirations in science were 
entered in three steps. First of all, selected demographics, a control variable that 
consisted of age, gender, major subject, and degree level were entered in Step 1. After 
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that, our focal predictors were entered hierarchically. It is important to note that given 
that both gender and academic field are dichotomous nominal variables, they had been 
dummy coded before entering the model. Women was coded as 0 and men as 1. 
Humanities majors were coded as 0 and science majors were coded as 1.  
 
In the present study, explicit stereotypes were entered before the implicit stereotype for 
two reasons. Firstly, as explained in the literature review, recent double dissociation 
predictive models of implicit and explicit attitudes (e.g., Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 
2000) suggest that explicit attitudes are particularly valuable for the prediction of 
deliberate, controlled behaviours, while implicit attitudes are more important for the 
prediction of less controlled, more impulsive behaviours. As a vital decision that may 
affect all aspects of one's life, career aspirations in science were regarded as controlled 
processes that participants are sufficiently motivated to engage in deliberate reasoning. 
In this case, career aspirations were assumed more likely to be influenced by explicit 
than implicit stereotypes. Secondly, the previous correlations also showed that explicit 
stereotype measures (SSE-Explicit and ISSOS) had stronger correlations with our 
outcome variable (CAS) than the implicit stereotype measure (SSE-IAT). Under such 
circumstances, explicit stereotype measures (SSE-Explicit and ISSOS) therefore were 
entered into Step 2 followed by implicit stereotype measure (SSE-IAT) into Step 3.  
 
Before the hierarchical multiple regression analysis was performed, the independent 
variables were examined for collinearity. Results of the variance inflation factor (all 
less than 2.0), and collinearity tolerance (all greater than .76) suggest that the estimated 
β (i.e., the standardised coefficients representing the relationship between predictors 
and outcome; Field, 2013) are well established in the following regression model. Table 
6.13 summarized the full model by reporting partial correlations coefficients (Partial 
r), the unstandardized regression coefficients (B) and its standard errors (SE B), the 
standardised regression coefficients (β), and the R square change (Block ΔR2) for each 
predictor.  
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Table 6.13 Hierarchical regression predicting career aspirations in science (CAS) 
from selected demographics, SSE-IAT, SSE-Explicit and ISSOS  
Predictor Partial r B SE B  β Block 
ΔR2 
Step 1 Demographics           .661 
 Age .007 .012 .011 .018  
 Gender .014 .112 .221 .008  
 Academic field .806*** 10.93 .225 .814  
 Degree level .008 .038 .129 .005  
Step 2 Explicit stereotypes     .008 
  SSE-Explicit -.052 -.099 .053 -.033  
  ISSOS -.116*** -.071 .017 -.076***  
Step 3 Implicit stereotype     .000 
  SSE-IAT -.030 -.450 .427 -.017  
Note. N = 1297. Both gender and academic field are dummy coded. Total R2 = .036. F 
(9, 781) = 3.33, p =.001. Partial r shows the correlations between each predictor and 
the outcome variable, controlling for all other predictors in the model. Block ΔR2 
shows the change in R2 resulting from the inclusion of the new block of predictors. ***p 
< .001. 
 
As shown in Table 6.13, results of Step 1 indicate that the variance accounted for (R2) 
with the first four control independent variables (gender, academic field, age, degree 
level) equaled .661 (adjusted R2 = .660), which was significantly different from zero (F 
(4, 1270) = 618.81, p = .000). Among all the demographics, only major subject was a 
statistically significant predictor for science career aspirations.  
 
In Step 2, explicit measures of stereotypes of empathy in scientists including SSE-IAT 
and ISSOS were entered into the regression equation. The change in variance accounted 
for (ΔR2) was equal to .008, which was also significantly different from zero (F (2, 1268) 
= 14.60, p = .000) However, only ISSOS (β = -.125, p = .000) was a statistically 
significant predictor for science career aspirations.  
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In Step 3, the implicitly measured stereotype of empathy in scientists (SSE-IAT) was 
entered into the regression equation. The change in variance accounted for (ΔR2) was 
equal to .000, which was not significantly different from zero (F(1, 1267) = 1.11, p = .292). 
Therefore, SSE-IAT is not a statistically significant predictor for science career 
aspirations.  
 
To conclude, the full model was responsible for 66.9% variance in career aspirations in 
science. Among all the demographic variables, only major subject was a significant 
predictor for science career aspirations. Explicit stereotypes about social skills in 
scientists (ISSOS) also significantly contributed to the prediction of career aspirations 
in science. However, neither implicit (SSE-IAT) nor explicit (SSE-Explicit) measure 
of stereotypes about empathy in scientists could significantly predict science career 
aspirations.  
 
Inspection of the squared partial correlations in the prediction of career aspirations in 
science revealed that major subject predicts the most significant unique variance (rsp2 
= .65, p = .000), indicating that studying a science major at the higher education level 
explains most of the variations in science career aspirations. ISSOS also predicts a small 
but significant unique variance in science career aspirations (rsp2 = .01, p = .000). The 
standardised β value for the ISSOS score is -.116, indicating that as the ISSOS score 
decreased in one standard deviation, the CAS score increased by .116 standard 
deviations. In other words, the less stereotypical/more positive attitude one reported 
about social skills in scientists, the higher career aspirations in science one would have 
had.  
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6.4. Discussion 
In this section, the results of the quantitative analyses are synthesized to answer the 
research questions of the present study. Discussion of the findings is carried out with 
reference to existing theories and empirical studies in the field. The limitations of the 
current study are presented with suggestions for directions of future research.  
 
6.4.1. The discrepancy between implicit and explicit stereotypes of empathy in 
scientists 
6.4.1.1. What are the implicit and explicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists 
among UK university students? 
The first aim of the present study is to investigate how people view empathy in scientists 
in contemporary UK society. In the present study, stereotypes of empathy in scientists 
were measured both implicitly and explicitly among UK university students. By 
combining relevant evidence produced by different measurements, a more 
comprehensive picture of people's perceptions about empathy in scientists as well as 
their attitudes toward social skills in scientists in UK higher education was generated. 
Evidence from the present study revealed discrepancies in implicit and explicit attitudes 
toward empathy in scientists among UK university students. Current findings were 
summarized in one sentence as below:  
 
Specifically, the negative averaged IAT score suggests a weak stereotype-congruent 
implicit bias against empathy in scientists among participants. In other words, 
participants implicitly associated empathy more strongly with humanities than with 
sciences. This implicit bias was consistent with previous findings from the Public 
Attitudes to Science 2014 survey in the UK, showing that almost half of the surveyed 
Finding 1: Participants showed implicit bias against empathy in scientists, but 
explicitly reported positive attitudes about scientists' empathy and social skills. 
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UK citizens perceived scientists as poor at communication (Ipsos MORI, 2014, p. 47). 
This implicit bias about empathy in scientists is also in accordance with the robust 
stereotypical depiction of scientists doing experiment alone in the lab found in the draw-
a-scientist studies (Finson, 2002).  
 
The average SSE-Explicit score was also positive but close to zero, representing a very 
weak explicit bias against empathy in scientists. However, such explicit bias was so 
trivial that can be ignored. Also, the negative averaged ISSOS score suggests counter-
stereotype positive views about scientists' social skills among UK university students. 
These findings suggest that, in general, participants did not endorse the implicit bias 
about empathy in scientists and explicitly reported positive explicit views about 
empathy and social skills in scientists. Such findings are consistent with Archer and 
colleagues' (2013) study with UK adolescents as well as Schneider's (2010) study with 
US undergraduates. In their ASPIRES report, Archer and colleagues (2013) claimed 
that only 21% of Year 9 students in the UK agreed that scientists are “geeks” and even 
fewer (14%) believed that scientists are ‘odd’. Similarly, Schneider (2010) found that 
undergraduates in the US also explicitly perceived scientists as being good at 
interpersonal relations, especially with their colleagues in the workplace. But US 
college students remained sceptical about scientists' ability to handle relationships in 
personal life (Schneider, 2010). Evidence from the present study did not differ between 
personal and workplace relationships, thus could not detect if there is any variation in 
participants' attitudes about scientists' social skills in different situations. The 
discrepancy between negative implicit attitude and positive explicit attitude about 
empathy in scientists among UK university students suggests that the stereotypical 
image of scientists may still be deeply embedded in people’s unconscious mind, but 
young adults are unaware of such stereotype or they deliberately reject this stereotype 
when asked to report their perceptions.  
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6.4.2. Individual differences of stereotypes of empathy in scientists vary according 
to whether they are measured implicitly or explicitly 
The second aim of the present study is to investigate individual differences in 
stereotypes of empathy in scientists by gender and major subject. In the present study, 
both implicit and explicit measures were used to assess stereotypes and we found that 
variations of stereotypes of empathy in scientists vary according to whether they were 
measured implicitly or explicitly. By comparing relevant evidence produced by implicit 
and explicit measurements, four main findings were generated. In this section, each 
finding is summarized and discussed with reference to existing social psychological 
theories as well as previous empirical findings.   
6.4.2.1. Are women less stereotypical about empathy in scientists than men? 
When comparing stereotypes between women and men, differences were only observed 
on explicit but not implicit stereotypes. Specifically, both women and men showed 
similar implicit bias against empathy in scientists. According to the t-test results, the 
average SSE-IAT score of women was not significantly different from those of men, 
indicating no gender difference in implicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists. 
However, women scored significantly lower in SSE-Explicit and more negative in 
ISSOS than men, indicating that women reported weaker explicit bias against empathy 
in scientists and more positive self-reported views about social skills in scientists than 
men. The size of the gender effect, however, was small. These gender differences were 
summarized as below: 
 
Such findings in the present study are in accordance with previous studies revealing 
that gender differences of attitudes vary according to the measures applied. The present 
study has successfully replicated the previous findings that men systematically reported 
Finding 2a: Women and men showed similar levels of implicit bias against empathy 
in scientists, but women explicitly reported weaker stereotypes of empathy in 
scientists and more positive views about social skills in scientists than men.  
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higher explicit prejudice than women (Brewer, 2007; Dozo, 2015; Ekehammar et al., 
2003; Hughes & Tuch, 2003). Nevertheless, the present study has added more mixed 
findings regarding gender differences in implicit attitudes to previous research. 
Ekehammar et al. (2003) found that women displayed systematically higher implicit 
racial prejudice than men. On the contrary, Dozo's (2015) meta-analysis of studies on 
prejudice against homosexuals and people with disabilities revealed that men 
consistently demonstrated a greater level of implicit prejudice as compared to women. 
Nevertheless, the current results suggest no gender difference in implicit stereotypes of 
empathy in scientists. It seems that gender differences in implicit attitudes may vary 
due to the content of the measured attitudes. Unlike the explicitly measured attitudes, 
there is no consistent female advantage in producing socially favourable implicit 
attitudes.  
 
The ubiquitous and robust gender difference found in explicit attitudes with men 
reporting more prejudice than women may be explained by the theory that social gender 
roles have an influence on the channels that are available for women and men's 
expressions of attitudes (Ekehammar et al., 2003). According to gender stereotypes, 
men are expected to be more agentic – assertive, competitive, dominant and deference 
to facts over feelings. In contrast, women are expected to be more communal – selfless, 
caring, egalitarian, and emotionally expressive (e.g., Rudman & Glick, 2001; Rudman 
& Phelan, 2010; Witt & Wood, 2010). These traditional roles we ascribe to each gender 
reflect the patterns of behaviours we expect them to engage in. Some researchers claim 
that it is less acceptable for women to explicitly express prejudice and negative attitudes 
(e.g., Eagly, 2013; Wood & Eagly, 2012), yet men face greater social pressure to engage 
in prejudice and stereotyping (Dozo, 2015). Due to the different expectations about 
what is appropriate for each gender, women demonstrated more motivations to 
withhold prejudice and negative attitudes (Ratcliff et al., 2006). As such, it is 
understandable that in the present study women reported more positive attitudes toward 
empathy in scientists even though they harbour similar levels of implicit bias as their 
male counterparts.  
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6.4.2.2. Are science majors less stereotypical about empathy in scientists than 
humanities majors? 
When comparing stereotypes between science majors and humanities majors, 
significant differences were only observed on explicit but not implicit stereotypes. 
Specifically, the averaged SSE-IAT scores of science majors was not significantly 
different from humanities majors’, indicating similar levels of implicit bias against 
empathy in scientists between science majors and humanities majors. However, science 
majors scored significantly lower in SSE-Explicit and more negative in ISSOS than 
humanities majors, indicating weaker explicit bias against empathy and more positive 
views about social skills in scientists among science majors as compared with 
humanities majors. These differences by academic field were summarized as below: 
 
 
Similar to the gender effect, the academic field effect has also been found to vary due 
to the measures of attitudes. As explained in the literature review, according to most 
theories on intergroup relations in social psychology (e.g., social identity theory; Tajfel 
& Turner, 2001; self-categorisation theory; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 
1987), we human beings, as social animals, have a strong tendency to respond more 
positively to people from our ingroups than we do to people from outgroups, which is 
known as ingroup favouritism. On the basis of the ingroup favouritism theory, science 
majors were hypothesized to have weaker stereotypes of empathy in scientists than 
those studying humanities. 
 
In the present study, the phenomenon of ingroup favouritism was only found for 
explicitly expressed attitudes but not implicit stereotypes. That is to say, although 
science majors reported positive attitudes about social skills in scientists, they still 
Finding 2b: Science and humanities majors showed similar levels of implicit bias 
against empathy in scientists, but science majors explicitly reported weaker 
stereotypes of empathy in scientists and more positive views about social skills in 
scientists than humanities majors. 
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demonstrated an ingroup implicit bias against empathy in scientists. Such findings were 
consistent with the evidence from Nosek, Banaji and Greenwald's (2002) study of a 
large sample of White and Black participants' implicit and explicit racial attitudes via 
the Internet (Ns > 17,000). They found that African Americans exhibited no implicit 
in-group favouritism but White Americans exhibited strong implicit in-group 
favouritism. Nevertheless, African Americans explicitly expressed much stronger 
ingroup favouritism in self-reports. Furthermore, when playing a video game 
simulating a police chase, African American and White American participants were 
found equally likely to harbour implicit stereotypes associating Black with criminality 
and responded faster to shoot at the Black armed fictitious characters compared to the 
White (Correll et al., 2007). In some other studies, African Americans were even found 
to favour White Americans over their ingroup members implicitly but not explicitly 
(Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2003; Dasgupta, 2004). Similar findings were also obtained with 
regard to implicit gender stereotypes. For example, women were found as likely as men 
to implicitly associate women with communal traits and men with agentic traits (Banaji, 
Hardin, & Rothman, 1993; Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001) and women also implicitly 
favour male leaders over female leaders (Rudman & Kilianski, 2000). Together with 
all the existing evidence, the current findings of the equally negative implicit bias 
toward empathy in scientists between science and humanities majors add more support 
to the well-documented phenomenon of implicit outgroup favouritism (or sometimes, 
less ingroup favouritism) in the case of stigmatized or disadvantaged groups.  
 
As introduced in the literature review, one potential explanation for the implicit 
outgroup favouritism is the system justification theory, which argues that people's 
intergroup attitudes and behaviours may sometimes reflect the tendency to legitimize 
existing social norms and hierarchies even at the expense of personal and group interest 
(Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2004). In other words, for the advantaged and dominant 
groups, the desire to preserve current social status (system justifying motive) and the 
desire to protect their self-esteem (ego-justifying motive) can work harmoniously 
together to produce ingroup favouritism implicitly and explicitly. However, for the 
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disadvantaged and stigmatized group, the two motivations work in opposition – the 
desire to protect self-esteem should lead to ingroup favouritism, but the desire to 
maintain current social arrangements leads to outgroup favouritism. In this case, for 
members of the stigmatized groups, that are the participants studying science in the 
present study, there are two independent sources of implicit attitudes with opposite 
directions. The first source, consistent with social identity theory, relies on people's 
group membership as a meaningful source for self-esteem and should promote more 
positive attitudes toward ingroups relative to outgroups. The second source, consistent 
with the system justification theory, is the mainstream culture's imposition of common 
beliefs on particular groups (Dasgupta, 2004). Thus, for science majors, the supposed 
implicit likings for the ingroups (e.g., positive implicit attitudes toward empathy in 
scientists) could be attenuated or even transformed into negative views of their own 
empathetic ability by the cultural construal of their group (e.g., the image of socially 
deviant scientists), whereas for the humanities majors, implicit bias toward the 
outgroups (e.g., negative implicit attitudes toward empathy in scientists) might be 
exacerbated by the cultural construal of their group (e.g., people studying social 
sciences and humanities are better at interpersonal relations than scientists).  
 
Such findings suggest that people don’t always show more positive views about ingroup 
members as the social identity theory predicts. When implicit measures are applied, 
mixed attitudes toward ingroups can be found, suggesting that people, even those in the 
stigmatized groups, also possess a tendency to justify the existing status of social 
arrangements.  
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6.4.2.3. Are people with dissonant identities (i.e., women in science and men in 
humanities) less stereotypical about empathy in scientists than those with 
consistent identities (i.e., women in humanities and men in science)? 
Moreover, when examining the interaction effect of gender and academic field on 
stereotypes of empathy in scientists, different gendered patterns were only observed in 
implicit, but not explicit, stereotypes between science and humanities majors.  
 
Specifically, for science majors, women showed weaker implicit bias against empathy 
in scientists than their male counterparts; but for those majoring in humanities, it was 
men who instead showed weaker implicit bias against empathy in scientists than women. 
 
Nevertheless, no interaction between gender and academic field was found on either 
SSE-Explicit or ISSOS scores. For both science and humanities majors, women scored 
lower in SSE-Explicit and more negative in ISSOS than men, meaning that women had 
weaker explicit biases as well as more positive views about empathy in scientists than 
men regardless of the academic field. These differences were summarized as below: 
 
As introduced in the literature review, according to the Social Identity Theory (SIT) of 
explicit cognitions (Tajfel & Turner, 2001), men majoring in science who have 
relatively lower self-evaluated empathy than their female counterparts should have 
been more motivated to show more positive views about empathy in scientists in order 
to promote their personal self-esteem in empathy. However, such prediction was not 
supported in the present study and women consistently displayed more positive views 
about empathy in scientists than men regardless of their identified academic field.  
 
Finding 2c: Female science majors and male humanities majors showed weaker 
implicit bias against empathy in scientists than male science majors and female 
humanities majors, respectively. But for explicit attitudes, women consistently 
showed more positive views than men regardless of academic field. 
 195 
As discussed in previous Section 6.4.2.1, the consistent female advantage in producing 
favourable explicit attitudes may be attributed to the greater social pressure that women 
face to withhold their negative views and behave as more egalitarian and caring than 
men (Dozo, 2015; Eagly, 2013; Ratcliff et al., 2006; Wood & Eagly, 2012). Moreover, 
such female advantage in producing favourable explicit attitudes is also consistent with 
the robust female advantage in self-report empathy (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983; 
Michalska et al., 2013; See Section 3.1.2.1 in the literature review for more details). If 
women, in general, perceive themselves as empathetic, it is not surprising that they 
would be reluctant to explicitly display negative attitudes towards others.  
 
As for the implicit stereotypes, the current evidence revealed an interaction effect 
between gender and academic field on stereotypes, which adds more support to the 
Balanced Identity Theory (BIT) of implicit social cognition (Greenwald et al., 2002). 
As explained in the literature review, The BIT is grounded in the fundamental principle 
of cognitive consistency that individual's implicit attitudes, stereotypes, self-esteem, 
and self-concept need to be congruent (Cvencek et al., 2012). BIT anticipates that 
change in any one of the three sets of associations – self-attribute (e.g., self (women) – 
empathetic), self-identified group (e.g., self (women) - science), or stereotype of the 
identified group (e.g., science – not empathetic) – will induce balancing change in at 
least one of the others. BIT takes associations as its conceptual building blocks and 
treats self-evaluation as an associative connection of self to positive attribute, and the 
balance-congruity principle calls for the link between the self-associated group and 
positive attribute to be strengthened by the link of self to positive attribute (Cvencek et 
al., 2012; Greenwald et al., 2002). In other words, BIT emphasizes the transmit of the 
positive attribution of self-evaluation to self-identified groups. In contrast with the 
SIT’s expectation that group members with low self-esteem should display stronger 
positive views about ingroups in order to promote their own social identity, BIT 
predicts the reverse – that those who have high self-esteem in a specific trait should 
develop stronger positive views about that trait for their ingroups. 
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Thus, for women in science majors, their self-attribute would be self (female) – 
empathetic and academic group identity would be self (female) – science. To keep their 
implicit perceptions about their academic group (i.e., science) consistent with their 
attribute gender identity (i.e., empathetic), BIT predicts the weakening of their implicit 
science – not empathetic stereotype. In other words, female science majors may view 
themselves as caring and empathetic (in order to confirm their social gender roles) thus 
automatically decline the negative evaluations of empathy in scientists at the 
unconscious level. Unlike their female colleagues, male science majors do not need to 
experience the clash of gender role and science identity, therefore it is easier for them 
to accept the traditional image of unsocial scientists. Evidence from the present study 
supports the BIT prediction and showed that female science majors had weaker implicit 
biases against empathy in scientists than their male counterparts. Such findings are also 
in accordance with Smyth and Nosek's (2015) study on gender-science implicit 
stereotypes in which they found that women majoring in more scientific disciplines had 
substantially weaker “scientist-is-male” implicit stereotypes.  
 
As for humanities majors, women again transmit their positive self-evaluation of 
empathy to their identified humanities majors, thus when completing the SSE-IAT, they 
would associate empathy more strongly with humanities than with science, suggesting 
a stronger implicit bias against empathy in scientists than their male counterparts. As 
such, different gendered patterns were observed for science and humanities majors 
regarding their implicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists in the present study.  
 
To sum up, the present study adds more mixed evidence for the Social Identity The0ry’s 
predictions of intergroup explicit attitudes. The SIT hypothesis that men in science with 
low self-evaluated empathy would be more motivated to show positive attitudes toward 
empathy in scientists in order to promote their own self-esteem was not supported. 
Women consistently displayed more positive views about empathy in scientists in the 
present study. Nevertheless, evidence from the present study has lent more support for 
the Balanced Identity Theory of implicit cognition. Evidence about the variations in the 
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implicit stereotypes by gender and major subject support the BIT theory that when 
individuals' self-evaluations conflict with the stereotypes of their identified academic 
fields, one may change their perceptions of the identified domain to keep a unified story 
of their implicit attitudes, stereotypes, and self-concept (Greenwald et al., 2002). That 
is to say, to balance out the clash between their gender roles (self (women) – empathetic) 
and the stereotypical image of their academic identities (self (science) – not empathetic), 
women with stronger science identity would decline the stereotypes and show weaker 
implicit bias against empathy in scientists than their male counterparts who do not need 
to experience the dissonance between their gender role and science identity. In addition, 
it is important to emphasize that evidence from the present study cannot imply any 
directional relations between science identity and perceptions of scientists. Though 
female scientists showed significantly weaker stereotypes of empathy in scientists both 
implicitly and explicitly, we still have no idea whether it is those who already possess 
positive views about scientists choose to enter science or it is the experience in studying 
science promotes their positive views about scientists.  
6.4.2.4. Are there variations by specific major subject? 
In the present study, participants were also asked to identify their specific major subject 
so that we could investigate the variations beyond the dichotomous groupings of 
science and humanities. As for the implicit stereotypes, no significant difference by 
major subject was found. However, regarding explicit attitudes, participants majoring 
in Life Science and Medicine showed significantly more positive explicit views about 
empathy and social skills in scientists than any other majors. Only Life Science & 
Medicine majors believed that scientists have comparable empathy with those who 
study humanities and displayed the strongest positive views about scientists’ social 
skills. These differences by specific major subject were summarised as below: 
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Such findings may be interpreted as evidence for the assumption that the science-
empathy stereotypes may change as the gender ratios in local environment change 
(Smyth & Nosek, 2015). As presented in the context of study chapter, national data has 
shown that in the UK higher education, women are well represented in Life Science & 
Medicine (61%) but remain underrepresented in Physical Science & Maths (40%) and 
Engineering & Technology (18%). Under such circumstances, when answering the 
question about empathy in scientists, given that students majoring in Life Science & 
Medicine have more opportunities to see female fellow scientists, who are usually 
perceived as more warm and friendly than male scientists in their environment (Steinke 
et al., 2007), it is not surprising that they would report more positive attitudes regarding 
empathy in scientists than participants majoring in other subjects.  
 
Another possibility is that Life Science & Medicine majors indeed have better empathy 
than those majoring in other scientific subjects, as such they would easily spurn the 
stereotypical negative views about empathy in scientists. As a discipline focusing on 
different types of living creatures including human beings, trainings on empathy as well 
as ethics are an essential aspect of life science and medical education (Hirsch, 2007). 
As presented in the literature review, several empirical findings have documented an 
advantage in empathy for Life Science and Medicine students. For example, Thomson's 
et al. (2015) survey using self-report empathy questionnaire revealed equivalent levels 
of empathy among students in life science and social science, but lower levels of 
empathy in physics majors. Moreover, Khorashad et al. (2015) even found that medical 
students exceeded all the other majors in an emotion recognition task. These findings 
Finding 2d: Unlike other majors who displayed stereotypical explicit bias against 
empathy in scientists, only participants majoring in Life Science & Medicine 
expressed a counter-stereotypical belief that scientists have comparable empathy with 
those who study humanities. They also reported strongest positive views about social 
skills in scientists. There is no significant difference by specific major subject in 
implicit bias.   
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lend support to the claim that the positive explicit views of empathy in scientists among 
Life Science & Medicine majors may due to their own superiority in empathy.  
 
However, though both explanations may have certain elements of truth, evidence from 
the present study cannot indicate any directional causality of these factors. It remains 
unknown whether it is the students who have an advantage in empathy choose to study 
Life Science & Medicine or it is their academic training in Life Science & Medicine 
improves their empathetic skills thus lead to reduced bias about empathy in scientists.  
 
6.4.2.5. Does the gender gap in stereotypes of empathy in scientists vary by specific 
major subject? 
Last but not least, gender differences in implicit and explicit stereotypes were also 
examined separately within each major subject. It was found that the gender gap in 
stereotypes of empathy in scientists was most pronounced for those majoring in 
Physical Science & Maths with women showing significantly weaker stereotype against 
empathy in scientists than men both implicitly and explicitly. 
 
Specifically, although no gender difference in implicit stereotypes was observed in 
general, a significant gender gap was found for participants majoring in Physical 
Science in particular. Women majoring in Physical Science & Maths scored 
significantly lower in SSE-IAT than their male counterparts, meaning that they were 
less likely to automatically link empathy with humanities but sciences.  
 
As for the explicit stereotypes, the only significant gender gap was also found for those 
majoring in Physical Science. Unlike their male counterparts who scored positively in 
SSE-Explicit, showing an explicit prejudice against empathy in scientists, women 
majoring in Physical Science scored close to 0 in SSE-Explicit, indicating that they 
believe scientists have comparable empathy with those who study humanities. As for 
the ISSOS results, women in Physical Science & Maths also showed significantly 
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stronger positive views about social skills in scientists than their male counterparts. No 
such significant gender gap in explicit stereotypes of empathy was observed for other 
majors. The gender differences within major subjects were summarised as below.  
 
Such findings may be explained by the evidence that, among women and men of 
comparably outstanding mathematical aptitude, women are more likely than men to 
have outstanding empathetic skills (Ceci & Williams, 2010). Valla et al., (2010) found 
that being in a scientific field of study was associated with poor empathising skills in 
men, but not in women. Based on this finding, Valla et al., (2010) proposed an 
interesting idea that men's choices of major subject may be determined more by their 
weakness than their strengths: men's choice of a science subject could be associated 
with weakness in empathising skills but women's choice of science subject are more 
associated with their strength in mathematical abilities. If this were the case, when 
women enter science field, they seem to do so because they are good at a particular 
scientific subject, whereas men may enter a scientific field more specifically when they 
have empathising difficulties regardless of their subject-related abilities (Valla et al., 
2010).  
 
Following this assumption, it is possible that men in Physical Science & Maths in fact 
have poor empathy while their female counterparts don't have such difficulty, therefore 
a gender disparity could emerge in their perceptions about empathy in scientists. 
Moreover, as presented before, Physical Science and Maths have remained male-
dominant disciplines with almost 60% of the students are male. As such, men in these 
fields are more likely to identify with the stereotypical image of scientists, while their 
female counterparts have overcome the barriers of stereotypes of scientists thus are 
Finding 2e: Gender gap in stereotypes of empathy in scientists was mostly 
pronounced for Physical Science & Maths majors. Women majoring in Physical 
Science & Maths showed significantly more positive views about empathy in 
scientists both implicitly and explicitly than their male counterparts. No such 
significant gender difference was observed for other majors.  
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more likely to challenge the prejudice against empathy in scientists. Again, it is 
important to bear in mind that all these explanations need further empirical 
investigations and we cannot assume any directional causality between the 
environmental factors and personality traits.  
 
To sum up, the present study revealed that individual differences in stereotypes of 
empathy in scientists varied by the measures of stereotypes used. Regarding implicit 
attitudes (SSE-IAT), no main effect of gender or major subject was detected, but an 
interaction effect was found with female science majors showed weaker implicit 
stereotypes of empathy in scientists than male science majors, whereas such gendered 
pattern was reversed for humanities majors. These findings have supported our 
hypothesis that people in untraditional roles may be less prone to stereotypes than those 
in traditional roles due to the fundamental principle of cognitive consistency among 
individuals' identities, beliefs and behaviours. Nevertheless, participants' implicit 
attitudes about empathy in scientists remained stereotypical regardless of their gender 
and major subject, showing that at the unconscious level, the tendency to legitimize 
existing social norms could be quickly internalized by people, even for those in the 
stigmatised groups at the expense of their personal and group interest (Ashburn-Nardo 
et al., 2003; Correll et al., 2007; Jost et al., 2004). 
 
As for explicit attitudes, both main effects of gender and major subject were found. 
Women (and science majors) consistently expressed less stereotypical views about 
empathy in scientists (SSE-Explicit) and more positive views about social skills in 
scientists (ISSOS) than men (and humanities majors). The female advantage in 
producing socially favourable attitudes may be attributed to the social expectations for 
women to be egalitarian and caring. The positive attitudes toward empathy in scientists 
among science majors can be explained by ingroup favouritism.  
 
In terms of variations among specific major subjects, we found that Life Science & 
Medicine majors expressed the most positive explicit attitudes about empathy in 
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scientists among all the majors. Only the Life Science & Medicine majors reported that 
they believe science majors have comparable empathy with humanities majors, while 
all the other majors reported that scientists were less empathetic than those studying 
humanities. Such findings indicate that an environment with more female scientists as 
well as providing empathy training may efficiently reduce one's prejudice about 
empathy in scientists.  
 
Last but not least, the most pronounced gender gap in attitudes toward empathy in 
scientists was found for Physical Science majors. Female physical science majors 
showed significantly more positive attitudes about empathy in scientists both implicitly 
and explicitly than their male counterparts, whereas no significant gender difference 
was discovered for other majors. Such findings may suggest that in a male-dominant 
scientific domain, men are more likely to identify with the stereotypical image of 
unsocial male scientists, while women in such area, in turn, may have overcome the 
barriers of stereotypes of scientists to study the traditionally "male" subject thus are 
more willing to challenge the prejudice against empathy in scientists.  
 
6.4.3. Relationships between implicit and explicit stereotypes of empathy in 
scientists and career aspirations in science  
6.4.3.1. Implicit-Explicit correlations 
As presented in the literature review, there are three potential models regarding the 
relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes. At one extreme, some researchers 
argue that the implicit and explicit measures are completely independent of each other 
(i.e., double-dissociation model; Wilson et al., 2000). For example, Rudman & Phelan 
(2010) proposed that people can have dual attitudes toward the same object, one 
implicit and one explicit. From this perspective, IAT and self-reports tap exclusive 
underlying constructs, therefore, the correlations between them should be low to 
nonexistent. At the opposite extreme, implicit and explicit attitudes are viewed as 
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measuring a single construct, only with different procedures (i.e., additive model; Fazio 
& Olson, 2003). From this point of view, attitudes can be compared to icebergs, with 
explicit attitudes residing above the surface of conscious control and implicit attitudes 
residing below it (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). One implication of this argument is that, 
given the right conditions, implicit attitudes, explicit attitudes, and attitude-related 
behaviours should all correlate and divergence between them would be attributable to 
extraneous method-specific influences that are irrelevant to measured constructs 
(Nosek, 2007). The third intermediate possibility is that implicit and explicit measures 
assess constructs that are distinct, but related (i.e., interactive model; Conrey et al., 2005; 
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014; Payne et al., 2008).  
 
Evidence from the present study supports the third model: that the SSE-IAT and the 
self-reports assess distinct but related constructs. According to the statistical results, 
implicit bias toward empathy in scientists (SSE-IAT) showed a significant, weak, 
positive correlation (r = .14) with the explicit bias toward empathy in scientists (SSE-
Explicit). Nevertheless, the contents of the implicit and explicit attitudes are actually 
different with implicitly measured attitudes reflecting negative views while the 
explicitly measured attitudes reflect positive views of empathy in scientists. Moreover, 
no significant correlation was found between implicit bias (SSE-IAT) and explicit 
attitudes about social skills in scientists (ISSOS). The lack of correlation between SSE-
IAT and ISSOS may be attributed to the extraneous method-specific variance. As 
explained before, SSE-IAT and SSE-Explicit have similar structures that both of them 
measure a relative attitude toward empathy in scientists by comparing the strengths of 
associations between science-empathy and humanities-empathy. However, ISSOS 
assesses propositional opinions on statements such as "scientists are cooperative". 
Moreover, ISSOS focuses on the evaluations of social skills in scientists, which is a 
related but distinct concept, from empathy in SSE-IAT. Given that SSE-IAT and ISSOS 
differ in both methodological structures and conceptual substance, it is understandable 
that they were not correlated in the present study.  
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The varied correlations of SSE-IAT with different self-reports in the present study have 
added more evidence to the mixed findings of implicit-explicit correlations. Previous 
research has shown that, in some cases, the IAT and explicit measures can be strongly 
correlated (e.g., Asendorpf et al., 2002; Cunningham et al., 2001; Jellison et al., 2004; 
McConnell & Leibold, 2001; Wiers et al., 2002). But there are also a number of studies 
revealing only slight or moderate (but generally positive) correlations between the IAT 
and explicit measures (e.g., Egloff & Schmukle, 2002; Jong, Hout, Rietbroek, & 
Huijding, 2003; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001; Ottaway, Hayden, & Oakes, 2001). A recent 
meta-analysis revealed that across 126 independent correlations, implicit-explicit 
correspondence ranged from r = -.25 to r = .60, with an average implicit-explicit 
correlation of .19 (Hofmann et al., 2005). Given that the extent to which implicit and 
explicit attitudes are correlated varies widely across studies, issues of conditions under 
which implicit and explicit attitudes will correlate may be a more fruitful direction for 
future research.  
 
In addition, it is worth noting that the current analysis also revealed a significant and 
positive correlation between explicit bias toward empathy in scientists (SSE-Explicit) 
and explicit attitude about social skills in scientists (ISSOS). Given that both of them 
are self-report measures and claim to assess similar constructs, it is not surprising that 
these two explicit measures correlate. This correlation can be interpreted as evidence 
confirming the convergent validity of the two questionnaires.  
 
To sum up, SSE-IAT was found to significantly correlate with SSE-Explicit, but not 
ISSOS. Despite the distinctiveness in the content of implicit and explicit attitudes, the 
positive correlation between SSE-IAT and SSE-Explicit can be interpreted as evidence 
for the assumption that implicit and explicit attitudes are independent, but related, 
constructs. Moreover, the lack of correlation between SSE-IAT and ISSOS may be a 
result of the method-specific variance as well as the divergence in measured concepts. 
The varied implicit-explicit correlations lead to a new question about the conditions 
under which implicit and explicit measures will correlate for future research. Last but 
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not least, a significant correlation between SSE-Explicit and ISSOS was found and can 
be seen as evidence supporting the convergent validity of the two questionnaires.  
 
6.4.3.2. How do the implicit and explicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists 
predict science career aspirations? 
In general, all the three measures of stereotypes of empathy were negatively correlated 
with science career aspirations, meaning that the stronger stereotypical views one 
possesses about empathy in scientists, the less likely one would pursue a scientific 
career in the future. To further understand which kind of stereotypes can serve as the 
better predictor for science career aspirations between the implicit and explicit ones, 
regression analyses were conducted.  
 
Given that gender, age, academic field and degree level were also significantly 
correlated with science career aspirations in the present study, these variables were 
included as covariates. Among all the predictors including the covariates and the focal 
variables of implicit and explicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists, academic field 
was found the most important predictor for science career aspirations. That is to say, if 
one has already chosen to major in science in university, then it is highly possible for 
the person to pursue a scientific career in the future. In the present study, science majors 
showed significantly higher science career aspirations than humanities majors.  
 
After controlling for the effect of academic field and other covariates (i.e., gender, age, 
and degree level), we found that it is the explicit stereotype, but not the implicit 
stereotype, of empathy in scientists, that serves as a significant predictor for science 
career aspirations. Among all the three measures of stereotypes, ISSOS was the only 
measure that could predict a significant unique variance in their career aspirations in 
science. This finding is consistent with previous evidence showing that ISSOS could 
positively predict US college students' science career intentions (Schneider, 2010). 
Neither SSE-IAT nor SSE-Explicit acted as a significant predictor for career aspirations. 
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These findings suggest that it is the endorsed explicit attitudes, but not the implicit bias 
at the unconscious level, that have an influence on one's career intentions. Specifically, 
for those who have already chosen to study science majors in university, regardless of 
the existence of the implicit prejudice against empathy in scientists, the more positive 
attitudes they express about social skills in scientists, the more likely they would want 
to continue a career path in the scientific field.  
 
Such findings may also be interpreted as evidence supporting the double dissociation 
predictive model of implicit and explicit attitudes. As explained in the literature review, 
based on the three theoretical models of implicit and explicit cognitions, Perugini, 
(2005) generated three types of predictive models of implicit and explicit attitudes 
including: 1) additive, that the implicit and explicit measures reflect a single construct 
with different procedures, therefore attitudes inferred by the two types of measures 
explain different portions of variance in the behaviour (e.g., Fazio & Olson, 2003); 2) 
double dissociation, that the implicit and explicit attitudes are completely independent 
of each other, thus implicit attitudes predict spontaneous behaviour whereas explicit 
attitudes predict deliberative behaviour (e.g., Wilson et al., 2000); and 3) multiplicative, 
that the implicit and explicit attitudes are distinct but related, as such they interact in 
influencing behaviour (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). As making decisions about career 
choices is a controlled behaviour that people are sufficiently motivated to engage in 
deliberate reasoning, only the explicit attitude was found significantly predicting career 
aspirations in sciences in the present study, indicating that implicit attitudes were not 
interacting with explicit attitudes in predicting behaviours, therefore lending more 
support to the double dissociation predictive model.  
 
However, it is important to note that although the SSE-IAT failed to predict science 
career aspirations in the present study, it may well predict some spontaneous behaviours 
in other situations. After all, the present study only assessed a single situation with only 
the controlled decision making as the outcome. It is certainly possible that SSE-IAT 
could predict some behaviours that tend to be out of one's conscious awareness such as 
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people's tendency to interact with scientists as compared with humanities majors in a 
social situation when the information about major subject is primed.  
 
Moreover, the current evidence should not be taken directly as evidence of the 
superiority of the double dissociation model. It is possible that there will be conditions 
where the additive or multiplicative models might provide a better explanation of the 
results. For example, research about people's defensive and secure self-esteem has 
revealed evidence to support the multiplicative model that implicit and explicit self-
esteem work together to predict behaviours. Specifically, people with secure self-
esteem (i.e., the congruence between high implicit self-esteem and high explicit self-
esteem) have been found to be less narcissistic, to show less in-group bias, and to 
engage less in dissonance reduction compared to participants with defensive self-
esteem (e.g., low implicit self-esteem but high explicit self-esteem; Jordan et al., 2003). 
Therefore, research needs to be extended to more behaviours and situations to test for 
alternative predictive models in the future.  
 
6.4.4. Limitations of the present study and suggestions for future research 
The present study has a number of limitations. Firstly, although SSE-IAT performed 
well in documenting individual differences in stereotypes in the present study, future 
research to particularly examine its psychometric properties would be desirable. Due to 
the time constraint of my PhD study, after we modified the SE-IAT to the SSE-IAT in 
Stage 2, the SSE-IAT was directly applied in Stage 3 without conducting a pilot study 
with an independent group of participants to establish its reliability and validity. 
Although the implicit-explicit correlations between SSE-IAT and SSE-Explicit found 
in the present study may be interpreted as evidence for the convergent validity of the 
SSE-IAT, there are many other important psychometric indicators that remain untested. 
For example, given that SSE-IAT failed to predict science career aspirations in the 
present study, future studies are needed to establish the predictive validity of the SSE-
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IAT by examining its relationship with more spontaneous behaviours. Additional 
evidence supporting test-retest reliability, as well as its correlations with other implicit 
measures for SSE-IAT, is also desirable. It is also worth noting that “science and 
humanities” were used as the category labels throughout the present study. However, 
researchers should consider using the “sciences” as a more precise label for SSE-IAT 
in their future studies.   
 
Moreover, it is worth noting that SSE-IAT still only revealed a relative implicit attitude 
that people automatically associate empathy more likely with humanities rather than 
science. Participants' absolute evaluation of the implicit association between empathy 
and science remains unknown. As demonstrated in Stage 2, we found a few 
psychometric problems with the standard SE-IAT for there is no clear opposite category 
to the focal attribute concept of empathy. Given that was the case, the controversial 
attribute rationality was dropped and the modified SSE-IAT with only the single 
attribute of empathy was applied in the last phase of the project (Stage 3). Nevertheless, 
the SSE-IAT still contains two target concepts (i.e., science and humanities), therefore 
it also only assesses a relative attitude by comparing the strengths of associations 
between science-empathy and humanities-empathy. In order to assess the absolute 
implicit attitude toward empathy in scientists, it would be necessary to assess the 
implicit science-empathy association independently from the implicit humanities-
empathy association. This would require a reliable and valid single-attribute, single-
target association test – that is, implicit procedures that purely assess associations 
between two concepts. However, reported reliabilities and validities of the existing 
available candidate methods such as the Go/No-Go Task (Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2014) 
and the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (Houwer & Bruycker, 2007) are discouraging. 
To close this research gap, the development of new implicit measurements for the 
reliable evaluation of the strength of simple associations between one target concept 
and one attribute concept will be an important task for the years to come.  
 
In addition, there are also limitations with the applied explicit measures. As for the 
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SSE-Explicit, though it was designed to resemble the structure of the SSE-IAT, it is 
comprised of only three questions and may not be a psychometrically sound tool to 
assess explicit stereotypes about empathy in scientists. An improved version of the 
SSE-Explicit may use all the stimulus items in the SSE-IAT to form a longer 
questionnaire. That is to say, instead of asking participants to rate the simple statement 
"scientists are less empathetic than those who study humanities" using only the category 
label of the attribute (i.e., empathy), a series of questions can be developed using the 
items representing the category that ask participants to specifically rate statements such 
as "scientists are less cooperative/considerate/affectionate/emotional than those who 
study humanities". Future studies using the improved version of the SSE-Explicit may 
reveal a stronger correlation with the SSE-IAT due to the closer structural 
correspondence between the two measures.  
 
Moreover, as mentioned before, the present study only assessed a single situation with 
only one measurement for the implicit stereotypes. Though current evidence supports 
the theory that implicit and explicit attitudes are distinct but related constructs, we 
cannot exclude the possibility that studies using other implicit measures assessing 
different attitudes may tell a completely different story about the relations between 
implicit and explicit cognition. Also, when examining the predictive ability of the 
implicit and explicit stereotypes, we only included controlled decision making as the 
outcome behaviour. It would be desirable for future studies to apply different types of 
implicit and explicit measures to predict both related spontaneous and deliberate 
behaviours when examining the predictive models of the implicit and explicit attitudes.  
 
Limitations also exist with regard to the study design. Given that scientists are often 
depicted as men (Cai et al., 2016; Miller et al., 2018) and men are often seen as socially 
insensitive (Hall & Mast, 2008), it remains unclear if the implicit bias against empathy 
in scientists found in the present study is actually a byproduct of the prejudice against 
empathy in men. To control for the potential confounding gender effect, future studies 
may use pictures of both female and male scientists to replace words as stimuli in the 
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IAT. Moreover, there may also exist an interactive gender effect between agent and 
target. That is to say, female and male participants' attitudes toward empathy in 
scientists may differ by the gender of the target scientists. It would be ideal to conduct 
a study that systematically assesses both female and male participants' implicit and 
explicit attitudes toward empathy in both female and male scientists.  
 
In addition, it is necessary to point out that the present study, as a cross-sectional study, 
lacks the statistical power to substantiate the direction of the relationships under 
investigation. The regression analyses in the present study could only indicate how 
changes in the independent variables (i.e., stereotypes of empathy in scientists) are 
associated with changes in the dependent variables (i.e., science career aspirations), and 
did not imply any causal relations. It is very likely that stereotyping of scientists and 
science career aspirations are bi-directional in influence. In order to account for the 
reciprocal influences entailed in the stereotyping of scientists – aspirations in science 
interaction, future studies could adopt a longitudinal study design with more advanced 
statistical methods, such as growth curve modelling (Curran, Obeidat, & Losardo, 
2010).  
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Chapter 7  General Discussion 
In this final chapter, a brief summary of the main findings of the current study will be 
presented. Major contributions and implications will also be discussed. At last, 
limitations and directions for future research are noted.  
 
7.1. Summary of findings 
This thesis is based upon three stages of research that embraced a systematic 
development of a new Implicit Association Test (IAT), a test of the psychometric 
properties of the IAT in order to address its psychometric issues. The test was modified 
before being applied in the main research to ensure its soundness for gauging 
participants’ unconscious bias towards empathy in scientists. In the third research stage, 
both the modified newly developed IAT and questionnaires were applied to assess 
individual differences in both implicit and explicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists 
as well as their potential relationship with aspirations for science careers among 
university students in the UK. Specifically, the present study sought to answer the 
following research questions:  
 
1. What are the implicit and explicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists among UK 
university students nowadays? 
2. What are the individual differences in the implicit and explicit stereotypes of 
empathy in scientists by gender and major subject? 
3. How do the implicit and explicit stereotypes of empathy relate to students’ career 
aspirations in science?   
 
Regarding the first research question, evidence from Chapter 6 indicates that 
participants still held an implicit bias against empathy in scientists but explicitly 
reported positive views regarding empathy and social skills in scientists. The 
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discrepancy found in the context of implicit and explicit perceptions of empathy in 
scientists suggests that university students possess strong default assumption of 
“socially clumsy” scientists but are aware that these are stereotypes, thus deliberately 
reject them in self-reports. This nuanced effect of students consciously being aware of 
stereotyping scientists’ interpersonal skills while at the same time reproducing them in 
a spontaneous manner shows how difficult it is to change old, sturdy stereotypical 
image of scientists. As Tintori & Palomba (2017) has put forth in Turn on the light on 
science: "In spite of the reality…For centuries, the Western model of science has been 
simple: we relied on geniuses; our most revolutionary breakthroughs have typically 
emerged from individuals, working by themselves. This is not true anymore, but the 
false picture has remained in people’s minds, becoming a deep-rooted stereotype" 
(Tintori & Palomba, 2017, p. 58). 
 
In terms of the second research question, we found that variations in stereotypes of 
empathy in scientists also varied according to whether they were measured implicitly 
or explicitly. As for participants’ unconscious bias towards empathy in scientists, 
findings from the present study indicated no significant difference by gender or major 
subject. That is to say, regardless of their gender or major subject, all participants 
exhibited similar levels of implicit bias against empathy in scientists. Nevertheless, 
when it comes to self-reporting explicit attitudes, women as well as science majors 
reported significantly more positive views of empathy in scientists than men and 
humanities majors, respectively. Such findings are in line with previous research 
showing that the female advantage in producing socially favourable attitudes may be 
partially owing to social expectations for them to be more egalitarian and caring than 
men (Doze, 2015). Although women explicitly reported more positive views about 
scientists than men, they harboured similar implicit biases against empathy in scientists 
to men.  
 
Moreover, the present study also revealed that science majors showed similar levels of 
implicit bias against empathy in scientists as their counterparts majoring in humanities. 
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The well-documented in-group favouritism was found for explicit attitudes but not 
implicit attitudes. Although science majors demonstrated more positive views of 
empathy in scientists than humanities majors, both possessed similar levels of negative 
attitudes toward scientists’ empathy in an uncontrolled, automatic and spontaneous way. 
Such findings provide evidence that, even being in the stigmatised group, science 
majors may have incorporated and internalised the prevailing cultural stereotypes of 
scientists at the unconscious level. As described by Jost and Banaji (1994), such in-
group bias of implicit cognition may come from the system-justifying effect, which 
suggests a tendency to maintain and legitimise existing social systems and cultural 
views. Our findings on the implicit bias towards own groups infers that unconscious 
stereotypes may be particularly insidious.  
 
Furthermore, when looking at the interactive effect of gender and major subject on 
stereotypes, we found that women majoring in science, especially those majoring in 
“hard science” (e.g., physics, mathematics), showed relatively stronger counter-
stereotypical views about empathy in scientists than general participants, both 
implicitly and explicitly. As seen in much previous research, women usually rate 
themselves higher in self-reported empathy (e.g., Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; 
Davis, 1983) and female scientists are also often viewed as more warm and caring than 
male scientists (e.g., Thomson et al., 2015; Willer, Wimer, & Owens, 2015), so it is not 
surprising that female science majors would be more willing to challenge the 
stereotypical idea of scientists being socially clumsy in order to reconcile their gender 
role and science identity (Rudman & Phelan, 2010). In addition, as described by 
Mujtaba and Reiss (2014), girls aspiring to take mathematics in school are more likely 
to have competitive personality traits than boys choosing mathematics. No wonder 
those competitive girls who continue to pursue science and mathematics at a higher 
education level would challenge stereotypes of scientists and demonstrate more positive 
views surrounding empathy in scientists in the present study. 
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In addition, we also observed that participants majoring in Life Science & Medicine, 
regardless of their gender, showed significantly weaker explicit stereotypes about 
empathy in scientists than all other majors. We speculated the positive attitudes among 
Life Science & Medicine majors may be attributed to two factors. Firstly, women are 
overrepresented in the Life Science & Medicine fields given that students from these 
fields have more opportunity to observe the counter-stereotypical female scientists, so 
they would more likely explicitly reject the traditional image of scientists. Secondly, 
considering training on empathy and ethics are an essential part of their education, 
students majoring in Life Science & Medicine may indeed be more empathetic than 
other majors (Billington et al., 2007; Khorashad et al., 2015), therefore would have 
more positive views on empathy in scientists. However, it is worth mentioning that 
evidence from the present study only demonstrated that certain individuals had more 
positive views about empathy in scientists than others, and hence why they held these 
counter-stereotypical views merits further empirical investigation - all the potential 
explanations herein are just hypotheses.  
 
Finally, regarding the third research question, we also examined the relationship 
between implicit and explicit stereotypes and career aspirations in science. Confirming 
the double-dissociation theoretical model of implicit and explicit cognition, only the 
explicit stereotype of social skills in scientists was found significantly correlated with 
participants’ career aspirations in science. According to the double-dissociation theory, 
implicit attitudes predict spontaneous behaviour, whereas explicit attitudes predict 
deliberative behaviour (Asendorpf et al., 2002). Taking into account that selecting a 
career path is no doubt an important decision such that every individual in such a 
scenario would engage in considerable amount of introspection, it is understandable 
that only the explicit stereotype is related. However, it is important to bear in mind that 
it was the participants’ major subject choice at the higher education level that accounted 
for the most variance in their career choice in the present study (66%), while explicit 
stereotypes of empathy in scientists only accounted for a very small proportion (1%). 
That is to say, if participants have already chosen to study science in universities, they 
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are very likely to continue their career path in science. Therefore, a more promising 
research direction may be to investigate the correlation between stereotypes of empathy 
in scientists and major choice for A-level students.  
 
7.2. Contributions and implications 
The present study has made contributions to the research fields of the IAT, social 
psychology of implicit and explicit stereotypes as well as the gender gap in math-
intensive STEM fields.  
 
Regarding contributions to the research of the IAT, the current work developed and 
modified a new IAT to test implicit stereotypes of empathy in scientists. This thesis 
summarised a systematic procedure of developing an IAT. As shown in the present 
study, the IAT effect can be contaminated by many construct-unrelated variables, and 
many problems may arise during the process of developing an IAT, obliging researchers 
to show scientific responsibility in using the IAT paradigm to customize their own 
implicit tests. Therefore, it is deemed important for researchers to provide a holistic 
approach for designing an IAT and highlights several important remedies for the 
respective contaminants. A three-step approach to develop and computerise an IAT has 
been presented in this thesis as a robust example for future researchers to follow the 
relevant steps in order to create their own IAT.  
 
In addition, when examining the psychometric properties of the preliminary SE-IAT in 
Stage 2, a major limitation of the traditional IAT in the assessment of contrasting 
categories has been highlighted (Karpinski & Steinman, 2006; Lane et al., 2007; Nosek, 
Greenwald, et al., 2007). When using the traditional IAT, it is unclear if an individual's 
score is based on a strong preference toward the attribute of interest (e.g., empathy) in 
one group, or an aversion toward the contrast attribute (e.g., rationality) in the other 
group, or a combination of both preference and aversion. Unlike "male" and "female", 
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which are the two dimensions of one concept "gender", "rationality" and "empathy" are 
two independent concepts, therefore leading the SE-IAT to measure more than one 
construct. Instead of focusing on associations between empathy and science, it lumps 
the evaluations of associations of science-empathy, science-rationality, humanities-
empathy and humanities-rationality altogether, thereby creating much "noise" in the 
test and potentially reducing its reliability and validity. To address this limitation, we 
employed a variant of the IAT – the Single-category IAT – to modify the SE-IAT to 
the SSE-IAT by dropping the category of rationality. As a relatively novel implicit 
measurement, there are only a limited number of studies using the Single-category IAT 
method to date (Bluemke & Friese, 2008; Karpinski & Steinman, 2006; Penke et al., 
2006).  
 
The present Stage 3 study has indicated that the Single-category IAT can serve as a 
reliable measurement to investigate individual differences in attitudes. The newly-
developed SSE-IAT adds to the instruments afforded to other researchers looking at 
unconscious attitudes that may affect subject and thence career choice at university. In 
addition, SSE-IAT can be translated into different languages and used to examine cross-
cultural differences in attitudes toward empathy in scientists. For example, students 
from more industrialised countries (e.g., UK, USA, Japan) often report weaker interest 
in learning science than those from developing country (e.g., Nigeria, India, Ghana; 
Sjøberg & Schreiner, 2012). It is very likely that the varied scientific aspirations are 
related to cross-cultural differences in stereotypes of scientists. Future studies utilising 
SSE-IAT and questionnaires to investigate cross-cultural differences in both implicit 
and explicit attitudes may reveal many interesting findings.  
 
Regarding theoretical contributions, the present study has examined the correlations 
between implicit and explicit stereotypes and revealed evidence supporting the 
interactive theoretical model that claims implicit and explicit cognitions are distinct but 
related constructs. Despite the divergence in the directions of implicit and explicit 
stereotypes (negative implicit views vs. positive explicit views), we found a weak but 
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significant correlation between the SSE-IAT and SSE-Explicit scores. Such a 
correlation may be interpreted as evidence that implicit and explicit attitudes are distinct 
but related constructs.  
 
Moreover, we found that individual differences in stereotypes of empathy in scientists 
varied according to whether it is measured implicitly or explicitly. Predictions based on 
some classic social psychological theory, such as the seemingly ubiquitous in-group 
favouritism according to the social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 2001), was only 
supported for explicit but not implicit stereotypes in the present work. Although 
researchers have proposed different models for the implicit and explicit cognitions, 
there is consensus that implicit manifestations of attitudes and stereotypes do exist and 
are different from explicit attitudes and stereotypes (e.g., Dovidio et al., 2010; Fazio & 
Olson, 2003; Gawronski et al., 2007). It is of great necessity for future psychologists 
who are interested in studying stereotypes and prejudices to differentiate between 
implicit and explicit biases. Furthermore, classic social psychological theories about 
stereotyping proposed before the emergence of implicit measures also need to be 
revisited using both implicit and explicit measurements of cognitions.  
 
Last but not least, regarding contributions to the current knowledge, the present study 
uncovered that although students reported positive views about social skills in scientists, 
there remained a pervasive and stable implicit bias against empathy in scientists among 
university students in contemporary UK society. Such findings indicate that efforts over 
the past decades to break down the stereotypes of scientists have raised awareness of 
the existence of stereotypes of scientists. However, it is uneasy to change the old, stable, 
implicit bias against empathy in scientists, deeply rooted in long-established 
socialization experiences.  
 
As noted by Leon (2014), even though there are more and more women playing STEM 
literate characters in movies or television series, they are often portrayed as merely a 
feminized version of their male counterparts, with all the stereotypical traits often 
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associated with scientists: wearing glasses with thick lenses, obsessed with difficult 
scientific questions, and isolated. These negative traits may even be amplified when 
depicted as incompatible with "feminine" traits, such as beauty, fashion, social skills, 
and sexual desirability in mass media (Tintori & Palomba, 2017). With this, there is 
often a marked difference between the "clever" and the "good-looking" female 
protagonists. For example, the popular TV sitcom, The Big Bang Theory (Cendrowski, 
2007), offers a contrasted image between the well-dressed, funny, and intuitive 
waitress/actress, Penny, and the neuroscientist, Amy, who is depicted as smart, quirky, 
out-of-fashion, spectacled, and working alone with monkeys in her lab. These 
portrayals of women in science may also reinforce negative stereotypes regarding 
scientists’ empathy.  
 
Existing initiatives and interventions (e.g., the Women in Science and Engineering 
(WISE) campaign), which is based on the message, “STEMs are for women too”, may 
imply that women who study STEM subjects are unusual and, in turn, bolsters the 
existing stereotypes of scientists being “special” (smart, isolated, focused on their work, 
crazy, and dangerous). A more accurate message that should be conveyed to the public 
is that “STEMs are for everyone”. A diverse set of images of scientists, not just “quirky 
geniuses”, depicted in all forms of media (e.g., textbooks, children’s literature, TV 
shows, movies) may help expand people’s idea about who can be scientists as well as 
realise that scientists are normal people too. Another more direct way to dismantle the 
stereotypes of scientists is to create more opportunities for scientists themselves to get 
in touch with the public. As stated in the Public Attitudes to Science report, 
considerable numbers of the UK citizenry think scientists are poor at communication 
and that they believe they see and hear too little about science, preferring scientists to 
talk more about the social implications of their work (Ipsos, 2014). If people are able 
to have chances to meet scientists in person, such interactions are very likely to change 
the narrative with respect to scientists and provide strong role models for students 
aspiring to a scientific career.  
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7.3. Limitations and directions for future research 
Considering the time and resource constraints of the PhD project, it is inevitable that a 
number of limitations of the present study would need to be addressed in the future. It 
is of great importance to take these limitations into account when interpreting the 
findings of the current work. The following sections explain the limitations of this 
investigation and also offers suggestions regarding directions for future research.   
 
First of all, the present study adopted the stratified random sampling method and 
participants were selected based on their major subject from the Russell Group 
universities in the UK. Consequently, it is sensible to consider the demographic 
characteristics of the current sample when interpreting the findings of the present study, 
instead of over-generalising the results without mentioning the formation of the sample. 
Given that all participants were recruited from elite universities, it is possible that very 
different findings would be yielded if the research were to be carried out with the 
general public or even with other student populations. According to the Public Attitudes 
to Science 2014 survey report, the UK public felt "uninformed with science" and 
reported negative attitudes surrounding the communication skills of scientists and 
engineers (Ipsos, 2014). As such, it is reasonable to hypothesize that those who are not 
affiliated with higher education institutions might have fewer opportunities to interact 
with scientists and possess stronger stereotype-congruent views about empathy in 
scientists than the current sample. Future studies may extend the present research to 
participants with varied education levels and professional backgrounds.  
 
Moreover, further research may also be beneficial if we were to target younger students. 
The present study has found that stereotypes of empathy in scientists varied by major 
subject in university. Given that the university subject options are dependent on school 
students' selected A-level subjects in the UK education system, we can guess that the 
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link between subject choices and stereotypes of empathy in scientists may stem from 
earlier phases in school. It is not unrealistic to suggest that perceptions regarding 
empathy in scientists may have an impact on A-level students' school subject choices 
as well as their future major choices in university. Thus, further empirical evidence is 
required to examine the hypothesized relationships between stereotypes of empathy in 
scientists, A-level subject choices and university course intentions among secondary 
school students.   
 
Secondly, throughout the thesis, we talked about gender as binary concepts of women 
and men. However, this traditional dichotomous model of gender has been criticised 
for failing to represent the experience of individuals who claim neither an 
unambiguously female nor male identity (Diamond & Butterworth, 2008). Gender 
binarism classifies gender into two distinct entities, assuming men adhere to traditional 
masculine traits and women to those that are feminine (Kay & Stewart, 2001). 
Nevertheless, not all women are feminine and not all men are masculine. It is possible 
that certain people identify with traits opposite to their biological sex (e.g., tomboys, 
which refer to girls who exhibit characteristics or behaviours considered typical of boys; 
Paechter, 2010) and others identify with both masculine and feminine traits such that 
they regard themselves as the “third gender” (Diamond & Butterworth, 2008). Future 
studies may differentiate between participants’ biological sex and their 
feminine/masculine characteristics to gain more detailed profiles about participants’ 
gender identities. As a symbolically masculine field, it is possible that STEM may not 
simply deter all women, but actually deter women who are hyper feminine (DeWitt et 
al., 2013). Similarly, there is also the potential that it may not be women who possess 
stronger counter-stereotypical explicit views than men, but feminine individuals 
(including men who identify themselves as more feminine) who are less stereotypical 
than masculine individuals (including women who identify themselves as more 
masculine). Future investigations adopting more specific conceptualisations of gender 
may reveal a more nuanced picture about individual differences in stereotyping and 
scientific aspirations. 
 221 
 
 
Moreover, regarding limitations with respect to the applied measurements, it is 
important to note that the implicit measures are not a process-pure reflection of 
activated associations and only provide a proxy for participants' implicit cognition 
(Gawronski et al., 2007). In their quad model, Conrey et al. (2005) proposed a total of 
four different mental processes that all contribute to performance regarding implicit 
measures: 1) the activation of an association; 2) the ability to distinguish between 
correct and incorrect responses; 3) the ability to successfully overcome the 
automatically activated bias in favour of the correct response; and 4) the influence of a 
general response bias that might lead responses in the absence of other available 
response guides. Several studies using the quad model have found that overcoming bias 
has a significant impact on participants' performance on implicit measures and the use 
of a simple scoring algorithm may conceal various underlying processes (e.g., 
Gonsalkorale, Sherman, & Klauer, 2014; Klauer, 2005). For example, although 
younger and older participants demonstrated equivalent levels of anti-old bias on an 
IAT, application of the quad model revealed that the anti-old associations were actually 
less activated among older participants versus those that were younger, - the older 
participants were less able to overcome these activations when performing the task 
(Gonsalkorale et al., 2014). Thus, when interpreting the implicitly measured attitudes, 
the lack of process purity of the measurements should be taken into consideration. 
Future studies using the quad model to analyse IAT effects may be desirable in order 
to discuss the alternative interpretations of the outcomes.  
 
Finally, the current research of stereotypes of empathy in scientists can be extended in 
multiple directions. Based on the current findings of the persistence of implicit 
prejudice against empathy in scientists, further questions would be why and how such 
implicit stereotypes remain unchanged. Qualitative research would be of value to seek 
in-depth understanding about how people form their stereotypes of empathy in 
scientists. Moreover, several explanations have been proposed for the individual 
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differences in stereotypes found in the present study, but empirical studies are required 
to examine these hypotheses. For example, it was proposed that the significant gender 
gap in stereotypes of empathy in scientists among Physical Science & Math majors 
might be attributable to the gender gap in their actual empathetic ability. As such, a 
study assessing relationships between physical scientists' empathetic capacity and their 
attitudes about scientists' social skills might uncover some intriguing findings. However, 
such study can still not imply any directional causality between empathetic ability and 
stereotyping. Experiments involving empathy training may uncover whether 
improvement in empathy can result in a weakening in stereotyping. Finally, a recent 
meta-analysis of Draw-a-Scientist studies found that children's depictions of scientists 
have become more gender diverse over time, but children still associate scientists with 
men as they grow older (Miller et al., 2018), indicating that the change in the 
sociocultural context within which participants are reared can impact their stereotypes 
about scientists. Future research could investigate whether different generations have 
varying stereotypes about empathy in scientists. Will stereotypes of empathy in 
scientists increase with age? This is an important avenue of research to pursue to 
understand factors related to the formation as well as development of stereotypes.  
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Appendix I Full attribute item categorisation scale 
Please rate how much you associate the following traits with rationality or empathy 
 
 
  
 
Strongly 
Rationality 
 
 
Moderately 
Rationality 
 
 
Slightly 
Rationality 
Neither 
Rationality 
Nor 
Empathy 
 
 
Slightly 
Empathy 
 
 
Moderately 
Empathy 
 
 
Strongly 
Empathy 
Affection ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Analytical ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Appreciation ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Consistent ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Coolness ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Comprehensive ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Concern ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Coherence ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Considerate ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Deduction ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Ethical ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Empathetic ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Emotion ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Feeling ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Insight ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Induction ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Intuitive ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Logical ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Ordered  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Organised ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Rational ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Reasoning ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Soul ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Systematic ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sensitive ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Sanity ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Standardised ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Understanding ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Warmth ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Perspective 
-taking 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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Appendix II Participant recruitment email 
Email subject: A favour - participant recruitment for a Cambridge PhD project 
 
Dear certain department administrator or student representative: 
 
I am sorry to interrupt you during the busy term time. My name is Yishu Qin, a PhD 
student in psychology and education from Darwin College, University of Cambridge. 
I am looking for UK university students to do an online test for my project, looking at 
what motivates students to choose their majors at higher education level. 
I have conducted the pilot survey in the University of Cambridge last year and I am 
now looking for more participants in London. I wonder if you could kindly help me 
to spread my survey link to the students from your department? For example, is it 
possible to post my advertisement on your Facebook group or add it to your weekly 
newsletter? 
The study is completely anonymous, and all information collected will be kept strictly 
confidential. The consent form and the debriefing are there when participants click the 
link and they can withdraw at any point from the survey. 
I have attached the letter of the ethics approval for you to review. This is a very vital 
part for my PhD thesis and thank you very much for your kind help! I am looking 
forward to your reply. 
 
Warm Regards 
Yishu Qin 
 
PhD student 
Psychology and Education 
Faculty of Education 
University of Cambridge 
 
Darwin College 
Cambridge 
CB3 9EU 
07709 396750 
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Appendix III Study Advertisement  
Advertisement title: Win Amazon vouchers - spare 5 minutes to do an online test to 
explore your underlying beliefs about personality traits in different professions 
My name is Yishu Qin and I am a PhD student from the Faculty of Education, 
University of Cambridge. I am interested in what motivates students to choose their 
majors at higher education level. My PhD project (in cooperation with Project Implicit 
from Harvard University) focuses on how people perceive different majors and whether 
their perceptions influence their career choices. I was wondering if you could spare 5 
minutes to do this online test for my project? 
The test itself is as simple as a pairing game and is fun and inspiring. The study is 
completely anonymous, and the instructions are there when you click on the link. This 
is a really vital part of my PhD thesis on psychology and education. You will have a 
chance to win £10, £25 or £100 in amazon vouchers as a reward for participation. 
Below is my test link (please use a computer or a laptop, the test requires using 
keyboard so cannot be run on tablets or phones): 
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/Launch?study=/user/nlofaro/contract.qin.empathy
/manager.expt.xml&refresh=true (Stage 2 study link) 
or 
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/Launch?study=/user/nlofaro/contract.qin.empathy
2/manager.expt.xml&refresh=true (Stage 3 study link) 
 
For those who have participated in this study, please do not retake the test  
If you have any idea to share with me, please contact Yishu Qin: yq228@cam.ac.uk 
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Appendix IV Introduction webpage in Stage 2 and 3 
Thank you for taking part in my PhD project looking at individual differences in 
attitudes toward or beliefs about scientists. You will complete two tasks: one brief 
questionnaire and one Implicit Association Task (IAT) in which you will sort words 
into categories as quickly as possible. We will also ask you to provide some general 
information about yourself. We would like to compare possible differences among 
groups in their IAT performance and opinions, at least among those who decide to 
participate.  
 
You should be able to complete these tasks in less than 10 minutes total. When you 
finish, you will receive a debrief report and have a chance to win £100 Amazon Voucher. 
 
Data exchanged with this site are protected by SSL encryption, and no personally 
identifying information is collected. IP addresses are routinely recorded, but are 
completely confidential.  
 
Before you start, please pay attention to the following:  
• Check that you have a good internet connection and speed. 
• Find a quiet place where you will not be disturbed. 
• Make sure you have enough time to complete the IAT test in one sitting.  
 
If you wish to continue, please click the "continue" button. 
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Appendix V Screenshots of the SE-IAT in Stage 2 
Instructions to the SE-IAT 
 
 
 
 
Block 1 – Target discrimination (20 trials) for practice 
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Block 2 – Attribute discrimination (20 trials) for practice 
 
 
 
Block 3 – Initial combined task (20 trials) for practice 
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Block 4 – Initial combined task (40 trials) for testing 
 
 
 
Block 5 – Reversed target discrimination (20 trials) for practice 
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Block 6 – Reversed combined task (20 trials) for practice 
 
 
Block 7 – Reversed combined task (40 trials) for testing 
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Appendix VI Self-report questionnaires in Stage 2 
The SE-IAT questionnaire 
1. Which statement best describes your view? 
I strongly associate liberal arts with empathy and science with rationality. 
I moderately associate liberal arts with empathy and science with rationality. 
I slightly associate liberal arts with empathy and science with rationality. 
I associate empathy and rationality with science and liberal arts equally. 
I slightly associate science with empathy and liberal arts with rationality. 
I moderately associate science with empathy and liberal arts with rationality. 
I strongly associate science with empathy and liberal arts with rationality. 
 
Please read each statement very carefully and rate how strongly you agree or disagree 
with the following statements. There are no right or wrong answers, or trick questions.  
 
2. Scientists are less empathetic than liberal arts majors 
3. Scientists are more rational than liberal arts majors 
 
The ISSOS questionnaire 
4. Scientists have fun with colleagues at work 
5. Scientists maintain friendships with colleagues in other departments 
6. Scientists do not have a lot of friends 
7. Scientists are out of touch with what is happening in the world 
8. Scientists have happy relationships 
9. Scientists are cooperative 
10. Scientists are family oriented 
11. Scientists are insecure 
12. Scientists are collaborative 
 
The drop-down list to the right of each of the two statements provided seven options: 
Strongly agree – moderately agree – slightly agree –neither agree nor disagree– slightly 
disagree – moderately disagree – strongly disagree 
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Demographic Information 
1. Which group from this IAT test do you identify with?   
Science/Liberal arts/Other (please specify)     
2. Gender: Female/Male                       
3. Age:              
4. Ethnicity:             
5. What is your current position? undergraduate/master/PhD/Postdoc/Other (please 
specify)         
6. Which university you are currently working for, if it is applicable?                
7. Major field of study or that of your highest degree:                
  If you have a second major or minor, please indicate the field of study:               
8. Prior to the current study session, had you ever completed an implicit association 
test? YES/NO 
9. Country/region of primary citizenship:               
10. Country/region of residence:                
11. Are you a native English speaker? YES/NO 
If not, if you took either or both of the following tests (IELTS and TOEFL), please 
provide your most accurate recollection of your best OFFICIAL scores: 
IELTS:                     TOEFL:                
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Appendix VII Debriefing webpage in Stage 2 and 3 
Thank you for your participation!  
 
How Does the Implicit Association Test (IAT) Work? 
The IAT measures the strength of associations between concepts (e.g., Science and 
Humanities) and evaluations (e.g., Empathy). The main idea is that making a response 
is easier when closely related items share the same response key.  
We would say that one has an implicit association of Empathy with Humanities 
compared to Empathy with Science if they are faster to categorize words when 
Empathy and Humanities share a response key relative to when Empathy and Science 
share a response key. Your automatic association may reflect your underlying attitude 
towards certain professions. 
 
However, it is important to note that the IAT measures your implicit attitudes toward 
certain groups. It is designed with the aim to decrease the mental control available to 
produce the response, reducing the role of conscious intention as well as self-reflective, 
deliberate processes. You may not consciously endorse the implicit ideas revealed by 
the IAT. Your explicit attitudes and beliefs can be different from your implicit attitudes. 
Explicit attitudes and beliefs are ones that are directly expressed or publicly stated. An 
implicit attitude is one that is powerful enough to operate without conscious control. If 
you would like to know more about IAT measures in general, please go to the Q&A 
webpage of Project Implicit for more information. 
 
If you have questions about this study, feel free to contact Ms Yishu Qin (PhD 
candidate): yq228@cam.ac.uk 
 
If you would like to participate in the raffle for a chance to win £10, £20 and £100 in 
Amazon vouchers, please clike here. 
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Appendix VIII An example of the respondent session record 
session_id  user_id  study_name  session_date  session_status  creation_date  
last_update_date  previous_session_id  previous_session_schema  referrer study_url  
user_agent 
92233xx -1 contract.qin.empathy 09Aug2016 10:07:11 null 09Aug2016 10:07:11
 NULL  0 null null /user/nlofaro/contract.qin.empathy/manager.expt.xml Mozilla/5.0 
(Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/52.0.2743.116 
Safari/537.36 
 
92233xx -1 contract.qin.empathy 09Aug2016 14:33:21 null 09Aug2016 14:33:21
 NULL  0 null null /user/nlofaro/contract.qin.empathy/manager.expt.xml Mozilla/5.0 
(Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_11_5) AppleWebKit/601.6.17 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/9.1.1 
Safari/601.6.17 
 
92233xx -1 contract.qin.empathy 09Aug2016 14:33:43 null 09Aug2016 14:33:43
 NULL  9223340 r null /user/nlofaro/contract.qin.empathy/manager.expt.xml
 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_11_5) AppleWebKit/601.6.17 (KHTML, like Gecko) 
Version/9.1.1 Safari/601.6.17 
 
92233xx -1 contract.qin.empathy 09Aug2016 14:36:02 null 09Aug2016 14:36:02
 NULL  0 null null /user/nlofaro/contract.qin.empathy/manager.expt.xml
 facebookexternalhit/1.1 (+http://www.facebook.com/externalhit_uatext.php) 
 
92233xx -1 contract.qin.empathy 09Aug2016 14:36:23 null 09Aug2016 14:36:23
 NULL  0 null null /user/nlofaro/contract.qin.empathy/manager.expt.xml
 facebookexternalhit/1.1 
 
92233xx -1 contract.qin.empathy 09Aug2016 14:36:23 null 09Aug2016 14:36:23
 NULL  0 null null /user/nlofaro/contract.qin.empathy/manager.expt.xml
 facebookexternalhit/1.1 
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Appendix IX Participant recruitment email addressing engineering 
students in Stage 3 
Email subject: A favour – Engineering students needed for a Cambridge PhD project 
 
Dear certain department administrator or student representative: 
 
I am sorry to interrupt you during the busy term time. My name is Yishu Qin, a PhD 
student in Psychology and Education, University of Cambridge. I am looking for UK 
university students to do an online test for my PhD project, looking at what motivates 
students to choose their majors at higher education level. 
I advertised the study last summer, but the engineering students are underrepresented 
in my current sample. Therefore, I am writing to gently ask if you could kindly 
advertise my study to the students from the Engineering Department in particular? 
For example, is it possible to post my advertisement on your Facebook group or add it 
to your weekly newsletter? 
The study is completely anonymous, and all information collected will be kept strictly 
confidential. The consent form and the debriefing are there when participants click the 
link and they can withdraw at any point from the survey. 
I have attached the letter of the ethics approval for you to review. This is a very vital 
part for my PhD thesis and thank you very much for your kind help! I am looking 
forward to your reply. 
Warm Regards 
Yishu Qin 
 
PhD student 
Psychology and Education 
Faculty of Education 
University of Cambridge 
 
Darwin College 
Cambridge 
CB3 9EU 
07709 3967 
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Appendix X Screenshots of the SSE-IAT in Stage 3 
Instructions to the SSE-IAT 
 
 
 
Block 1 – Target discrimination (20 trials) for practive 
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Block 2 – Initial combined task (40 trials) for practice 
 
 
 
Block 3 – Initial combined task (50 trials) for testing 
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Block 4 – Reversed combined task (40 trials) for practice 
 
 
 
Block 5 – Reversed combined task (50 trials) for testing 
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Appendix XI Self-report questionnaires in Stage 3 
The SE-IAT questionnaire 
1. Please choose one statement that best describes your view about the relationship 
between science and empathy. 
I strongly associate science with empathy.  
I moderately associate science with empathy. 
I slightly associate science with empathy. 
I do not associate science with empathy at all. 
 
2. Please choose one statement that best describes your view about the relationship 
between humanities and empathy. 
I strongly associate humanities with empathy.  
I moderately associate humanities with empathy. 
I slightly associate humanities with empathy. 
I do not associate humanities with empathy at all. 
 
3. Scientists are less empathetic than liberal arts majors 
 
The ISSOS questionnaire 
4. Scientists have fun with colleagues at work 
5. Scientists maintain friendships with colleagues in other departments 
6. Scientists do not have a lot of friends 
7. Scientists are out of touch with what is happening in the world 
8. Scientists have happy relationships 
9. Scientists are cooperative 
10. Scientists are family oriented 
11. Scientists are insecure 
12. Scientists are collaborative 
 
The drop-down list to the right of each of these statements provides seven options: 
Strongly agree – moderately agree – slightly agree –neither agree nor disagree– slightly 
disagree – moderately disagree – strongly disagree 
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The CAS questionnaire 
In your future career, how likely is it that you will:  
13. Get an advanced degree in science? 
14. Have a very successful career in science? 
15. Have a lifelong career in science? 
 
The drop-down list to the right of each statements provided seven options: 
Very likely – likely – mildly likely – not sure – mildly unlikely – unlikely – very 
unlikely 
 
Demographic Information 
1. Please specify the field you identify with the most: 
Options: Arts & Humanities; Engineering & Technology; Life Science & Medicine; 
Natural Sciences; Social sciences and Management; Other 
2. Please specify your gender 
Options: Female/Male                               
3. Please specify your age:        
4. Ethnicity:  
Options: White; Asian/Asian British; Black African/Caribbean/Black British; Other 
ethnic group 
5. Which degree are you currently pursuing?  
Options: Bachelor's degree; Master's degree; Doctorate degree; Not currently a 
university student 
6. Which university are you currently affiliated with? _________ If not currently a 
student, enter you most recent institution: ____________        
7. Please indicate the major field of study or that of your highest degree:             
If you have a second major or minor, please indicate the field of study:             
8. Prior to the current study session, had you ever completed an implicit association 
test? Options: YES; NO; Don't know 
9. What is your country of birth? 
10.What is your country of residence?      
11. Are you a native English speaker? YES/NO 
If not, if you took either or both of the following tests, please provide your most accurate 
recollection of your best OFFICIAL scores: 
IELTS:              TOEFL:           
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Appendix XII An example of the recorded trial latencies in SSE-IAT  
Block 
number 
Block pairing 
definition 
Category 
name 
Trial item 
 
Trial 
response 
Reaction  
time (ms) 
Trial 
error 
4 Humanities, 
Science+Empathy  
Science Chemistry Right 572 0 
4 Humanities, 
Science+Empathy 
Science Mathematics Right 751 0 
2 Humanities+Empathy, 
Science 
Science Biology Right 690 0 
3 Humanities+Empathy, 
Science 
Science Mathematics Right 512 0 
3 Humanities+Empathy, 
Science 
Science Engineering Right 738 0 
5 Humanities, 
Science+Empathy 
Humanities Politics Left 648 0 
5 Humanities, 
Science+Empathy 
Empathy  Thoughtful Right 1885 1 
1 Humanities, Science Science Computer 
Science 
Right 813 0 
1 Humanities, Science Science Chemistry Right 768 0 
1 Humanities, Science Humanities Fine arts Left 594 0 
This table shows sample data for individual trials. Note that an item (e.g. mathematics; 
chemistry; etcetera) receives different reaction times under different blocks.  Scores 
are calculated not on an individual item basis, but based on comparisons between items 
in compatible and incompatible blocks.  Refer to Procedure (Table 5.12, pg.137 ) for 
details about blocks. 
